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Abstract 
This report presents the results of an exploratory research jo intly conducted by the European Commission's 
Joint Research Centre - Directorate for Growth and Innovation, Human Capital & Employment Unit, and a team 
of external experts from the European University Institute, School of Transnational Governance. The aim of the 
study is to review social impact investing strategies being proposed in EU Member States and assess what their 
impact is or can be in view of possible reforms to be introduced in the European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESIF), including how to combine them with the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI).  
In particular, through insights from a comprehensive review of the landscape on social impact investment 
across Europe, and the analysis of a case study and a prospective scenario of use, the study represents a first 
attempt to assess what are the opportunities offered by this growing phenomenon, drawing recommendations  
in light of the proposal for the new Multi Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for the next programming period. 
In view of the changes in the structure, governance and modes of implementation of EU investment 
programmes, and with the purpose of supporting the further development of a social impact investment 
market, conclusions of the analysis also set the ground for future research directions on how to finance 
strategies and outcomes oriented approaches for a new generation of innovative social policies, including the 
need to define a research agenda for developing a monitoring tool and an observatory of the use and impact of 
social innovation and social impact investment in the EU.  
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Foreword 
This report is the result of research originated as part of the project 'ICT -Enabled Social 
Innovation to support the Social Investment Package (IESI) conducted by the European 
Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), Directorate for Growth & Innovation in 
collaboration with the Directorate General Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. 
When we started the IESI research in 2014, combining the terms social innovation and 
impact investing was considered by many at least bizarre. This study was thus initiated 
exactly to explore the two rapidly emerging phenomena of social innovation and social 
impact investment, and identify possible links between them, by better understanding 
the underpinning principles and suggest ways for combining and integrating their 
operational mechanisms into mainstream and new policy instruments.  
The impulse to the Commission's social agenda observed in the period 2013-2017, first  
with the adoption of the Social Investment Package in February 2013, culminated then 
with the joint proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by the Commission, 
the Council and the Parliament in November 2017, confirms our intuition was timely. 
Indeed the proposal for the Multi Annual Financial Framework for the period 2021-2027 
advanced by the European Commission in June 2018 clearly sets the ground for a set of 
initiatives aimed at building a 'Social Europe', as a high policy priority for the future. 
In particular, within the InvestEU Programme it is foreseen a "Social window" of 4 billion 
euros, aiming at mobilising up to 50 billion of investments. This "Social Investment and 
Skills Window" is expected to help achieving the following goals: (i) deliver on the 
European Pillar of Social Rights; (ii) modernise education and healthcare infrastructure in 
Europe; (iii) support European culture and creativity, through financing projects in: 
skills, education and training; social housing, schools, universities, hospitals; social 
innovation; healthcare, long-term care and accessibility; microfinance; social 
enterprises; integration of migrants, refugees and vulnerable people.  
The new impetus in shaping the European social agenda clearly recognises the need to 
combine different dimensions and domains, and that social innovation is thus to be 
considered a transversal policy priority. The Social Dimension of the EMU sees an 
increasing engagement and commitment by different DGs, each with its own perspective 
and adopting its own initiatives. This explain also the strong interest showed in the field 
by many stakeholders, even beyond their instrumental role, to adapt the EU social 
models to current and future challenges and galvanise Europe's social market economy. 
In this regard, the debate on how to leverage innovative financial instruments and 
support mechanisms able to foster social innovation and to promote scaling processes of 
bottom-up initiatives in the field of employment and social inclusion, has grown 
exponentially since the publication of the ''Reflection paper on the social dimension of 
Europe'' within the discussion initiated by President Juncker on the Future of Europe. 
Within this context the European Commission has called national governments to lead on 
the renewal of Social Europe, while providing guidance and acting as a catalyst for 
stimulating cross-fertilisation and exchange of practices, while stressing the need of 
making central the social aspect of innovation in research and investment programmes. 
This has been a central theme of the High Level Conference on Opening up to an era of 
Social Innovation organised by the European Commission in Lisbon in November 2017, 
further reinforced during the recent Conference titled Beyond Imagination: a socially 
innovative Europe, held in Seville in November 2018.  
Alongside this event in fact the Social Innovation Declaration promoted by the European 
Social Innovation Community at large has been endorsed at the Web Summit 2018 in 
Lisbon by Commissioner Carlos Moedas, who stressed the fact that ''Innovation today is 
about purpose, about doing something that can fulfil you as a human being''. 'In the EU, 
we are going to put more money into social innovation, not because it’s trendy, but 
because we believe that the future of innovation is about social innovation''. 
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At the same time, relevant interest in the connubial between social innovation and social 
impact investment, especially with regard to the adoption of outcome-oriented funding 
mechanisms for addressing complex societal challenges, has been raised as crucial to 
develop a set of possible policy initiatives and a coordinated framework to grow the 
social economy and the social impact investment market in particular. 
This piece of research attempted to address some of the foundational and conceptual 
issues that should be taken into consideration for enabling the potential of social policy 
innovation and further promote the modernisation of EU social protection systems.  
To this end, following conversations with Miguel Maduro, jointly with colleagues from the 
European University Institute, we designed and carried out an exploratory research with 
the overall aim of reviewing social impact investing (SII) strategies proposed in EU 
Member States, while defining an approach for the assessment of their potential impact. 
The specific objectives of this work was in fact to 1) Develop a thematic analysis of SII 
approaches and narratives adopted in fostering social policy innovation, overcoming the 
typical fragmentation and the scattered picture that existing studies offers; 2) 
Understand the determinants in adopting SII approaches in relation to existing cases or 
possible future scenarios of use combining European Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF) instruments with the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI); and 3) 
Identify policy and research recommendations with regard to possible implications in 
terms of governance mechanisms and impact assessment of social policy reforms, as 
well as with regard to adequate changes in the regulatory frameworks of ESIF and EFSI.  
Since we started implementing the study in 2017, the topic under investigation received 
a growing attention and both policy and research interest developed rapidly. While on 
the one side this allowed us to be exposed to a very rich set of new inputs and analyses, 
on the other, the growth of scientific publication in the field, as well as the development 
of the debate in the practitioner and policy arena, which also originated the emergence 
of many new initiatives, made of the object of this research an extremely rapid "moving 
target", thus limitations of the analysis are clear.  
Nevertheless, it should be recognised the contribution of the research to the policy 
debate as we had the opportunity to exchange insights with various experts in the field, 
contributing - for instance - to the work of the OECD Expert Group of Social impact 
investment, the Global Steering Group on Impact Investment, the RISE Expert group or 
the Social Economy Task Force, as well as the work of colleagues involved, in various 
capacities, in shaping the proposal for the next MMF and the Future of Europe.  
I am thus extremely pleased to invite you to read this report, acknowledging that the 
results achieved so far are only preliminary, although show the potential of further 
research in this field, characterised by the need to adopt a multi-disciplinary and cross-
sectoral approach, being at the crossroads of several policy relevant topics and research 
disciplines, from the sustainability of finance and in general of the market economy, to 
mission-oriented policy investments and the reform of the welfare systems via social 
innovation and in light of the digital transformation, looking at new funding mechanisms 
to support growth while strengthening the governance and resilience of our society.  
Gianluca Misuraca 
IESI Project Leader 
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Executive Summary 
This report presents the results of an exploratory research jointly conducted by the 
European Commission's Joint Research Centre - Directorate for Growth and Innovation, 
Human Capital & Employment Unit, and a team of external experts from the European 
University Institute, School of Transnational Governance. The aim of the study is to 
review social impact investing strategies being proposed in EU Member States and 
assess what their impact is or can be in view of possible reforms to be introduced in the 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), including possible ways to combine 
them with the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) in view of the proposal 
for a new Multi Annual Financial Framework (MFF) prepared by the Commission. 
The research is globally structured into four parts. The first chapter aims at providing an 
overview on the state of the art of social innovation and social impact investing literature 
and practice in order to offer a first original contextualisation of a growing phenomenon. 
Moving from a review of the most relevant drivers of change and pressing current 
challenges that European countries are facing, some of the most important policy 
initiatives in the field and narratives of change are investigated, setting the scene for a 
discussion of the social innovation and impact investing debate and related experiences. 
As it emerges from a comprehensive literature review and a look at the most promising 
initiatives implemented across the EU, social innovation and impact investment are 
probably two of the most popular terms used in the debate on the political and 
institutional changes required to address the challenges faced by European societies. 
They have come to embody a broad set of transformations in the public and private 
sectors approaches to societal challenges. In this respect, the very diverse set of 
policies, actors and initiatives engaged in developing innovative approaches to address 
such societal transformations requires a conceptual clarification of these key terms. 
Social innovation is a term developed in an almost organic form, reflecting a diverse set 
of innovative ways to address new and old societal challenges. It calls the attention to 
innovations on social and environmental services and products or on the processes 
linked to such social services and products. As a consequence it aims at challenging our 
understanding of how social goals can be pursued and attained and social policies 
designed, funded and assessed.  
Social impact investment, instead, is a term that appears to have been originally coined 
by philanthropic bodies, especially those adopting the so-called "strategic giving" 
approach, arguably to call the attention of funders and investors, beyond financial 
return, to other forms of return on their investment (sometimes endowments) associated 
to common and social goods. To this extent social impact investing principles and 
initiatives led to the spread of a variety of instruments that are still being tested and 
implemented. The different financial products and instruments used under the social 
impact investing scope have been listed in this study. We have also included some c ase 
studies to illustrate real life applications of the different instruments. 
What these experiences show us is that the more important transformations, at the 
crossroads between social policy innovation and impact investment, do not happen in a 
segregated form. On the contrary, they are the product of an interaction between private 
and public actors. For a market in social impact investment to emerge, public policies are 
crucial to incentivise and support the development of market supply for investing in 
social and impact oriented initiatives and help capacitating market demand. On the other 
side, for these new public policies to be successful the market  capacity to develop and 
mobilise new financing instruments and social innovation ideas is crucial.  
Although there are some conceptual and analytical differences, it can be reasonably 
argued that social innovation and social impact investment "meet", in the sense that 
both aims at answering to increasing societal challenges by democratising how they are 
addressed at their input and output levels.  
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In other words, by involving a broader set of actors and funding sources in the design 
and delivery of innovative solutions to those societal challenges the ultimate goal of both 
concepts – and their combination - is that of promoting social justice and welfare in the 
context of new societal and financial challenges. These new challenges, but also the new 
opportunities generated by innovative public and private ideas, are leading the social 
agenda in new directions. The focus is on how to render social actions more sustainable, 
internalise social goods into market activity, promote outcome oriented public policies 
and private funding of social goods. These are the core goals of the social polic y 
innovation and impact investment agenda and the opportunities it generates.  
In order to develop this exploratory study as an original contribution towards a deeper 
understanding of social impact investing’s rise and its most relevant policy implicat ions 
we have identified a stylised ecosystem approach as the most suitable perspective in 
order to effectively improve the knowledge of impact investing principles and practices. 
The second chapter aims, therefore, at presenting an overall picture of the social impact  
investment landscape across the EU, digging into national and sub-national ecosystems 
in search for preliminary evidence.  
To this purpose, an institutional-based analytical framework has been designed 
considering the three elements of a robust soc ial innovation and impact investment 
market – demand, supply and market infrastructure, laying a major focus on the last 
one. The proposed framework, presented in chapter three, has been validated against 
the analysis of experiences of the more mature European impact investing markets and 
discussion with leading experts and representatives of relevant stakeholders. 
The framework works indeed as a draft methodology to categorise the EU Member 
States according to market’s maturity stages of each of the three above-mentioned 
elements. Short case studies of public -driven market infrastructure building impact 
investing initiatives are provided to further illustrate relevant practices that are building 
the impact investing market. The categorisation exercise in the second chapter suggests 
that most EU Member States' markets are still in an incipient phase, showing no signs of 
leadership and participation from the public sector, no organised pool of private 
investment and no dynamism in the demand side. However, there are also some 
Member States that show more mature ecosystems and growing institutional interest. 
Among the more mature impact investing ecosystems, Portugal and Italy represent two 
interesting cases to look at more in-depth. In both cases, as shown respectively in the 
fourth and fifth chapter of this report, there is an attempt to understand the 
determinants (enablers and barriers) for the development of a social innovation 
ecosystem and an impact investing market. In the Portuguese case, the existence of a 
comprehensive public framework initiative has led to focus the case study on such 
initiative. In the Italian case, the study focused instead on the current dynamic – though 
still largely fragmented - public and private initiatives rapidly emerging in the field and 
on a prospective scenario based on assessing some of the most relevant  experiences. 
The concluding chapter takes stock of the review of the EU landscape and the lessons 
learned from the case-studies analysed, offering a policymaker-tailored narrative of the 
phenomenon under investigation, thus filling a gap in the literature and providing 
recommendations on how to possibly unleash such an emerging ecosystem and market  
in the evolving policy context and in view of the forthcoming programming period.  
From the analysis it emerges clearly that the current social policy innovation agenda, 
taking advantage from new impact investing principles, strategies and practices, 
expresses itself in new forms of providing common and social goods. It expands and 
transforms the social economy while changing the traditional paradigms of both the 
market and the public sector. At the same time, in the market context, the impact 
investing approach aligns market returns with social and environmental goals. In other 
words, it aims at promoting investment that incorporates social values side by side with 
financial returns.  
xii 
This is done either by making traditional social economy initiatives more financially 
sustainable or by supporting and facilitating investment in for profit market ventures that 
internalise a strong social or common goods positive impact. On the other hand, with 
regard to the public sector context, impact investing introduces a results or outcomes 
oriented approach to public policies. In other words, instead of focusing on a top-down 
approach in the design of service delivery models, or on the direct provis ion of such 
services, the State shifts its focus to the actual outcomes those services deliver.  
This has two main consequences: first, it shifts the measurement of public policies from 
how much of a certain service is provided to the actual results achieved by that service 
in the provision of the common and social goods; second, by paying for results the State 
creates a market for such outcomes, attracting private funding for public policies and 
promoting a larger pool of ideas on how to provide and attain those goods.  
A series of elements is at the core of the transformations taking place in the design, 
funding, delivery and evaluation of social goods: innovation (representing new forms of 
planning, delivering and funding social services, products or proc esses); impact or 
results orientation (a focus on outcomes – the result actually achieved – and not outputs 
– how much is provided); proximity (solutions tend to be initially tested and
implemented at the level of decision making closer to the problem); integrated 
governance (they require the cooperation between different actors in setting the right 
outcome metric and designing and delivering the solution); high scalability (testing and 
learning usually takes place on a small scale but can be easily replicated). 
In light of these elements, the study identified policy and research recommendations 
with regard to possible implications in terms of governance mechanisms and market and 
ecosystem building for social innovation, as well as possible future scenarios for both the 
reform of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), including their 
combination with elements of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI).  
In particular the findings of the research suggest adopting an inclusive strategy engaging 
both public and private actors and traditional and non-traditional social economy agents. 
This strategy should start by convening all those actors and decision makers from the 
public, private and social sector to design a national action plan. This should provide the 
basis for public action in terms of development of a comprehensive polic y framework. 
At the same time, it is crucial to put in place a capacity-building strategy to help the 
transfer of both private and public stakeholders to the social innovation ethos: the new 
forms of action, impact assessment and sustainability enshrined in the social innovation 
agenda. Moreover, attention should be paid in clarifying and expanding the different 
types of social economy entities, as well as in making the necessary amendments to the 
definitions and regulations of profit and not-for-profit actors so as to facilitate an 
expanded access to the social innovation and impact investment market.  
These policy recommendations obviously assume and require consistent political support  
and transversal government engagement. Ideally, the public agenda on social innovation 
should be coordinated from the centre of government and be uphold on an integrated 
governance model. Continuity of support across political cycles is also crucial.  
With regard to the possible contribution that might come from the current available 
European funding resources and schemes, it needs to be highlighted how European 
Structural and Investments Funds (ESIF) are the right instrument to finance social 
innovation and steer such necessary changes in the social ecosystem and public policies. 
Social innovation is a transversal priority at the core of ESIF. It fits the results orientation 
included in the EU structural funds, which is even more relevant considering the 
increasing pressure on Member States public budgets and social expenditure, hindering 
the investments to promote social change and address emerging societal challenges. 
However, some adjustments to the current regulations are necessary to facilitate this 
role and really match the rhetoric of results orientation with the set of instruments and 
incentives resulting from the implementation of ESIF rules.  
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In this regard, in the concluding chapter of the report we provide a number of 
recommendations drawn from the analysis, in view of both promote social innovation 
and strengthening synergies with the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI). 
In fact, while EFSI aims to overcome the investment gap in the EU, it also plays an 
important role in supporting unleashing social investment when combined with ESIF. 
EFSI and ESIF can be coordinated in at least three forms: EFSI supports a project that  
benefits from ESIF grant; EFSI supports a project that benefits from a ESIF financial 
instrument; or EFSI and ESIF can jointly establish a Financial Instrument (FI) at 
wholesale or retail level. The latter can have a substantial leveraging effect with respect 
to national programmes funded by Structural Funds, by attracting private investment. 
At the same time EFSI can also help in reinforcing capacity-building and governance 
systems, two dimensions that may lack at national level; as well as in overcoming the 
geographic and thematic limitations to which ESIF are subject to. To this end, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) group, managing the EFSI in coordination with the 
Commission, has been assuming an increasing role in promoting the use of innovative 
Financial Instruments (FIs) at the request and on behalf of several Member States.  
Direct management of Member States ESIF FIs by EIB has sometimes been perceived as 
a more favourable alternative for Member States with no previous experience or installed 
implementation capability. It also represented a faster (though usually more expensive 
and standardised) set-up option for Member States. In fact, as EIB is subject to previous 
global Commission clearance procedures, the later does not have to abide by the same 
lengthy and often limiting public procurement procedures or State aid rules of other 
similar players managing FIs at Member States level, even in cases where EIB is 
managing ESIF and Member States public resources on their behalf. At the same time, 
any EIB involvement must not come at the expense of the development of national 
expertise nor ignore the different realities and degrees of maturity of the impact 
investment markets and social innovation ecosystems in the different Member States.  
The recommendations elaborated in the report are clearly made against the legal 
framework of the current programming period. However, they address general principles 
that so far have affected ESIF functioning and are thus valid in a prospective manner. As 
we are in fact in a transition phase, moving towards the programming period 2021-2027, 
insights from the analysis also contribute to the on-going debate on the design of the 
next EU Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MMF).  
The concluding section of chapter six thus discusses the research findings in light of the 
relevant proposals included in the next MFF, looking in particular at the European Social 
Fund Plus (ESF+), presented as the EU’s main instrument to implement the EU Pillar of 
Social Rights, and which calls for a strengthened effort in unleashing the social 
innovation agenda; as well as the InvestEU Fund, proposed to replace the current EFSI. 
In particular, among the innovative aspects embedded in the InvestEU proposal, it is of 
specific interest the thematic policy window on "Skills and Social Investment", which is 
explicitly linked to the goal of delivering on the European Pillar of Social Rights. This 
gives the guarantee and its social window a clear policy mandate and a purpose which 
builds strongly on social impact investment as a tool for renewing the political 
commitment on reinforcing the Social Dimension of the EU.  
In view of the changes in the structure, governance and modes of implementation of EU 
investment programmes, and with the purpose of supporting the further development of 
a social impact investment market, insights and recommendations drawn by this 
exploratory study also set the ground for future research directions on how to finance 
strategies and outcomes oriented approaches for a new generation of innovative social 
policies in the EU, including, in particular the need to define a research agenda for 
developing a monitoring tool and observatory of the use and impact of social innovation 
and social impact investment in the European Union.  
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1. Introduction
1.1. In search for a strategy to unlock social innovation policy 
1.1.1. Looking beyond the welfare state debate 
Before one starts delving into the world of social impact investment, a general and 
threefold premise is required. The challenges faced by contemporary welfare states, 
conceived as the bundle of national institutions designed to prevent and fight citizens' 
vulnerabilities (Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 2006), go far beyond the demanding task 
of a mere modernisation process of the welfare system itself. With the exception of 
research focusing on the need to reform social protection systems (Pierson 2001; Bonoli 
& Natali 2013), the available literature in the field barely offers a comprehensive picture. 
For this reason it is worth framing the analysis in the light of a broader interpretative 
framework of the on-going transformative process of society and the welfare State.  
First it is worth mentioning how globalisation processes and the development of systemic 
interconnections, along with the increasing interdependence that promotes – and at the 
same time is necessary to – answer to current societal challenges, has encouraged a 
series of institutional transformations that puts under pressure the legitimacy conditions  
of the national state (Cassese 2006). The current crisis of legitimacy faced by Nation 
States is thus strongly related to the impact of interdependence on the conditions 
traditionally offered by the Nation State to support the social contract by balancing 
inclusion with closure in a political community (Maduro 2016). 
In fact, as argued by several legal scholars, any social contract needs to be associated 
with a well-defined jurisdiction in which to balance between its benefits and costs, and 
for this reason «the level of interdependence that we have achieved beyond the state, 
leads to question the ability of states to effectively guarantee the conditions for 
democracy and social justice» (Maduro 2016). Therefore, the need to reform and 
modernise the welfare state goes well beyond a mere public resources discourse or the 
emergence of new social needs and risks. Rather it is rooted in the social contract 
dimension of democratic institutions. 
Second, the way that entrepreneurship, investment and, generally, the market have 
been conceptualised, modelled and taught depart from the idea of a firm as a production 
function to be optimised, the idea that personal preferences are given and cannot change 
over time, and the idea that each agent is only determined by its utility function. These 
assumptions have been consolidated over time, including in the public sphere (Petrini 
2009 and Latouche 2010). The 2008 financial downturn basically showed how some of 
these assumptions can fail in face of reality, with the well-known consequences it 
brought. 
According to Stiglitz, there is now more than ever a case for a general rethinking of how 
markets work, being aware that «we have focused too long on one particular model, the 
profit-maximizing firm, and in particular a variant of that model, the unfettered market» 
(2009). To this extent the 2008 financial crisis can be seen as the empirical counterpart 
of the idea of the performativity of economic theories and a suggestion to return looking 
at markets as social constructs (Mac Kenzie 2006; Mac Kenzie et al. 2007). 
Third, affected by the two previous macro-processes on institutional legitimacy crisis and 
the performativity of economic theories, another relevant process is the one more 
directly related to the role and functions of the welfare state: in the public imagination 
the welfare state became more and more as a bulwark and corrective to market failures 
(Saraceno 2013). As a consequence the ideal tension between welfare state and market, 
following the political patterns of the traditional distinction between public and private, 
became a tough contrast, broking the conceptual and political equilibrium that in times of 
economic growth and high employment rates appeared however possible.  
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The highly institutionalised character of welfare systems made them particularly adverse 
to changes and reforms, or at least made welfare systems not enough flexible to change 
(Capano and Giuliani 2002). 
Thus, bastion against market ’s distortions and negative effects, welfare systems entered 
since few decades ago in a travail phase in which modernisation strategies were designed 
and elaborated, without however warding off the idea of a profound crisis (Saraceno 
2013). Being not able to question the mainstream economic vision even brought 
someone to infer a causal relationship between the welfare state crisis and the financial 
events of 2008 (Saraceno 2013). These are ideas that experts have easily rejected and 
proved as inconsistent, however, they are representative of the fact that behind the 
challenges faced by the welfare state lies not only a mere reform of the protection 
systems and its possible strategies.  
In this perspective, “looking beyond” does not mean “looking elsewhere”; an informed 
reflection on the challenges that the welfare state is called to face appears therefore a 
needed starting point for that general rethinking warmly advocated for by several 
scholars (e.g. Stiglitz 2009, Mazzucato 2014, Mazzucato & Jacobs 2016). In particular it 
is crucial to consider that the need for a welfare state reform often crashes against a 
structural limitation of current political systems (Ferrera 2016) as well as some other 
contextual factors that prevent the reform attempt to be implemented. 
In other words, whereas the welfare state reform remains a central issue to deal with the 
great societal challenges, it is worth to consider the hypothesis that a genuine reform 
process is not fully possible within the public welfare domain, but it needs to include 
external forces that might contribute to such an endeavour. 
1.1.2. Building on emerging visions for future welfare systems in the EU 
On top of the great transformation processes mentioned above, further specific 
challenges are pressing the welfare systems in the EU Member States, as well as the 
overall European Social Model. In particular, the demographic transition, low productivity 
growth, ample territorial diversity and the unsatisfying performance of the labour market 
are some of the structural challenges threatening the future of the European Union, and 
are all related to a certain extent to the domain of welfare policies. 
Although signs of recovery from the 2008 financial crisis are now visible, economic 
growth is still weak and characterised in many EU countries by what has been defined 
the “jobless recovery”. At the same time the workforce is projected to shrink because of 
population ageing. Within this context, while gains in life expectancy are undoubtedly a 
remarkable achievement, longer lives also mean more years spent in retirement  and 
more health costs. Funding those extra years, when the number of active workers is 
decreasing, may prove particularly strenuous.  
Most Member States have responded to these challenges by reforming their pension 
systems. However, even when long-term sustainability has been achieved, issues of 
fairness and social justice, especially across generations, arise, including as a 
consequence of the redistributive impact of the new digital and global economy. To 
survive and thrive, European governments seem to need to re-engineer their welfare 
systems and combine long-term financial sustainability with adequate support to those in 
need, while promoting equal opportunities and social mobility for a fairer society. 
To address these issues, the European Commission launched the Social Investment 
Package (SIP) in 2013. The SIP was promoted by the Commission to help «reorienting 
Member States’ policies towards social investment where needed, with a view to ensuring 
the adequacy and sustainability of social systems» (European Commission 2013). While 
acknowledging the key role played in Europe by welfare systems in ensuring inclusive 
growth, as well as their stabilisation function in time of financial and economic hardship, 
the Commission also recognised that an extra effort was required to meet citizens’ needs 
while ensuring fiscal sustainability and increased competitiveness.  
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1.1.3. Implementing recalibration strategies: lost in translation 
As highlighted by Misuraca et al. (2016), the social investment approach, which has been 
championed at EU level since the Dutch presidency of 1997, and has informed both the 
Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 Strategy, relies on two distinct justifications. First, 
that social investment is linked to economic growth, and secondly that it is more cost 
effective due to its preventive nature. Social investment would be therefore efficient both 
in terms of economic growth (increased tax revenues derived by a more competitive 
economy sustained by a healthy and skilled workforce), and in terms of savings deriving 
from reduced need for future corrective interventions.  
However, despite the agreement around the approach proposed by the social investment  
paradigm, the consistency between the programmatic ambitions of the SIP and the 
reform practice is not easy to gauge. Scholars who have undertaken empirical research 
on the implementation of social investment policies in European countries have held 
different positions, ranging between moderate pessimism (Morel, Palier & Palme 2011) 
and moderate optimism (Hemerijck 2012). 
The main reason of a “lost in translation” implementation of the social investment 
approach might belong to the sphere of political cycles and political costs, as shown by 
Maurizio Ferrera, Martin Rhodes and Anton Hemerijck when they advanced the concept of 
welfare state recalibration, to which a social investment approach belongs (Ferrera, 
Hemerijck and Rhodes 2000; Ferrera & Hemerijck 2003). 
The multidimensional concept of welfare recalibration has been elaborated to study the 
complex way in which the basic architectures of European welfare states are being 
recast. Welfare recalibration is conceived as «a reflexive, knowledge-intensive, 
multidimensional, interconnected, and institutional bounded change process» and the 
notion of welfare recalibration «is based on an explicit recognition that welfare states are 
made of multidimensional and institutionally interdependent social and economic policy 
repertoires» (Hemerijck 2008). 
Through the recalibration lens, four dimensions have been elaborated. 
 The first one is the functional recalibration: it has to do with the social risks 
against which the welfare state aspires to protect, and the need for functional 
recalibration is often described in terms of the shift from “old” to “new” social 
risks. 
 The second dimension of recalibration is the distributive one and concerns the re-
balancing of social protection provisions across organised interests. The European 
mature welfare states are confronted with a syndrome of labour market 
segmentation and the insider/outsider cleavage, urging them to take into account  
these new scenarios. 
 The third dimension is the normative recalibration, which concerns the norms and 
values implicated in the dilemmas emerging from the search for functionally 
effective and distributive fair policy directions. 
 The fourth and final dimension considered by the recalibration concept is that 
concerning reforms in the design of institutions, levels of decision making and 
social and economic policy governance, and the responsibilities of individuals, 
states, markets and families. 
Supporters of welfare recalibration want to go beyond the traditional dichotomies of 
expansion and retrenchment, more or less protection, punctuated change or institutional 
inertia. They quested for empirical studies and projects on the emergence of a new 
welfare edifice. This is basically the reason why the social investment approach might be 
related to such a reform strategy.  
However, those who proposed and theorised recalibration as an effort for incremental 
reforms of the welfare state also highlighted some of the main obstacles such a change 
would have met, thus offering a well-grounded hypothesis also related to the difficulties 
in implementing a social investment approach. In particular, scholars in the field of 
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welfare state changes and reforms, argue that among the main reasons why recalibration 
reforms have been less developed than expected are the financial constraints and the 
political costs they imply (Ferrera & Hemerijck 2003). 
This is especially relevant when reforms try to pursue what Ferrera et al. identified as 
functional recalibration, i.e. the attempt to adapt to new social risks and needs that 
changed socioeconomic circumstances might have brought with them. The main 
constraint such a recalibration efforts face is financial by nature, thus any shifts from a 
budget line to another implies a political cost, benefiting some citizens and penalising 
others. With regard to the distributive dimension, again there is a quite high political 
cost, since distribution always involves a choice between different organised groups, or at 
least the removal of barriers between insiders and outsiders. As per the normative 
dimension of recalibration, the costs related to such a path of reform are also high, 
implying a change with regard to values and norms related to the role of the state. 
Finally, the institutional dimension of recalibration reforms, which deals with levels of 
decision and the role of those actors that might or should be involved in the governance 
of welfare production and provision, has also high costs, as it is clear that administrative 
bodies might not want to transfer decision power to other actors, as well as to lose 
control over specific policy initiatives. 
These political and institutional reasons explain why it has been so difficult to fully 
implement a social investment approach in the past years and, as mentioned above, this 
is supporting the case for exploring alternative strategies able to effectively support the 
delivery of a social investment shift of welfare systems. 
 
1.2. A new narrative of change for welfare state reforms 
1.2.1. Social innovation to unleash social investment 
In light of the difficulties highlighted in pursuing a recalibration attempt through a social 
investment approach, a further strategy has emerged to support the broader reform and 
modernisation effort of the welfare state, advancing on the concept of social innovation. 
According to many scholars in fact, social investment should rely on social innovation to 
diversify its funding sources and provide solutions that produce better results than 
existing solutions or the status quo. At the same time, the productivity of social 
protection systems can be increased by social innovation through organisational reform 
and procedural simplification; finally, social innovation can help stabilise the economy by 
increasing social capital, social cohesion, and facilitating interaction between different  
stakeholders (Misuraca et al. 2015). 
Social investment and social innovation are thus related, but non overlapping, concepts. 
Whereas social investment captures the «congeries of ideas about the objectives, areas 
of intervention and instruments» (Bonoli & Natali 2012); social innovation represents the 
enablers and drivers for social change, more equal economic development and possible 
shared prosperity. In fact, social innovations can help steer the market towards social 
goals, improve the efficiency of social policies and their effectiveness in addressing 
societal challenges and also facilitate life-long investment in human capital (Misuraca et 
al. 2017). 
Aware of such potential, the European Union has been devising policies which promote - 
directly or indirectly — social innovation. Many research projects which address social 
innovation and social services reform have been funded under the FP7 or H2020 
programmes. Other initiatives that centred on social innovation can be found in the 
legislative package on cohesion policy, which includes the support to scaling up and 
capacity building for social innovation under the European Social Fund (ESF); the 
innovative actions in the area of sustainable urban development funded by the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF); and the Employment and Social Innovation 
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programme (EaSI), established to fund best practices, capacity-building and testing of 
innovative policies through social policy experimentation, with the objective of scaling up 
the most successful measures addressing social needs. 
The growing interest at policy level on social innovation and the rich articulation of 
supporting measures that emerged in the last decade built on the initial vision that the 
Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA) set in a publication which focused on learning 
from over ten years of social innovation practices (BEPA 2014). What is particularly 
striking of that document, though, is that it refers almost exclusively and de facto to the 
social economy and social entrepreneurship, avoiding any direct link with debates 
regarding specific social policies or welfare state design. Rather, it presents a series of 
good practices which show what the potential of social innovation may be for job creation 
and citizens’ participation.  
This is in line with the fact that, as Pisano et al. recall (2015), the European 
Commission’s activities on social innovation are primarily derived from the Europe 2020 
Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, launched in 2010 with the aim to foster Europe’s 
capacity to innovate by facilitating the market uptake of innovative solutions and job 
creation. In this respect, the activation dimension of the social innovation perspective 
emerges quite clearly since the main objectives of EU’s action is to promote sharing 
information and stimulating social innovation through already established funds.  
At the same time, the academic community renewed the interest in the concept of social 
innovation, with a “voluntary” link to policy development. Caulier-Grice et al. provided a 
definition according to which «social innovations are new solutions (products, services, 
models, markets, processes etc.) that simultaneously meet a social need (more 
effectively than existing solutions) and lead to new or improved capabilities and 
relationships and better use of assets and resources. In other words, social innovations 
are both good for society and enhance society’s capacity to act» (2012). 
This definition, which then informed the official one used by the European Commission, 
contains direct reference to the “activation” component of social innovation, which makes 
it particularly palatable for the social investment strategy, and it is also significantly in 
line with the Europe 2020 agenda. 
More specifically, in the academic reading five key elements must be at the core of social 
innovation (Pisano et al. 2015): 
a) novelty – social innovation should be new in some way, either new to the field, 
sector, region, market or user, or to be applied in a new way; 
b) implementation – social innovation is concerned with the practical application or 
implementation of a new idea that needs to be (or have the potential to be) 
financially sustainable in the mid- to long-term; 
c) social need focus – social innovation needs to be explicitly designed to meet a 
social need, understood as something that can cause serious harm or socially 
recognisable suffering when not met; 
d) effectiveness – social innovation should be more effective than existing solutions 
by creating a measurable improvement in terms of outcomes (such as quality, 
level of user satisfaction, etc.); 
e) activation: social innovation should enhance society’s capacity to act and often 
entails changes in social and power relations, empowering beneficiaries by 
creating new roles and relationships, developing assets and capabilities and/or 
better use of assets and resources.  
This confirms the fact, of special interest for this research, that the social innovation 
agenda is strongly linked to the social investment strategy, as it is conceived as 
instrumental to support social enterprises and their capacity to create jobs and growth. 
However, current and future challenges faced by the welfare systems require developing 
a new narrative, tackling directly the design of social policy programmes, and the need to 
redefine the social investment strategy itself. This would enable to support the social 
market economy as a particular feature of EU Member States. 
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1.2.2. The need for a comprehensive policy-oriented perspective 
The key dimensions that characterise the concept and practice of social innovation in 
respect to the social investment paradigm we have identified above, and often referred to 
as the elements structuring a social innovation “pragmatic approach”, seem to leave 
some of the policy questions to be addressed by social innovation in relation to welfare 
systems’ reforms unmet. 
On the one hand, in fact, social innovation embodies new ways to address and deal with 
old as well as new social risks and needs, and it wants to be a comprehensive concept, 
able to depict all those projects and initiatives designed and implemented in order to 
respond to those pressing societal challenges. On the other hand it needs to be 
acknowledged that social innovation initiatives are still limited and normally implemented 
by private sector organisations (either for-profit or not-for-profit) at local level, involving 
a single community and a small number of beneficiaries. 
Moreover, social innovation initiatives are subject to the complexity that characterises 
social issues and the risks of failure that characterises every innovation. At the same 
time public resources constraints, as well as the need for cost-effective public 
interventions, lead to a risk-adverse approach that hinders the mainstreaming of social 
innovation and the underlying governance structures and cultural norms underpinning it. 
Paradoxically, but not surprisingly, the same factors that render changes more necessary 
also feed a culture resistant to those changes. 
Making reference to the framework depicted above in terms of political and institutional 
costs of recalibration efforts, social innovation is expensive especially with regard to 
political costs. To shift public policies design from outputs to outcomes is bound to face 
many resistances, both from the dominant administrative and policy culture and from the 
social actors benefiting from traditional policies. In addition, what would people think 
about public money spent to fund an intervention that , in the end, reveals itself not so 
impactful, either because the small number of lives touched or due to the missed 
expected results? 
Furthermore, the new forms of relation between the market and the State and the public  
and private sector related to social innovation increase the political risks associated with 
a narrative of privatisation of the welfare state. This is so even if, in fact, social 
innovation would, instead, be better presented as “socialising the market” (because 
several of its actions further the internalisat ion of social goals in market activities).  
Moreover, other big questions emerge with regard to social innovation initiatives even 
when they reach positive outcomes: how can the policymaker learn from those social 
innovation initiatives that worked? How to scale up successful but small initiatives? How 
to make social innovation initiatives sustainable over time? And again: which criteria 
might be used to state whether an initiative is successful or not  (in other words, how to 
measure outcomes)? 
And being even more operational, is there any strategy able to spur social innovation 
initiatives? Does the public sector have adequate tools to foster social innovation? Is the 
public sector responsible for the services delivered through social innovation initiatives? 
And – one more time – what is the role the public sector is called in to play in order to 
make social innovation become systemic?  
A crucial dimension that relates several of these questions regards the financial 
mechanisms and resources that can be activated in order to build a social innovation 
ecosystem and the related policy framework enabling its development. In this respect, 
the social impact investment concept emerged in the last decade exactly to describe a 




1.2.3. Defining social impact investment 
Social impact investment is the use of money to generate both social and financial 
returns, offering a way to help social organisations access suitable financing and improve 
their ability to deliver impact. In other terms, Social impact investment refers to 
«investments made into companies, organisations, and funds with the intention to 
generate a measurable, beneficial social or environmental impact alongside a financial 
return» (GIIN 2017). 
Box 1 - Social impact: a new variable in the investment equation 
Until now, investments have been made taking two variables into consideration: risk 
and return (in terms of financial return). These variables tend to move in the same 
direction (i.e. when the risk increases, so does the return required by investors).  
Social impact investment is about adding a new variable in the investment decisions: 
impact, defined as the creation of value for society. From this perspective, the 
correlation between variables does not have to be negative - the impact and the 
financial returns are not mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, the investor may accept a lower return given the expected impact and risk, 
which may only cover inflation, or may even take a financial loss in exchange for high 
impact. In some contexts, time plays an important role, since in the long run some 
social impact investments are even more profitable than traditional commercial ones. 
Social impact investment can be used to finance the day-to-day delivery of a specific 
programme, such as upfront funding to deliver an outcomes-based contract, or it can be 
used to help enterprises realise their mission over the long term by helping them develop 
their strategy and service model and expand their operations. 
Outcome-based contracts tie at least a portion of a contractor’s payment, contract 
extensions or contract renewals to the achievement of specific outcomes that are 
measurable and can be predicted. Under these contracts, social service providers need 
liquidity to operate while they wait for the revenues to flow in. Outcome-based contracts 
require a focus on the consequences of a given set of activities and outputs. The focus is 
therefore placed on the outcome to be achieved and not on the service or good provided. 
They trigger innovation along the process, as they chance the set of behavioural 
incentives and drive efficiency and effectiveness. 
On the contrary, output-based contracts are about achieving several key performance 
indicators, independently of their outcomes. The focus is on how much is provided of a 
certain service or good, regardless the final outcome. In addressing social challenges, in 
specific situations, the link between payment and outputs might even be perverse (e.g. if  
contracts are based on the number of child in care hosted in a centre, the same 
institution has no financial incentive to prevent children to get that unfortunate path).  
The term social impact investment has been originally coined by philanthropic bodies, 
especially those adopting the so-called "strategic giving" approach, arguably to call the 
attention of funders and investors, beyond financial return, to other forms of return on 
their investment (sometimes endowments) associated to common and social goods. 
According to Salamon (2014), social impact investment practices represent «what 
students of the field have begun referring to as “yin-yang” deals, deals that bring 
together, as in Chinese thought, seemingly contrary forces that turn out to be uniquely 
capable of producing new life forms when taking advantage of their interdependencies». 
With this regard it is also clear that the emergence of social impact investment at the 
new frontiers of philanthropy is framed within the “four beyond” process (beyond grants, 
beyond foundations, beyond bequests, beyond cash), behind which there is a common 
imperative, usefully summarised in a single word: leverage, that is «the mechanism that 
allows limited energy to be translated into greater power» (Salamon 2014). 
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To this extent social impact investment principles and initiatives generated a variety of 
instruments that are still being tested and implemented in the context of current social 
and institutional transformations. 
The different financial products and instruments used under the social impact investment 
scope have become more and more interesting to understand possible developments and 
contributions of such a phenomenon. 
In practice, social impact investment has been mainly used to refer to a broad spectrum 
of financial instruments that runs from socially-conscious investments or responsible and 
sustainable investment to philanthropy. It includes all forms of capital that include social 
change as an important decision variable. Figure 1 illustrates this spectrum. 
Figure 1 - The spectrum of social impact investment 
 
Source: UK NAB 2017. 
On one side of the spectrum, there are profit-first investors. Their driving force is not the 
impact created although their due diligence process includes an assessment of societal 
consequences. Impact is not a criterion but a limit. Examples include not investing in 
tobacco nor war equipment.  
On the opposite side of the spectrum, one can find the philanthropists who are impact-
first. Their due diligence starts on the impact potential assessment and not on the 
financial viability. They usually combine financial support in hybrid formats, such as 
mixing grant money with patient capital lending, and/or financial support with non-
financial support to the social service providers. They accept a financial return, although 
their priority is to guarantee social impact.  
Social impact investments can be made by mixing motivations (spectrum above) and 
across different asset classes. They often result from adapting and combining existing 
financial instruments. Investors, governments, intermediaries and social organisations 
have showed signs of cutting edge financial innovation, by the articulation of motivations 
and resources towards a common goal. Moreover, these investments can yield a wide 
range of financial returns, attracting multiple types of investors that provide different 
forms of capital (patient, subordinated, etc.). As we will see in Chapter 2, Social Impact  
Bonds (SIBs) are the more well-known example amongst many others. 
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1.3. Social impact investment: helicopter view of a rising industry 
1.3.1. In between social market economy and policy experimentation 
A first inquiry into the available narratives on social impact investment reveals many 
possible ways to look at the phenomenon. What seems to be especially relevant with 
regard to the need of a further effort in investigating and exploring social impact 
investment practices is that, based on the review of the literature, several open issues 
and some shortcomings can be identified. 
First, among the entire literature production on social impact investment there is not 
much scientific literature and the limited academic work in this areas comes, mostly, 
from the management and economic domains (Wong et al. 2013; Nicholls & Tomkinson 
2013), not from the public policy studies field. So-called grey-literature is predominant, 
coming especially from those organisations that are trying to position themselves in this 
new rising market. 
Second, taking into consideration also those reflections that informed the public debate 
on the rise of social impact investment, it must be acknowledged a growing polarisation 
between hype and scepticism: some, present impact investing as the panacea of every 
society’s illness, others argue that it is a neoliberal attempt to destroy all the institutional 
and political legacy received from the past century’s welfare state (McHugh et al. 2013; 
Joy & Shields 2013). 
Third, even those scholars and practitioners who got involved with the topic without any 
ideological shortcomings, often look at Social impact investment from a too narrow 
perspective, and without any significant insight from empirical studies, generating in such 
a way many partial narratives, strictly bonded to limited fields of already developed 
streams of study, such as those on third sector (Joy & Shields 2013), social enterprises 
(Venturi 2015), philanthropy (Salamon 2014), and sustainable/ethical investment. 
These ways to look at the phenomenon are those mainly advanced also in the available 
grey-literature that spread since 2010. Although not always fully developed, these 
narratives often overlap, bringing into the debate cross-cutting issues such as hybrid 
organisations, regulatory frameworks for social enterprises, tax and fiscal incentives, and 
corporate social responsibility strategies (Dagher 2013).  
In other words, there is a wide, but often fragmented, area of studies that tends to 
depict the rise of Social impact investment stressing one or another of its features, but 
avoiding or ignoring to address and articulate any comprehensive analysis and narrative.  
Still, it is possible to identify two different global viewpoints on the topic. On the one 
hand, there is a "maximalist" interpretation of social impact investment, which looks at it  
as a way “to fix capitalism” and unleash the change of economy’s fundamentals. Moving 
from the well-known shared value approach advanced by Porter and other scholars since 
at least a decade, the “maximalist” perspective sees the Social impact investment as the 
set of those principles on which a healthy capitalistic economy should rely on, thus not 
only avoiding the negative externalities usually produced by private companies, but also 
making the case of «letting the business try to solve massive problems like climate 
change and access to water», since «when business solves a problem, it makes a profit – 
which lets that solution grow» (Porter 2016).  
This shift in a firm’s purpose would be – according to those assuming a “maximalist” 
approach to Social impact investment – the concrete path towards the establishment of 
something close to what has been historically known as a social market economy.  
On the other hand, there is another possible perspective that might be defined as 
“minimalist”: this approach basically considers Social impact investment as a way to 
better manage resources for policy experimentation and policy innovation.  
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In such a perspective, social impact investment does not only work as the financial tool 
to cover expenses required by experimenting new polic ies, rather it assumes a broader 
meaning, playing as a key tool to unleash what has been defined as “experimentalist 
governance” by Sabel and Zeitlin (2013). 
In other terms, the “minimalist” approach tends to look at Social Impact Investing as a 
way to allocate risks and responsibilities (financial, political, operative, etc.) among all 
those actors playing within the social arena and sharing capabilities, power and resources 
in order to foster social innovation. 
These two main perspectives, that bring to shape the related narratives on the Social 
impact investment phenomenon, are particularly underdeveloped in the current 
literature. Moreover, both the “maximalist” and the “minimalist” narratives share an 
important feature that is definitively missing within the debates around Social impact 
investment: the policy maker angle. This crucial viewpoint seems to have been largely 
forgotten by both the scientific and the practitioners’ literature. 
The policymaker’s perspective is probably one of the most important in terms of its 
required conceptual comprehensiveness, its concrete contribution to the development of 
the impact investment phenomenon, as well as its potential impact on shaping and 
governing new institutions to be developed in between the ideas of a social market 
economy and that of policy experimentation. 
1.3.2. Opportunities and challenges for social impact investment  
Investments to tackle social change represent a new set of attractive investment 
opportunities that behave differently from traditional investments. In fact, the 
performance of impact investment assets may have lower correlation with other 
mainstream investment assets and may not be exposed to the same business cycles. 
Hence, impact investment is more and more seen as an alternative and convenient asset  
class to diversify the investment portfolio. 
According to the G8 Social impact investment Taskforce (2014), Social impact 
investment can also add value to the classic and mainstream portfolio by including 
impact investments exits across all asset classes and not representing one asset class by 
its own. Examples include: impact equities, impact fixed income and impact alternative 
investments.  
Nevertheless, being treated as a specific and different asset class can be advantageous, 
as more teams will be dedicated to these and a new skill sets will be developed. It is 
expected that this leads to a larger allocation.  
As a matter of fact, the interest in social impact investment is growing in multiple ways. 
Different players are entering the market, such as investment banks, fund managers, 
high-net-worth individuals and family offices. Moreover, original sources of investment  
have been sought in many countries. The use of 150 million euros European Structural 
funds in Portugal or the uses of 400 million pounds of unclaimed assets of dormant bank 
accounts in the UK are some of the most creative examples. 
Foundations, which are shifting from being grant makers towards seeking to receive back 
(part) of the money, have played a ground-breaking role in developing the social impact 
investment market across Europe. 
In the philanthropic context, such shift means for foundations to find a way to go beyond 
the limited flow of charitable resources generated by the earnings on foundation assets 
to catalyse for social and environmental purposes some portion of the far bigger 
investment assets resident in banks, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, 
and the accounts of high net-worth individuals.  
An example in this sense is the case of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Portugal, 
as described in Box 2 below. 
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Box 2 - Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation: a market catalyser 
The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (CGF), in Portugal, is internalising impact 
investment practices within its philanthropic duties and has played an important role in 
cooperating with the State in developing an ambitious public framework for impact 
investment and social innovation. CGF was at the origin of the first social impact bond 
(SIB) in South European countries, being the first and only investor. 
This SIB has come to an end, the investor has been reimbursed according to outcomes 
achieved and the new edition aims at multiplying the impact by 10 times. In the new 
edition, CGF was investing alongside new investors – international bank and 
foundation. In 2017, CGF will be cornerstone investor in 3 other SIBs, allocating more 
than €500,000. 
 
While the investors’ interest seems to be a precondition to build a stable social impact 
investment market, some other structural challenges need to be considered. According to 
Salamon (2014), the social impact investment practice, in order to flourish, has to deal 
with at least one main issue, which might be summarised as “no good deed goes 
unpunished”, meaning Social impact investment practices have quite relevant normative 
implications  
In fact, it is important to recognise that the shift in the locus of decision-making 
responsibility for allocating social-purpose resources from charitable foundations and 
government program officers to private sector investment managers, and the new 
investment focus and metrics-oriented emphasis that this will bring with it, does not 
come without distributional consequences. Simply put, in the social-purpose arena there 
will be winners and losers resulting from this shift in terms of responsibility, and in the 
criteria for allocating resources.  
Among many others, this is a good reason to explore the current state of the art of Social 
impact investment practice across Europe and assess its weight as well as its potential. 
This is required by the already mentioned important knowledge gap that comes from the 
limited literature so far produced on the topic . While Social impact investment has been 
studied from the third sector and government relations perspective, or from the social 
economy and sustainable investment viewpoint, not to mention the strategic 
philanthropy approach, what is yet to be developed is an empirical grounded narrative 
tailored for policymakers. 
This is necessary to make the case for their informed intervention, either as a regulator 
or as an enabler, or both. This is probably the main challenge Social impact investment is 
facing at the upstream of its development. 
1.3.3. The gap to be filled and the need for an ecosystem approach 
As we have seen before, the broader framework of the EU2020 Strategy, the Social 
Investment Package, the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Reflection paper on the 
Social Dimension of Europe are the main EU policies setting the context within which a 
European Commission’s vision on Social Europe develops, while strengthening Europe’s 
competitiveness and stimulating investment for the purpose of job creation and growth.  
For this to become reality, it is required to look at economic and social policy as two sides 
of the same coin. In this perspective, while more focussed on work inclusion, the 
framework proposed through the EU Pillar of Social Rights seems very much aligned with 
the social investment approach proposed by the European Commission in 2013.  
Indeed, modernising EU welfare systems to make them more sustainable, and investing 
in people’s current and future capacities throughout their lives while maintaining 
adequate levels of social protection seem to be fundamental not only to build a fairer 
Europe, but also to foster competitiveness and reignite long-term growth.  
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To meet this ambitious goal, also considering the fiscal constraints and demographic 
challenges still facing most EU member states, it is necessary to use available resources 
more efficiently and effectively. This means simplifying and better targeting social 
policies, working to integrate services ac ross levels of governments and areas of 
intervention, avoiding duplication and the proliferation of benefits and promoting instead 
a person-centred approach.  
Collaboration with the private and third sector to leverage public budget and to improve 
the reach and the quality of services provided is therefore key. At the same time, 
engaging users in the design, delivery and evaluation of services is also crucial to 
increase efficacy and uptake of services. 
This calls for further investment in the human capital needed to accompany citizens 
throughout their lives. Preventive and activating measures need to be complemented by 
adequate social protection at critical moments, such as the transition from education to 
work or when starting a family, losing a job, being sick or retiring. To give an example, 
both Nelson (2012) and Lorenz & Lundvall (2010) found a very strong positive correlation 
between activating policies combined with generous unemployment benefits and levels of 
high-quality employment. 
For this investment to be effective it is required to take an ecosystem approach, with the 
aim to prepare people to successfully confront risks as unemployment, sickness or old 
age rather than simply “repairing” the consequences afterwards through the 
disbursement of subsidies. For example, investing in early years’ education and care, 
particularly for children of disadvantaged families, is assumed to raise dramatically their 
future educational attainments, and so employment opportunities and future income. 
This in turn translates into increased returns for the State, both in the form of tax 
revenues and saving on social costs. Similarly, investing in health prevention, and 
reducing food and energy poverty, would lead to saving in healthcare and long-term 
care.  
As we will see in this report, social impact investment can thus provide an important 
support to the effective implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, which is 
intended to drive forward a social Europe for all European citizens. It can in fact help the 
Pillar to contribute to social progress by supporting fair and well-functioning labour 
markets and welfare systems, embedding in the institutional environment those adaptive 
mechanisms already available but not yet perceived as an effective policy tool t o unleash 
ecosystems potential in improving people’s lives, and thus ensuring the European social 





2. The social impact investment market landscape  
2.1. Exploring the emerging social impact investment ecosystems 
Embarking in the exploration of the social impact investment landscape requires, f irst of 
all, fixing from the outset a possible misunderstanding: although the European long-
standing tradition in this area shall not be overshadowed, the social impact investment  
phenomenon goes well beyond the traditional boundaries of the so-called social 
economy. At the same time, although taking seriously the social economy role within 
European institutional history, it is needed to have a certain degree of flexibility in its 
conceptualisation, in order to value current transformative processes within such domain.  
For instance, literature shows the raise of hybrid organisations (i.e. those organisations 
that mix elements, value systems and action logics of various sectors of society). This 
pushes for relaxing some of the more traditional definitions that usually depict the social 
economy as the field of action for those organisations that are completely detached from 
any form of profit; it is not by accident that some scholars advanced the concept of the 
“Fourth Sector”, showing the need to adjust and update what the literature has always 
referred to as the “Third Sector” (Sabeti 2011). 
Box 3 - European Social Economy in figures 
 In EU there are 2 million social economy entities in Europe (10% of all businesses).  
 6% of the EU’s employees - 11 million people - work for social economy entities.  
 European social economy entities have different legal forms. 
 Primary objective of these entities  is to serve members rather than make profits. 
 Up to 160 million people in Europe are members of social economy entities. 
(European Commission) 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy_en 
Due to the lack of agreement on the definitions and key performance and size indicators, 
data on the social impact investment market in Europe is limited. Nonetheless, there is 
public consensus on the fact that this practice is expanding rapidly and there is a growing 
number of players entering the market. In 2013, Eurosif conducted a survey on Impact 
Investing in Europe; the main results are the following:  
 In 2013, the European social impact investment market was sized in 20 billion euros. 
This number refers to the reported assets under management of survey respondents. 
Only actual transactions were considered. No information on the forms of capital, 
return and impact expectations is provided.  
 The European social impact investment market has grown at a rate of 50%, since 
2011. Although there is such a steep growth, this market still represents a small 
share of the capital market in Europe.  
Alongside the amount of assets under management, other proxies to assess market’s 
development and growth shall be considered, such as the number of Social Impact Bonds 
(SIBs) and the amount of capital raised through these mechanism, the number of 
stakeholders emerging in the ecosystem (namely intermediaries and advisors to social 
service providers and investors), or the number of social service providers.  
Moreover, the social impact investment local markets have different shapes, which are 
the result of their social economy landscape and social needs, financial markets 
sophistication and scale, public sector commissioning culture and policy-making 
processes, just to mention a few.  
However, before digging into national and sub-national social impact investment 
ecosystems, it is worth to recall some of the financial instruments currently most used or 
emerging in this field.  
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2.2. The usage of innovative financial instruments 
2.2.1. Financial products and social impact investment instruments 
The definition of financial instruments used by the EC is «union measures of financial 
support provided on a complementary basis from the budget to address one or more 
specific policy objectives of the Union. Such instruments may take the form of equity or 
quasi-equity investments, loans or guarantees, or other risk-sharing instruments, and 
may, where appropriate, be combined with grants» (Fi-Compass 2016).  
Financial instruments are usually composed by different financial products, such as loans, 
guarantees, equity and quasi-equity. 
A loan can be defined as «an agreement which obliges the lender to make available to 
the borrower an agreed sum of money for an agreed period of time and under which the 
borrower is obliged to repay that amount within the agreed time» (Fi-Compass 2016). 
A guarantee is instead «a written commitment to assume responsibility for all or part of a 
third party’s debt or obligation or for the successful performance by that third party of its 
obligations if an event occurs which triggers such guarantee, such as a loan default» (Fi-
Compass 2016).  
Equity means «provision of capital to a firm, invested directly or indirectly in return for 
total or partial ownership of that firm and where the equity investor may assume some 
management control of the firm and may share the firm’s profits» (Fi-Compass 2016). 
Finally, quasi-equity can be defined as «a type of financing that ranks between equity 
and debt, having a higher risk than senior debt and a lower risk than common equity. 
Quasi equity investments can be structured as debt, typically unsecured and 
subordinated and in some cases convertible into equity, or as preferred equity» (Fi-
Compass 2016). 
Widening the picture and considering social impact investment instruments, we can refer 
to a general classification that identifies, on the one hand, traditional instruments, and on 
the other, innovative financial instruments (see Table 1). 
Table 1 - Traditional and innovative instruments 
 
Source: Adapted from EIB 2016. 
 
A list of some social impact investment innovative instruments that combine different 
tools is reported in Table 2 below, along with a brief description of the main 
characteristics that each innovative instruments present. 
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Table 2 - Innovative financial tools 
 




Different financial instruments have been created in Member States across the EU. These 
financial instruments rely on a repayment basis, where capital invested is expected to be 
paid back. Also, they are characterised by being oriented towards medium and long term 
social impact and having incentive structures to promote both operation efficiency and 
impact effectiveness.  
These instruments play an important role in shaping the emerging social impact 
investment ecosystem. They are created to tap an existing financial gap, as for instance 
shown by two different case studies of financial instruments developed in the UK and in 
Germany (see Box 4 and Box 5).  
Box 4 - Revenue Participation Agreements: CAF Venturesome (UK) 
What is it? Venturesome is a social investment fund, an initiative of the Charities Aid 
Foundation (CAF). It provides capital to civil society organisations, operating in the 
space between providers of charitable grants and providers of bank loans at market 
rates. It was launched in 2002 and has invested over £12.5m in more than 200 
organisations.  
What is its value added? Based on a deep experience on charity investment and 
investee financial needs, Venturesome developed a new financia l instrument that fills 
the gap between debts on the one hand, and grants/equity on the other. This has led 
to a type of financial instrument known as ´ quasi-equity, a specific instrument meets 
situations in which debt financing is inappropriate or too onerous for charities or social 
enterprises (especially in early stage, high-risk start-ups), while the use of share 
capital is simply not possible because of the way many such enterprises are legally 
structured (e.g. companies limited by guarantee or unincorporated trusts). 
 
Box 5 - Patient Capital: Ananda Fund (Germany) 
What is it? Ananda Ventures is one of the leading venture capital investors for social 
enterprises in Europe. Social entrepreneurs solve social challenges in sustainable, 
market-driven ways – tackling issues such as education, social integration, the ageing 
population and long-term unemployment. Like most social investment funds they 
invest in high growth companies for social change based in Europe. 
What are the criteria used to select investees? 1) Strong social impact: the key to 
success lies in the impact of the target company (the investee on demand side); 2) 
Financial position: the financial position of the social enterprise is the capability to 
manage and deal with the invested capital. 3) Effective team: management skills are at 
the core of any success, without extraordinary individuals (social entrepreneurs or 
management team) success would be difficult. 4)  Best-Practice: the business model 
has to be amongst the most efficient and effective solutions in its peer group.  
What’s the investment process? Ananda’s investment managers continuously 
evaluate new ideas in the field of social entrepreneurship. In order to obtain a brief 
overview, they ask for an Executive Summary of the potential beneficiary. If the 
described venture is of interest to them, they will contact the potential beneficiary for a 
more comprehensive business plan. If the venture continues to be of interest to them 
and meet their preliminary criteria, they will arrange an interview with the potential 
beneficiary either personally or via the telephone. The Due Diligence process can take 
between 4 and 16 weeks to go from the initial application to receiving support from the 
Social Venture Fund. 
According to Fi-Compass (2016), financial instruments have two major characteristics: 
 Leverage: they can attract additional resources, both public and private in a 
matching fund approach. Therefore, leverage could be the sum of the amount for 
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example of some European fund (or EIF/EIB) and of the contribution raised from 
public and private resources divided by the nominal amount of, as an example, 
the ESI Funds contribution; 
 Revolving: it is the ability of the financial instrument to create positive and further 
flows of money – either paying back the money or through the effectiveness of 
investments – with the objective of further use of money and fund. The revolving 
nature of financial instruments allows public authorities to manage scale effect  
from the increased resources generated. 
Three key issues emerge when public authorities, through managing authorities, intend 
to face and address social and societal needs by adopting innovation policies and through 
financial instruments use:  
 Local social investment ecosystem, including its specific contest and complexity, 
which can be optimised by a real knowledge of the system and by the correct 
choice and use of financial products targeted to the specific needs of final recipients 
(i.e. chosen in light of that ecosystem);  
 The analysis and comprehension of the financial instrument’s life cycle, its efficient 
strategy addressing the objectives of use (i.e. market gaps) and encouraging any 
kind of co‑investors to contribute funding (national, regional and/or private), 
services and expertise; 
 Local experience and competence have to be developed and made use of in order 
to ensure continued development of the local social economy (through final 
recipients, projects and institutions). 
2.2.2. Role played by intermediaries in the impact investment market 
Worthy of analysis is the parallel evaluation of impact investing supply chain and financial 
instruments deal flow from both public and private point of view, as well as their source 
of funding. Within this ecosystem a key role is played – on both sides – by financial 
intermediaries (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 - Financial products deal flow and intermediaries role  
 
Source: Adapted from EIB, 2016.  
 31 
 
As showed in Figure 3 below, a chart developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF), 
financial intermediaries not only are crucial in the deal flow process, rather they have an 
essential role in the social impact investment ecosystem, by providing links, connection 
and relationship between investors and final recipients, as well as by proposing 
innovative solutions and offering advice, services and non-financial support which can 
help to lower costs and reduce risk. 
Figure 3 - Financial and other intermediaries in the ecosystem 
 
Source: Adapted from  World Economic Forum, 2014. 
Financial intermediaries that operate in the social impact investment ecosystem differ in 
legal status, size, governance structure and mission. Three main distinctions should be 
considered:  
 The ability to collect deposits distinguishes banks from non-banks;  
 Proximity to the local socio-economic context distinguishes multi market from 
local intermediaries;  
 Their mission, which is investing sustainably or not.  
Banks normally do not provide finance to non-bankable or socially excluded targets as 
part of their usual commercial activities. These financial intermediaries include 
commercial banks, credit unions, cooperative banks and savings banks.  
Non-banks operate more in markets with low financial service penetration and limited 
public or third party support. Non-banks may not only aim at developing commercial 
activities but also at providing finance to socially excluded targets. These intermediaries 
include NGOs or foundations, specialized microfinance intermediaries (non-bank financial 
institutions) government bodies or agencies, and community development financial 
institutions (see Table 3).  
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Table 3- Characteristics of financial intermediaries 
Source: Adapted from  World Bank, 2013. 
If we consider Table 3, the financial intermediaries operating under European Funds 
framework should promote investments that generate social impact in their ecosystems. 
The financial instruments should also produce positive social outcomes and contribute to 
the creation of new social economy infrastructure. Even if tailored to entrepreneurial 
needs, financial instruments should be set up to promote social outcomes. This does not 
imply, however, that investing in social goals does not generate economic and financial 
returns.  
Supporting finance for social business and start-ups implies that financial intermediaries 
accept a higher degree of risk and lower returns on the investments (at least initially), so 
financial products may be effective only in the long run. In this case, financial products 
should be shaped to maximise the leverage effect. Social investment relies on the 
capacity of financial intermediaries to sustain long-term projects by minimising the cost  
of running them.  
2.3. Project financing and partnerships: the Social Impact Bonds 
2.3.1. Social Impact Bond: principles and underpinning logics 
Approaching Social Impact Bond (SIB) as an emerging way to configure and manage 
public sector and not-for-profit relations, a preliminary point needs to be made. In fact, 
the use of the term “bond” is misleading: SIBs are not bonds in the conventional sense 
(Warner 2013). The term “social impact bond” is in fact a misnomer especially for early 
SIBs, which do not share typical bond features such as scheduled principal payments, 
designated interest rates (or coupons), and ease of transfer in secondary market (Bolton 
& Savell 2010; Liebman 2011). 
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A SIB is a public-private partnership tool that combines performance-based contracting 
and private financing. By joining the two, governments are better able to align the 
procurement of, and payment for, services with the achievement of targeted social 
outcomes. 
In the first component of a SIB, pay-for-performance contracting, the government 
contracts with a lead contractor to implement a (usually) preventive intervention to 
address a social problem, often to reduce consumption of costly remedial services, with 
agreed-upon targeted outcomes that result in government payments only if success is 
achieved. The second key element of SIB contracts is that a third party funds the upfront 
operating capital required for the program. Tapping into private capital is believed to 
bring basically three benefits: 
 it provides the necessary resources to ensure sufficient operational capital to 
launch and support the initiatives; 
 it transfers the risk of non-performance from the State and service providers to 
the investors; 
 it creates a level of transparency that provides a feedback loop that allows 
stakeholders to continuously assess the impact of the program. 
Should a provider achieve the agreed-upon social outcomes, the public sector pays the 
project, and by extension repays the investors, the principal plus a risk premium. Under 
the SIB contract, third-party investors take on social service providers' risk and can lose 
money if the program is ineffective. The public sector thereby reduces its financial risk, 
providing greater willingness by the public sector to either pilot high-potential 
opportunities or scale proven programs to achieve a wider social impact.  
In other terms, SIBs represent a financing mechanism aimed to fund mostly preventive 
interventions relying on a pay-for-performance contract (it can also be named outcome-
based contract). In this model, investors, through a financial intermediary, pay for a 
certain social service aimed to reach an outcome that is of interest to a government 
commissioner. If the provided services do produce the agreed results, the government 
commissioner repays the investors for their initial investment plus a return for the 
financial risks they took. If not, the investors lose their investment. 
The articulation of a SIB structure is at the basis of some signif icant advantages it is 
supposed to bring compared to traditional methods to procure social services. First, the 
SIB model does not rely on government or contractors for covering up-front costs of 
service provision, because this is up to the financial intermediaries that raise funds from 
different types of investors. In this way, SIBs overcome, at least partially, the problem of 
constraints to the public funding and free service providers, in particular Third Sector 
organisations, from the need of performing fundraising activities (Fox & Albertson 2011). 
Second, the SIB model redesigns the relationships between partners involved in the 
commissioning of social services (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013) and contributes to align 
the interests of multiple stakeholders with distinct backgrounds and mandates 
(Buckingam & Goodall 2015). 
Thanks to this new network of relationships, SIBs can foster innovation by leaving service 
providers free to design new initiatives to achieve the expected social outcome, by 
exploiting synergies between different actors, by reconfiguring the structure of service 
delivery, by creating opportunities of cross-fertilisation between different stakeholders 
(Jackson 2013). 
As illustrated in Figure 4, actors involved in a SIB deal are, first of all the investors, who 
provide capital for a service provider to deliver social services to a population in need and 
that are willing to put at risk not only potential financial returns but also all or part of the  
investment against the possibility that the social objectives set out in the pay-for-success 
contract are not met. Second, there is an outcome funder or payer (a public entity or 
government) that wishes to engage in a pay-for-success contract on the basis of which it  
will pay certain sums for certain outcomes that correspond to measurable improvements 
generated through the activities of prevention or correction of a particular social problem. 
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Third, the intermediary, that can play multiple roles: (i) raising capital from private 
investors, (ii) distributing it to social workers for their services during the life of the social 
impact bond (iii), monitoring and providing general oversight with respect to overall 
performance of the social impact bond and also directing the financial flows between the 
actors of the partnership. Fourth, one or a group of social service providers who may act 
either as a direct or indirect service provider or may offer credibility in light of past 
effectiveness with regard to the social problem intended to be addressed through the SIB 
scheme. In addition, an evaluator may be involved to determine if and to what extent the 
social outcomes established by the pay-for-success contract have been achieved. 
Figure 4 - The structure of a social impact bond 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The use of performance-based contracts that work through pay-by-results or pay-for-
success mechanisms is not, in itself, new. It is a logic that has been employed in public 
contracts since the nineties in both the United States and the UK (Del Giudice 2015), 
even if it is only recently it has become more popular. What primarily differentiates a SIB 
from conventional pay-by-results regards the origin of financial resources, which, in the 
case of SIB, is represented by private investors, often (but not necessarily) socially 
oriented and, in any case, with the availability of patient capital (Kennedy & Novogratz 
2010).  
The importance of the involvement of private capital in these partnerships is that the 
actors traditionally active in the pursuit of social goals require financial resources that are 
difficult to find through ordinary credit channels. In fact, the financial burden that social 
enterprises should face, in terms of guarantees or cost of capital, often appears 
prohibitive because of the standard criteria used for the assessment of creditworthiness. 
On the other hand the frequent constraints on redistribution of profits are often 
considered an obstacle for access to ordinary credit lines. 
The logic of a SIB is therefore to involve one or more socially oriented investors at an 
early stage of the design of the intervention, in which you agree ex ante the amount of 
capital required, the duration of the investment and the rules of return on invested 
capital. Investors therefore provide the necessary capital to start the activities carried 
out by the social enterprise, then waiting for the capital to be returned, downstream and 
with interest, from the public administration, by quantifying social achievements. The 
role of the public sector is thus twofold: measuring the savings resulting from the social 
outcome and guaranteeing their payment to the private investor, who therefore secures 
a return on investment in case of success of the intermediary or social service provider. 
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Furthermore, according to Del Giudice (2015), there would also be some positive side 
effects that exceed both the saving of public spending and the returns for private 
investors: with this structure a SIB introduces a mechanism of incentives that would 
encourage the efficient allocation of resources, stimulate the development of activities 
aimed at creating positive social impact and increasing investment in social activities of a 
preventative nature. This brings benefits in all cases higher than the mere savings 
achieved. 
2.3.2. Defining features, spread and coverage of Social Impact Bonds 
As an innovative tool, Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are highly flexible financing schemes 
open to multiple constructs. Variations of SIB financing are being developed across the 
globe with projects launched in many countries. However, the main features that the 
literature has identified as common tracts of SIB or SIB-like arrangements can be 
described as follows. First of all, as already said, a SIB is a public-private impact 
collaborative partnership that involves the joint action of government, private investors, 
and not-for-profit or for-profit service providers. Each of these actors brings specific 
resources to the initiative. 
Differently to other public-private partnerships, in this case risk falls mainly on the 
private investors. As a partnership, the priorities of the public and private actors need to 
be aligned around a common objective – and in the case of SIBs they coalesce around 
providing financial returns based on improved social outcomes. 
SIB contracting is predicated on the measurement of social outcomes rather than the 
quantity or type of services provided. In that respect, it differs from most traditional 
social services contracting, which tends to focus on measuring outputs (e.g., how many 
individuals are served, how many “beds” are made available to the homeless, how many 
attended a job training workshop, etc.) rather than outcomes (e.g., the number of young 
persons who have obtained and maintained employment after training, or the number of 
homeless individuals who successfully moved their lives forward in supportive housing 
arrangements). 
SIB financing is often framed around preventive intervention that targets specific social 
outcomes, often reductions in the use of remedial services such as prisons, hospitals, 
shelters, or nursing homes. SIB financing provides a low-risk opportunity for government 
to test whether an intervention is effective, before allocating increased resources to the 
program. An additional attraction is that often these programs drive fiscal savings for 
governments along with improved outcomes. 
Moreover, since implementing such initiatives can be complex, to achieve the desired 
outcomes, SIBs normally require the service provision of multiple organisations, each 
delivering a specialised service that provides complementary and highly integrated 
solutions. To ensure coordination of services, a single organisation may oversee the 
program delivery. This organisation, often referred as the 'intermediary', acts as the lead 
contractor. It provides oversight of the SIB contract and manages the coordination of 
services towards a common targeted solution. 
According to Bridges Ventures (2014), three main types of SIBs can be identified (Direct  
SIB, in which a social enterprise raises capital directly to finance a payment by results 
contract; Intermediated SIB, in which a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is set up – either 
as a joint venture or owned by a social enterprise and this SPV raises the working capital 
and manages the process including relations with the commissioners; and Managed SIB, 
in which an organisation, such as Social Finance, manages the whole process).  
This flexibility in the design of different SIB’s architectures is one of the reasons of the 
rapid spread of such an innovative tool (reported in Figure 5 below up to June 2016, and 




Figure 5 - The development of SIBs market since 2010 
 




Box 6- Updated figures on Social Impact Bonds (December 2018) 
 In December 2018, 121 SIBs had been launched (doubled in the last 2 years) 
 Launched SIBs are spread across more than 20 countries; 
 Almost 413 million have been raised so far; 
 More than 1,059,154 lives touched through a SIB programme. 
 More than 70 SIBs are currently in development stage 
 In all the five continents there are SIBs, either launched or in development 
                (Data available in the Impact Database, Social Finance, UK) 
                                      https://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk/ 
SIBs have been used to deal with different social needs in different areas of social policy. 
According to the data offered by the online database of Social Finance, first week of 
December 2018, Workforce Development is the main field of implementation: under this 
expression were considered 37 different initiatives addressing a variety of needs (e.g. 
school dropouts, youth unemployment, or in general young NEETs – Not in Education, 
Employment or Training, refugees unemployment, long-term unemployment, etc.). 
Health problems related SIBs are 22. Another social area well represented (with 23 SIBs) 
refers to Housing and Homelessness. Child and Family Welfare is an area of social needs 
addressed 15 times out of the total amount of launched SIBs: this area includes issues 
like work-life balance, children adoption and foster families, children placed in out -of-
home foster care, social care and assistance. Criminal Justice, meaning mainly recidivism 
rates and ex-prisoners integration after being released, is addressed 11 times. SIBs in 
the field of Education and Early years are 11, and the remaining part of launched SIBs 
deal with Environment and Sustainability, and Adults with Complex Needs (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 - Social issues addressed through a Social Impact Bond (2018) 
 
Source:  Own elaboration 
2.3.3. Social Impact Bonds as a new form of project financing  
From a theoretical perspective, although based on findings from empirical analysis, it can 
be said that, so far, implemented SIBs give substance to a thesis already advanced 
elsewhere: a SIB basic model, although including innovative features, also draws 
inspiration from existing mechanisms and contractual arrangements, traditionally used in 
other areas (Pasi 2014). In this sense, it is important to look at the world of project 
finance while dealing with SIB or SIB-like structures.  
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As some scholars pointed out, «governments have long used public-private partnerships 
to crowd private sector resources (both financial resources and know-how) into building 
large-scale infrastructure projects» and public-private partnerships «have also be used to 
tackle development issues» (Burand 2013). It has been said above that what is crucial on 
SIBs is the link with outcomes and the allocation of risk, however this is also the case 
with at least some forms of project finance. Even though further studies are needed to 
deepen the nature of SIB structures, it is possible to establish certain common elements 
with project finance, that can be defined as the «structured financing of a specific 
economic unit that the sponsors create by means of share capital, and for which the 
financier considers cash flows as the source of reimbursement, whereas project assets 
only represent collateral» (Gatti 2005). Further shared principles are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Project finance principles applying also to Social Impact Bonds  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Pasi, 2014. 
Therefore, building on the know-how accumulated in the field of more traditional project 
finance, as well as on launched SIBs, the most favourable pre-conditions to launch a SIB 
might be referred to four main dimensions, relevant on both side of design and 
implementation. 
First, to success a SIB needs the presence of solid players and the availability of data. 
This means that, for instance, the public sector pay-outs need to be effective, stable and 
reliable, while donors and investors are required to be strategic, professional and socially 
minded. The social service provider, instead, needs to be able to show data of proven 
impact at scale and an overall financial stability.  
Second, a key success factor in designing and implementing a SIB is the awareness and 
interest of potential players, which needs to share a good understanding of the model, its 
financial logics and the envisaged process of actions.  
Third, since a SIB scheme always involves some public sector's commitments, this 
demand for the adoption of a SIB model needs to be capable and proactive, meaning the 
public sector needs to be able to define the most suitable procurement process and 
identify the pressing issue of socioeconomic value, the pricing and the adequate metrics.  
Fourth, and finally, a pre-requisite for a successful SIB relies on those actors 
representing the supply side: service providers are required to deliver the intervention 
with reasonable expectation of success; investors need to be actually available to invest 
and provide oversight to the project; while intermediaries need to be able to support and 




3. Assessing social impact investment market’s maturity 
3.1. Social impact investment market’s composition 
Within the EU, there are significant differences between Member States in relevant 
legislation, practice and culture, and in the functions and participation of the state, 
affecting nature and form of the social impact investment ecosystems. Nevertheless, like 
any other market, social impact investment is a combination of parts: Demand for capital 
to finance social interventions; Supply of impact driven capital; and Infrastructure to help 
connect supply and demand.  
 On the demand side, there are the impact-driven enterprises and social 
organisations – all types of organisations, which have a long-term social mission, 
set outcome objectives and measure their achievement, whether they are social 
sector organisations or impact-driven businesses. 
 On the supply side, there are multiple sources of impact capital that provide the 
investment flow needed, including: Government/ EU investment, Social investment 
wholesaler, Charitable trusts and foundations, Local funds, Institutional investors 
and banks, Corporates, High net worth individuals, Mass retail. 
Figure 7 illustrates the main elements of demand and supply sides of a social impact 
investment market. Between the two main forces, there are other market elements 
bridging capital seekers and capital owners, which compose the market infrastructure. 
Market infrastructure is the foundation needed to efficiently match demand and supply of 
social impact investment. Within this system, capital owners use different channels to 
flow in their capital to social service providers. Also, as we have already seen before, 
capital might take different forms, such as secured and unsecured loans, equity and 
quasi-equity capital or SIBs. 
Figure 7 - Elements of supply and demand of a social impact investment market 
 
Source: Adapted from the G8 Social impact investment Taskforce 2014.  
Three important aspects for building a solid market infrastructure are highlighted below:  
A) Institutional culture: To have an efficient running ecosystem it is essential to speak a 
“common language”; concepts and principles are harmonised to avoid any 
misperception; information is created and disseminated; and all agents are encouraged 
to co-create value to society. The market has a shared culture if customs and values are 
naturally agreed and shared by different players and there is a clear manifestation of 
what is noteworthy and meaningful. 
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B) Market information: Collecting, producing and sharing good quality information 
amongst all players in the ecosystem ensure successful decision-making and growing 
reputation. Useful information can have a broad range of sources and uses: information 
on the financial situation of social service providers, on their track record and 
performance (financial and impact), information on market returns and characteristics of 
transactions pipeline, information on the incidence and costs of social issues.  
Symmetrical information within an ecosystem is one of the keys to its success: this is 
possible only if relevant data are available for both demand and supply sides.  
C) Intermediaries: As in commercial markets, their role is crucial also in the social impact 
investment market, where distinctive, sector-focused skills and advice are sought. Social 
investment intermediaries speak the language of the different stakeholders and can 
navigate the diverse range of skills, experience and expectations. Independent of their 
for or not-for-profit legal form, intermediaries sit between demand and supply and are 
dedicated to social impact investment deal making. In nascent markets, their activities 
might be polarised, as demand and supply sides are rigid and far apart . At this stage, 
their efforts might focus on creating an enabling culture and the relevant market 
information. At later stages the range of activities tends to focus on deal making, and it 
also involves activities and services such as advising social sector organisations on 
financial capacity and business issues, structuring financial product or managing 
performance and outcome evaluation. 
If we look at some notable examples such as Social Finance UK (Box 7), Impact 
Investing Australia, or Sitawi in Brazil – it can be noticed that - despite having different  
legal forms or acting in different contexts – these institutions usually share the same 
cultural elements: 
a) Multi-stakeholder approach: Although having different working approaches they 
share a focus on tackling social issues. They partner with different stakeholders 
from different sectors: governments, social investors and social service providers.  
b) Cross sectors collaboration and integrative approach: Because of their focus on 
the social issue itself, intermediaries tend to promote the articulation across 
sectors. They tend to contribute to the elimination of administration and 
organisational silos and promote the collaboration of different thematic bodies. 
They further integrated governance models. 
c) Range of activities and services: These organisations normally split their work 
streams into market building and deal-making. They are concerned with the 
creation of efficient and healthy ecosystems and usually seek to act where no one 
is or returns are difficult to get.  
d) Focus on additionality: These organisations are frequently flexible to 
accommodate their services according to markets’ needs, which the market does  
not pay for. Business models are difficult to build and establish. They tend not to 
be specialised or exclusive to a thematic area.  
e) Changing business model: In the early days of a market, due to market building 
activities, these entities rely on grant money. They often start off partnering with 
a big market champion. Financial sustainability lies ahead, when engaging in deal 
making activities. 
Examples of intermediaries structuring the social impact investment market ecosystems 
in their countries can be found in Portugal and France (See Box 8, and Box 9 below).  
Box 7 - Social Finance (UK, Global) 
Social Finance (SF) is a UK not-for-profit working in partnership with government, the 
social sector and the financial community. SF has mobilized over £52 million and 




Box 8 - The Social Investment Lab (Portugal) 
The Social Investment Lab (SIL) is a not-for-profit Portuguese organisation, created in 
October 2013. It was founded by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, with the support 
of Social Finance UK. The SIL worked to improve social enterprises' access to capital 
and skills that enable them to fulfil their impact potential. 
SIL’s focus has evolved over the years, adapting to the Portuguese market’ needs. In 
2017, SIL’s work spanned from public sector commissioning advisoring, capacity-
building and investment readiness support,and capital raising support. 
Box 9 - Le Comptoir d'Innovation (France) 
Le Comptoir de l'Innovation is a certified "social enterprise" created in June 2010 with 
€850,000 initial capital. Its investment subsidiary, Comptoir de l'Innovation 
Investissement is a French limited company (SAS à capital variable), founded in 2011. 
Both organisations rely on the expertise of GROUPE SOS, the European leader of social 
entrepreneurship. Le Comptoir de l'Innovation's mission is to finance, support and 
promote social entrepreneurship in France and in the world, and offers a wide range of 
solutions for financial institutions, corporations, public authorities, etc. willing to foster 
innovative business combined with social impact. 
However, along with intermediaries, governments also play a crucial role in shaping the 
required market infrastructure. Governments indeed perform an enabling force in 
building the market. As market builders, they are called to upgrade and strengthen the 
ecosystems, notably by creating financial instruments that support impact investment. 
This is related also to governments' role of large purchaser of social outcomes that can 
drive pay-for-success and outcomes oriented commissioning practices. 
In addition, by promoting the rise of high skilled intermediaries, capacity building 
programs to strengthen social service providers or by establishing referential wholesale 
institutions that create the incentives for new capital to flow in, governments can act as 
market catalysts. And removing legal and other barriers to investment and ensuring that  
the constructive intentions of impact investment are sustained over time, governments 
are at the same time also market steward. 
 
3.2. An institutional-based analytical framework 
In order to conduct a comparative assessment of the social impact investment markets in 
the 28 EU Member States, building on reference data published by the European 
Commission and other institutions, we have created an original framework of analysis 
that aims at understanding the institutional conditions required for building or 
strengthening the different components of the social impact investment ecosystems in 
each country.  
Clearly this is a preliminary exercise, which would need further insights and a more 
accurate analysis, especially in consideration of the very rapid growth of the phenomenon 
in many countries, which makes extremely difficult to monitor progresses 'real time'.  
Moreover, it is worth to notice that in designing a tool to appreciate the maturity level of 
each social impact investment market, we opted for a fully qualitative approach. In fact, 
literature in the field, especially coming from practitioners, has shown several attempts in 
sizing and segmenting the different social impact investment markets based on 
quantitative criteria such as the asset under management, the public social expenditure 
and other commonly used economic indicators. However, focusing on volumes rather 
than on the pre-conditions for market development might be misleading, as it means not  
considering the political and institutional settings of each national welfare system, 
affecting the elaboration of accurate policy recommendations.  
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Importantly, due to the acknowledged flawed nature of the majority of current available 
indicators (Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi 2009), a quantitative approach tends to emphasise the 
crowding out potential of social impact investment and this is bound to threaten the 
political legitimacy of many policy efforts. Furthermore, since the main purpose of the 
current study is that of shaping a comprehensive narrative for the policy-makers rather 
than for investors, thus the need to identify policy relevant case studies for in-depth 
analyses, the aim of the framework is to be a working-heuristic tool rather than to drive 
an actual assessment exercise1. 
In light of the above, and given all the methodological disclaimers of the case, the 
analytical framework considers therefore three broad and general criteria, each of them 
corresponding to a different element of a social impact investment market:  
1) Market Infrastructure, triggering an enabling policy environment for social 
enterprise and social innovation to grow;  
2) Demand Side, having a healthy ecosystem to support social service providers and 
a vibrant and organized set of social service providers; and  
3) Supply Side, the availability of impact-driven capital that provides the investment  
flow needed to fuel the local ecosystem. 
This exercise has relied on an individual analysis of market’s maturity levels according to 
the criteria above. For each criterion, three levels were established: Low, Medium and 
High. Table 5 presents the requisites for the three levels identified2. 
Table 5 - Description and maturity levels for each market component 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Criterion 1, which is significantly more important for the course of this analysis, is 
focused on the pushes made by the public sector (local, regional or central) in each 
jurisdiction to set up the grounds for a robust market, thus contributing in building the  
Market Infrastructure.  
Criterion 2 assesses the development stage of the Demand Side of the market. It 
considers the number of dynamic and organised social service providers that are 
committed to solve specific and entrenched social issues, as well as the existence and 
role of entities that are dedicated to build social service providers’ capacity. 
Criterion 3 analyses the Supply Side of the market. It considers the number of active 
social investors, independently of their form or motivation, willing to support social 
service providers. This criterion also includes an assessment of the intermediaries’ 
network in place.   
                                     
1 The use of quantitative indicators is however important. It is in fact currently under evaluation the opportunity 
to develop a more sophisticated framework. This idea will be further developed in the final Chapter.  
2 The country reports of the study Map of social service providers and their eco-systems in Europe, published by 
the European Commission (2016), were the main reference used to perform this assessment.  
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Scores (from 1 to 3) were attributed to each Member State, according to their market’s 
development stage in each of the three criteria. The three criteria had the same weight in 
the final scores. Member States were divided into three segments, according to their final 
scores. These three categories would represent different social impact investment 
market’s development stages: Incipient, Infant and Performing markets. 
Table 6 - Market’s segmentation according to final scores  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
As shown in Table 6, according to the framework developed, the classification of an 
incipient market is given to a local market whose final score is up to 4 points; an infant  
market is a market whose final score ranges from 5 to 7 points, while a performing 
market ranges from 8 to 9 points. Table 7 presents the maturity level of the social 
impact investment market for each of the EU Member States, providing both the 
individual criteria scores for each element and the final score3. 
Table 7 - Social impact investment market maturity scores 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
                                     
3 This analysis was conducted in 2017. Changes may have, in the meanwhile occurred. One example is Finland 




As a result of this analysis (Figure 8) it seems that only 5 Member States present a high 
level of maturity in their social impact investment ecosystem, thus having a performing 
market. These are UK, Germany and France, which reach the maximum score (9) 
followed by Italy and Portugal with a score of 8 points. The remainder of EU countries 
falls then either in the Infant Market category (10) or the Incipient Market group (13).  
Figure 8 - Outputs of EU MS’ social impact investment market segmentation 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Some considerations that emerge from the analysis and the resulting segmentation of 
the social impact investment markets in the EU can be carefully proposed. Firstly, t here 
is no obvious geographical, cultural or ideological trend in the development stage of 
social impact investment markets, as infant markets include EU Member States from 
Western, Eastern and Central Europe. As 13 Member States are classified as being at  an 
early stage, this means that most of the EU Member States are still grasping the field, 
while 36% of them are taking off the ground, being at their infancy stage. France, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal and United Kingdom are at the fore front  of the Social Impact  
investment market development, being considered performing markets, with some 
important differences however among them. Important differences between each 
category are present also among incipient markets as well as infant markets.   
Segment 1 - Incipient markets 
Table 8 - Characterisation of Segment 1: Incipient markets 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
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EU Member States that according to the framework belong to the category of incipient 
social impact investment markets are 13: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.  
Incipient local markets represent the majority (almost 50%) of the EU Member States' 
landscape and can be found in Western, Central and Eastern Europe, thus confirming that 
it is not possible, so far and under the present circumstances, to observe any 
geographical trend. In none of these local markets, we can see demand, supply for 
market infrastructure being highly developed. 
Segment 2 -Infant markets 
Table 9 - Characterisation of Segment 2: Infant markets 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The 10 EU Member States’ infant social impact investment markets are Belgium, Croatia, 
Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden. Infant 
markets can be found in a Central/Eastern band of European Union and seem all to be 
driven by demand and market infrastructure rather than supply.  
In fact, almost all of these Member States have a significant number of social service 
providers or a few initiatives to support them. 
Notably, 8 of these infant markets have implemented a set of public initiatives to 
promote the ecosystem and 4 of them have an existing agenda to promote a local social 
impact investment market. Overall the supply side is still incipient in half of the infant 
markets – only in Belgium there is an organised group of active investors or capital 
supply ready to support social service providers. 
Segment 3 - Performing markets 
Table 10 - Characterisation of Segment 3: Performing markets 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Amongst the 28 EU Member States, there are five social impact investment markets in a 
comparatively more developed stage, classified as performing local markets under this 
exercise scope. These markets are located in a Western-central European band, and are 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Portugal and Italy.  
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All these markets have made significant efforts to build a robust market infrastructure. 
They have national wide known agendas developed by their respective National Advisory 
Boards (NABs) and other entities engaged in advocating for a social impact investment  
agenda. All NABs have a place in the Global Social Impact Investment Steering Group4. 
Although no causality is assured by this exercise, the link between growth stage of a 
social impact investment market and the efforts to build elements that sustain these 
markets is evident. In other words, it will be difficult to see a market emerging without  
any concerted initiative towards building a robust market infrastructure. 
Moreover, results suggest that demand goes hand in hand with supply side. Comparing 
with the scores in the infant markets, it can be said that having an active and interesting 
number of social service providers is a good way to trigger the supply side. Social 
investors eventually catch the wave, if market infrastructure is in place. 
However, significant differences exist amongst these five local markets. The United 
Kingdom takes the leading position in this group and the remaining 4 countries lag 
behind, with further distinction between Germany and France, with a consolidated 
supply-demand relationship, and Italy and Portugal where efforts are still undergoing to 
ensure a well-functioning relationship between the two sides of the market  (see Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5). 
 
3.3. The framework in action: the role of market infrastructures 
Looking at the different segments, it is quite evident that efforts to build the 
infrastructure of a robust market are driving forces for the development of a social 
impact investment market. These initiatives address different incentives and motivations 
and have different promotors.  
Some of them are organised by a group of stakeholders worried with market 
development as a whole; others are promoted by Foundations who have a parachute 
view of the market and are willing to take the first lead so that the market becomes more 
attractive for others to join; others are promoted by financial intermediaries who are 
willing to do whatever is needed to drive social change; and finally, as the examples 
presented below suggest, there are many public -led market building initiatives.  
At this stage, it becomes important to draw attention to some of these initiatives. The 
Table 11 below presents examples for each of the 7 areas considered in the market’s 
infrastructure criteria. This wide list of areas was set by the European Commission in A 
map of social service providers and their eco-systems in Europe (2016).  
They represent what is perceived as being the main instrumental initiatives to drive a 
social impact investment market. Each area may be materialised in different ways as the 
examples columns suggest.  
Even though not all performing markets have implemented initiatives in the 7 areas, 
most of them have tapped these gaps. For instance, it is worth noticing that, for some of 
these areas, similar initiatives were developed across countries. Examples include the 
Unit Cost Database firstly developed in the UK and later on in Portugal (One.Cost) to 
serve the same purpose. The Portuguese actors have adapted the layout of the tool 
developed in the UK to potentiate its usage in their national context, but both are 
databases of unit costs for different social issues.  
                                     
4 The Global Steering Group for Impact Investment (GSG) is an independent body catalysing impact investment 
and entrepreneurship “to benefit people and planet”. The GSG was established in August 2015 as the successor 
to and incorporating the work of the Social Impact Investment Taskforce established under the UK´s presidency 
of the G8. Chaired by Sir Ronald Cohen, the GSG brings together leaders from the worlds of fin ance, business, 
and philanthropy. The GSG is currently formed by 21 National Advisory Boards (NABs), plus the EU as a 




Table 11 - Examples of social impact investment market building initiatives 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
To further illustrate the kind of initiatives developed to establish a social impact 
investment market, we present other 6 examples of initiatives carried out in the most  
mature markets to help understand what some of these areas refer to (Box 10, Box 11, 
Box 12, Box 13, Box 14, Box 15, and Box 16). 
Box 10 - The investment and contract readiness fund (UK) 
The Cabinet Office launched a £10 million Investment and Contract Readiness Fund 
(ICRF) in 2012, to build social organisations' capacity through business support and 
help them become investable, scalable and able to bid for government contracts.  
To access ICRF funding, organisations must be seeking support to raise more than £0.5 
million of investment or bid for contracts of over £1 million. This requirement helps 
ensure that capacity building support is purpose-driven and focused on achieving a 
significant financial growth. 
Also, it aims at assuring revenue streams to specialist support providers and helps 
them create financial sustainability. 
Box 11 - The DWP Innovation fund (UK) 
The UK Department for Work and Pensions launched, in 2012, a £30 million outcomes 
fund focused on preventing disadvantaged young people from becoming Not in 
Education, Training or Employment (NEET). 
The DWP identified 9 outcomes that would encourage social organisations to address 
most common issues. They priced the outcomes based on the potential cost savings to 
government of having fewer young people disengage from school, training and 
employment. 
The DWP Innovation Fund helped develop the UK social investment market by 
demonstrating the benefits of outcome-based contracting, such as how it can: (1) 
encourage organisations to measure outcomes; (2) test whether investing in 
prevention can create cost savings, and (3) build an evidence-base of ‘what works’. 
Box 12 - One Cost (Portugal) 
One.Cost is an on-line portal aiming to centralize, standardize and provide data 
regarding the cost of Portugal’s entrenched social problems in 5 areas (education, 
employment, justice, social care and health). One.Cost is Promoted by the Calouste 
Gulbenkian Foundation and the Social Investment Lab. 
It includes costs. Data has the potential to improve public service commissioning and 
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public service reform, informing public policy and a more efficient use of public funds. 
This portal is also relevant for social organisations whose services are commissioned by 
public sector (social enterprises, social investors, philanthropists and intermediaries) 
who value relevant data to enter into payment-by-results contracts schemes such as 
SIBs. 
Box 13 – ESUS (France) 
The French legal framework for the social economy was strengthened in 2014 with the 
adoption of the Law on Social and Solidarity Economy. This law enhances the position 
of the sector in the French economy and reinforces its legal bases. 
The law has extended the perimeter traditionally admitted in the SSE to include the 
model of social enterprises due to the introduction of a legal status for businesses with 
a social utility (“ESUS”). 
Box 14 – 90-100 Employees savings schemes (France) 
In 2008, France has introduced the 90-10 saving schemes, aimed at facilitating the 
access and investment in solidarity funds. Under these schemes, companies are forced 
to offer employees the option to allocate part of their savings into Solidarity funding 
schemes. 
These schemes have to invest at least 5-10% of their capital in non-listed organisations 
that are labelled as social purpose organisations. It’s the French governance who 
regulates the application of this labelling process that also serves as a quality standard.  
Box 15 – MRI Education Pilot Fund (Germany) 
The Mission-Related Investment (MRI) Education Pilot Fund was set up by the expert 
group on impact investing within the Association of German Foundations to enable 
charitable foundations under German law to invest a part or the entirety of their 
endowments in accordance with their mission. With an initial funding of a relatively 
modest amount the pilot fund is intended to serve as a model for future funds with 
other objectives and goals. 
 
As shown by applying the analytical framework, a key success factor of most promising 
experiences is the design and implementation of market building initiatives. This explains 
why United Kingdom, France and Germany have the most performing markets with 
highest score in terms of demand, supply and infrastructure. Portugal and Italy belong to 
the same maturity level; however the potential high performance of the market is not 
fully realized, either because of difficulties still present in the demand side or supply side. 
This suggests looking in-depth at these two countries, with the aim to grasp some of 
their features and to identify lessons learned or paths to future developments.  
In fact, the existence of a robust infrastructure and the rapid emergence of demand and 
supply side mechanisms in these two countries makes of them ideal cases to be analysed 
in depth. This is the rationale for having chosen them as, respectively, a case study and 
a prospective scenario in this research. This effort for a more elaborated analysis is 




4. Portugal: A policy framework initiative 
4.1. Social innovation and the social economy as a policy priority 
In the recent past, social innovation has progressively emerged in the Portuguese public  
agenda through the actions of public opinion leaders (such as the late Diogo 
Vasconcelos), academic experts (such as Filipe Santos and António Miguel) and 
institutions such as the Gulbenkian Foundation. Moreover, in the period 2011-2014 
Portugal was defining the priorities with the European Commission on its 2014-2020 ESIF 
programming cycle. This represented the opportunity to address the previous lack of a 
clear public support and agenda on social innovation and social entrepreneurship. 
Portugal in fact identified these two areas as a key priority of its 2014-2020 Partnership 
Agreement.5 
With the aim of designing and develop a bold policy framework initiative, as well as to 
support the negotiation process with the European Commission, «a small working group 
was created, including ESIF experts/negotiators and experts in social innovation, 
reporting directly to the Minister coordinating the 2014-2020 Partnership Agreement and 
Operational Programmes (OPs) negotiation» (Fi-Compass 2018). After several rounds of 
relevant discussions, in December 2014, Portugal and the European Commission reached 
an agreement. 
Following this agreement, on December 16th 2014 the Portuguese government created 
Portugal Inovação Social (EMPIS) a €150 million public-driven initiative, using EU 
Structural Funds (European Social Fund).  
EMPIS had three main objectives: 
1) Funding the full life-cycle of social innovation and social entrepreneurship projects, 
through innovative financing programmes; 
2) Mobilising the Portuguese social innovation ecosystem, helping to promote 
collaborative networks between public, private and social economy players; 
3) Stimulating the creation and growth of a Portuguese social impact investment 
market. 
In line with the mentioned objectives set out by the Portuguese government, and 
acknowledging the relevance of the social economy sector to the broader Portuguese 
economy, in 2014, the Portuguese Parliament has passed a law for the foundations of the 
Social and Solidarity Economy. This law sets some definitions and establishes the limits 
of its activities. Under these boundaries, social economy represents a pool of social 
utility-oriented organisations that promote employment, social cohesion, local and 
regional development and social innovation. It is therefore a widely fragmented and 
heterogeneous sector, including organisations that differ in legal form, purpose, funding, 
size and thematic area.  
The raising attention to the social economy in Portugal, and the related recognition of 
social innovation and social entrepreneurship as policy priorities, have been based on an 
overall assessment of the sector, its strengths and its needs as well.  
In 2013, the Portuguese social sector was composed by 61,268 organisations, from 
which only 14% (7,500 organisations) were organisations dedicated to address social 
issues – social services providers. Sport associations and agriculture cooperatives are 
examples of social economy sector organisations that represent the remaining slice of the 
sector.  
                                     
5 In this regard it should be recalled that increasing social needs following the austerity measures adopted as a 
consequence of the three-year Economic Adjustment Programme agreed by Portugal with the EU, the European 
Central Bank and the International Moneta ry Fund (2011), have called the traditional Portuguese social 
economy entities as well as emerging social entrepreneurs to a renewed engagement and stronger effort in 
designing and implementing new initiatives. 
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In the same year, this sector represented 5.2% of national paid employment and had a 
2.8% contribution to the national GDP. In 2010 – the latest year of available data – the 
social service provision organisations represented almost half of paid employment and 
41.3% of the GDP within the social economy sector. 
Most of these social services are undertaken by circa 5,000 social economy entities with 
IPSS status (Social Solidarity Private Institutions). The IPSS status allows these 
organisations to benefit from fiscal incentives and to be responsible for the provision of 
social services on behalf of and contracted by the State, under Cooperation Agreements. 
Contracts are multiannual and output prices have been quite steady over the years.  
However, despite the IPSS status of the provider, the overall regulatory framework 
provided by the Cooperation Agreements scheme has revealed to be based on incentives 
not adequately supporting service innovation efforts, de facto preventing too much 
innovative service providers to be awarded with public contracts. There are in fact high 
entry barriers, since most contracts are oriented towards outputs and not outcomes and 
there is no competition on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness (outputs combined 
with outcomes). 
The Portuguese State pays a total amount of €1.4 billion per year under the existing 
Cooperation Agreements framework. As a result, approximately 40% of IPSS ’ revenues 
come from these agreements with the State (through the Social Security Institute). 
The remaining organisations don’t have this funding stream available, even if in some 
cases they are the ones trying more innovative solutions and tapping into emerging 
social needs. They either finance themselves through an organic and patient growth or 
through the good will of traditional philanthropists – e.g. foundations, corporations and 
high net-worth individuals. External financing of social innovation, through mainstream 
debt and equity finance is unaffordable due to their governance model or legal structure.  
An analysis undertaken by the Social Investment Lab (2014) based on publicly available 
data estimates that the funding gap ranges between €250-400 million. This amount has 
then been confirmed also by the ex-ante assessment of the Social Innovation Fund done 
by Quaternaire (2016). As the Figure 9 presented below suggests, these analyses are 
based on the cost and rate at which some social issues are growing, compared to the 
State support provided (Cooperation Agreements) over the years. 
Figure 9 - Estimation for the funding gap amongst social providers in Portugal  
 
Source: Social Investment Lab 2015.  
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4.2. The Portugal Social Innovation Programme 
4.2.1. Conception and overall governance 
As mentioned before, in December 2014 the government announced the creation of 
Portugal Inovação Social (EMPIS). The initiative was led by the Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers through the Ministry for Regional Development (overseeing EU structural 
funds), with the support of the Ministry of Solidarity, Employment and Social Security, the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. 
EMPIS was also supported by the existing social economy and social innovation critical 
mass. Of particular importance was the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation initiative to 
convene the Portuguese Social Investment Taskforce, with the support of the Social 
Investment Lab and Social Finance UK. This taskforce gathered more than twenty senior 
representatives of influential public, social and private national institutions – including the 
financial regulator, banks, foundations, business schools and consultancy firms, and its 
main output was a report which encompasses five recommendations that paved the way 
for a national action plan on social investment. That report was extremely useful for the 
working group set up by the government and that led to the creation of EMPIS. 
EMPIS was in fact conceived as a catalyst entity to promote social innovation and social 
entrepreneurship in the country, by tackling the mismatch between supply and demand 
of capital and testing the use of innovative financing instruments, while helping to 
promote collaborative networks between public, private and social economy players, 
relevant for the development of new innovative solutions to societal problems.  
Whilst there was a general agreement on the need for a catalyst entity to promote social 
investment in the country, the use of unclaimed assets (as it was done in the UK to 
capitalise their wholesaler entity – Big Society Capital) or the national public budget 
represented alternatives with little prospects in Portugal in 2014. The government opted 
for using European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) instead, whose Partnership 
Agreement – as already mentioned – was being negotiated with the European 
Commission at the time.  
The Partnership Agreement, positioned social innovation as a strategic cross sector 
approach to address national wicked societal issues in areas such as health, justice, 
education, social protection, and employment. To this extent is worth to notice that since 
the beginning EMPIS has been managed as a transversal flagship initiative to promote 
the development of social innovation in Portugal.  
EMPIS, in line with the Partnership Agreement, reflected in a clear and transversal way 
the focus of the new programming period 2014-2020. In particular key features of the 
overall conception were: (i) the optimisation of the use, effects and impact of public 
financial resources; (ii) the adoption of financing schemes with a reimbursement 
expectation of private capital allocated; and (iii) the combination of national and 
European financing sources. 
Moreover, EMPIS was built upon two foundational principles that mutually complement  
and reinforce each other:  
 To promote preventive public policies or preventive interventions to address the 
emergence and development of societal risks;  
 To promote innovative public polic ies or interventions to eradicate specific social 
problems and advance social goals through the provision of outcome linked 
financial resources.  
Conceived upon these foundations and under this partnership framework, EMPIS was 
created with the goal of financing the full life cycle of social innovation and social 
entrepreneurship initiatives through a set of four financing programmes dedicated to the 
promotion of the social impact investment market in the country.  
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In order to make EMPIS able to achieve the mentioned goals, its governance has been 
considered, since the design phase, instrumental. In fact, different governance models 
were explored, including: (i) to create a new public organisation and build up its team 
from scratch; (ii) to embed the initiative into an existing public entity and adapt the 
governance model; (iii) to outsource its management activity to an external third party. 
A transversal working group was created to prepare a report on the different possible 
governance models. The working group also did some initial work on the design of the 
four EMPIS financing instruments, supporting the then on-going negotiation process with 
the European Commission. 
The government, following the suggestions of the working group, decided for setting up a 
new organisation within the governmental sphere that would be dedicated to a given 
mission (a Mission Unit) and would be given a specific set of competencies and 
responsibilities. Main reasons for this choice were the set -up speed and simplicity, the 
independence from stakeholders, as well as the need for specific dedicated expertise. 
Main concerns were instead the barriers encountered to recruit talent from outside the 
public administration and the government bodies in light of the on-going Portugal 
financial and sovereign debt crisis and the hiring constraints arising therefrom. 
EMPIS was therefore set up as a QUANGO – a quasi-autonomous organisation, managed 
by an Executive Committee – one executive president and two executive board members. 
The Committee is responsible for realising EMPIS mandate and reports directly to the 
Council of Ministers.  
In order to provide the organisation with the necessary political empowerment and to 
pursue a model of integrated governance (across the different governmental 
departments), it has been decided EMPIS ought to be placed under the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers (originally under the Minister Adjunct to the Prime Minister and for 
Regional Development – in charge of EU structural funds – and, in the current 
government, under the Minister of the Presidency and of Administrative Modernisation). 
EMPIS’ Executive Committee is supported by a legal advisory team and manages two 
technical operational teams: a “financing team” and an “ecosystem team”.  
The “financing team” is responsible for the implementation of the funding programmes 
on the ground, opening and managing application processes, assessing applications and 
assuring regulation compliance. This team is based in Coimbra (in the Centro region) and 
includes four people, each responsible for one financing programme.  
The “ecosystem team” is responsible to link EMPIS to regional market stakeholders, such 
as promoters of social innovation and social entrepreneurship projects, social investors, 
regional or local public entities, intermediaries and other service providers. It includes 
three people, located in each of the geographies currently targeted by EMPIS financing 
programmes – Centro, Norte and Alentejo. These people are named ecosystem activators 
and answer to any questions or requests on the ground, in addition to regular activity of 
pipeline/market creation.  
In the current Portugal 2020 framework, i.e. the Portuguese 2014-2020 Partnership 
Agreement, EMPIS is formally an intermediate body (IB) with delegated ESIF functions 
from both the Programa Operacional Inclusão Social e Emprego and Programa 
Operacional Capital Humano. 
4.2.2. Objectives and investment principles  
EMPIS’ mission relies on the assumption that social innovation and social 
entrepreneurship initiatives who seek for new or better solutions for societal problems 
lack access to sources of financing and financial instruments adapted to their needs to 
develop and expand their services, improving the quality of life of their beneficiaries and 
of the whole society. This is so because the currently available instruments of public and 
private financing do often not match the innovative character of such initiative.  
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In addition, the promotion of such innovative solutions requires capacity-building actions 
and the development of an ecosystem that will further align both the demand and supply 
sides of social innovation initiatives. 
Hence, EMPIS’ main objective is to build such ecosystem and, in the process, overcome 
the existing financing constraints and unlock the access to adequate financing sources 
and instruments. 
This general objective unfolds into more concrete ones that also contribute to other 
public objectives: (1) Improving social economy entities competitiveness and 
sustainability; (2) Promoting the growth of projects with proven intervention and 
business models; (3) Informing public policy and promoting the creation of evidence-
based policy decisions; (4) Attracting new players to the market; (5) Promoting an 
outcome-based culture amongst the public sector; (6) Promoting the development of 
priority areas. 
With regard to the objective of improving social economy entities competitiveness and 
sustainability, one of the main identified bottlenecks is related to their often-suboptimal 
organisational structures, skills and resources. In a context of limited funds, social 
entities choose to allocate the existing resources only to the operational side. This 
situation hinders innovation, leads to low levels of efficiency and undermines the ability 
to attract talent.  
On this point EMPIS intends to overcome this difficulty through its capacity building 
programme. This is a grant scheme, that focusing primarily on the teams engaged in the 
implementation of social innovation or social entrepreneurship projects, funds the 
development of social economy entities workforce and organisational structure. This way 
it builds impact and investment readiness within each beneficiary entity while promoting 
sustainable and lasting relations with investors. 
As above mentioned, in Portugal, there is a financing gap to support social enterprises 
whose intervention models have been tested but cannot gain scale. Business models are 
needed to further strengthening those who are ready to scale. Grants are often 
inadequate to finance these activities and financial support is usually hard to find and 
pay. 
To address this problem, i.e. to promote the growth of projects with proven intervention 
and business models, EMPIS targets mainly social innovation and social entrepreneurship 
projects in these development stages, providing financial and non-financial support. The 
four EMPIS’ financing programmes address the full life cycle of projects, adjusting the 
type of support and of end beneficiary, as well as ticket sizes to the specific needs of 
these projects. 
Despite the considerably large number of social entities and social interventions, in 
Portugal there is no culture of evidence-based actions, data is often lacking and there is 
often no adequate measurement of the outcomes (and not simply outputs) of social 
interventions. It is difficult to find an organisation that collects relevant information in the 
most adequate form and that uses it to fine-tune its service and improve its 
performance.  
To promote such culture, create evidence of the effectiveness of social services and 
inform public policy decisions, EMPIS promotes the implementation of robust outcome 
evaluation processes, as well as the adoption of performance management practices. 
Outputs, outcomes and any relevant data generated shall be shared with EMPIS and 
other public bodies in order to inform the design of public policies and the update of 
social services commissioning.  
Closely and maybe instrumental to this objective of a strengthened evidence-based 
culture, there is also the issue of promoting an outcome-based culture amongst the 
public sector. Cooperation Agreements represent a big share of the funding streams of 
social service provision organisations in Portugal. 
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EMPIS can pay a role in gradually help steer such services into a more outcomes oriented 
culture. When contracting takes place through competitive and open procurement bids 
based on outcomes, this raises incentives for social service providers to demonstrate: 
(1) their managerial capacity; 
(2) evidence of achieving outcomes and impact; 
(3) overall efficiency in delivering such services. 
This would be matched in the public sector by an inc remental shift towards the 
development of outcome metrics and outcome-oriented incentives.  
EMPIS, acting as an outcomes-payer under its Social Impact Bonds programme, and 
developing the Programme in partnership with relevant public sector agencies, is meant  
to set the ground towards the adoption of an outcome-based culture in the coming years. 
Moreover, the Social Impact Bonds Programme is expected to create evidence and to 
demystify the concerns on outcome-based contracts, thus contributing to the emergence 
and spread of a new culture amongst the public sector. 
As a way of closing the existing financing gap, EMPIS intends to attract new market 
players to the sector, namely venture capitalists and private equity funds. Such strategy 
was mostly to be undertaken through the Social Innovation Fund, acting as a cornerstone 
investor, using ESIF as patient low-cost capital to leverage private investors and funds, as 
well as to serve as first loss. 
Finally, worth to say that Portugal’s regional development faces strong inequalities. Given 
its central role as the capital and its high concentration of population, services and social 
economy entities, Lisbon absorbs much of the available national financing sources. 
Reflecting the priorities of EU structural funds and to contradict such tendency as well as 
to encourage entities to scale interventions to the country ’s less developed areas, 
EMPIS’s programmes prioritised interventions operating in the North and Centre regions, 
as well as in Alentejo. 
To sum up, according to the mentioned goals and objectives, EMPIS represents an 
ambition to stimulate social innovation and outcome-oriented public policies and to create 
a well-functioning social impact investment market, where any social entrepreneur with a 
proven idea or a track-record project can find the means to operate and scale their 
impact.  
EMPIS plays a role in activating the different elements of this market – demand and 
supply – but also in creating or fostering the emergence of the main market 
infrastructure elements, reaching out to public sector bodies, private investors, 
implementing entities, namely social economy entities, as well as intermediaries and 
other service providers.  
EMPIS’s success is therefore not linear to define and not easy to assess as well. 
However, according to its design and in line with its identified goals and objectives, some 
features of the system might work as a proxy for an overall evaluation: 
(1) EMPIS’ multiplier effect, i.e. by the amount of capital attracted as leverage for its 
investment 
(2) Rate of emergence of new entities and social innovation interventions to solve 
current societal problems; 
(3) Creation of new market infrastructure and ecosystem elements (such as financial 
and non-financial intermediaries, their reinforcement, research and data centres, 
etc.); 
(4) Emergence of more outcomes oriented public policies and incentives.  
Concerning the eligibility criteria, it is therefore clear that EMPIS assumes a quite broad 
approach, accepting applications from any initiative with a proven innovative intervention 
model to address a societal issue. In particular, the following entities are eligible:  
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 Not-for-profit organisations that operate within legal structures such as 
cooperatives, mutuals, foundations and other entities that follow the social 
economy principles.  
 For-profit organisations (with any legal form) as long as they have a social 
mission. The social mission can be directly reflected in the services provided or be 
embedded through the inclusion of marginalised groups in the entities’ value 
chain.  
The four financing programmes share the same investment principles, therefore the 
different financing programmes also share eligibility criteria, and eligible entities can 
apply for any of them. 
These financing principle are: 
(1) Diversification: in terms of assets, players, geographical distribution and thematic  
areas of intervention.  
(2) Pro-activity: looking for untapped potential areas, with market failures of any 
kind, such as lack of evidence, lack of support or unbalanced equilibrium of risk-
return propositions.  
(3) Adaptation: being flexible to accommodate the different risk profiles associated to 
each investment, assuming a subordinated role. 
Illustrative areas of interventions that are considered as addressing a societal issue are 
the fight of poverty and social exclusion, the support of children and youth, the 
improvement of educational outcomes, the promotion of health and wellness, the raise of 
employability and employment, and the promotion of active ageing. 
4.2.3. The EMPIS’ design and its four pillars 
Specific aim of EMPIS is to support social innovation and social entrepreneurship projects 
across the development stages life cycle. Therefore each financing programme has been 
designed against the different stages of development. These phases are within a 
spectrum that includes four main stages: 1) Solution designing and testing, 2) business 
model fine-tuning, 3) scaling and 4) dissemination. Each phase is correlated to one of the 
four EMPIS’s actions, as shown in Figure 10 below. 
Figure 10 - Development stages and funding programmes adequacy  
 
Source: Portugal Social Innovation 2014.  
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Funding programmes are not mutually-exclusive, especially as there are synergies 
between them: for instance, a social enterprise that benefitted from the Capacity-
Building Programme or the Partnerships for Impact Programme, is likely to be a robust 
candidate for the Social Impact Bonds Outcomes Fund or the Social Innovation Fund.  
By acting across the different stages of development of a social enterprise and of the 
social innovation ecosystem, EMPIS shifts its role from a direct participant in the market 
towards an indirect contributor to its development and consolidation. In the process, it 
also builds pipeline/demand for other financing programmes. This constant adaptation is 
essential to meet its mission of addressing the specific needs of social enterprises and 
other stakeholders and filling market gaps.  
As mentioned, EMPIS is structured into four financing programmes, each providing 
incentives or offering support to different market stakeholders; although end 
beneficiaries are always entities implementing social innovation or social 
entrepreneurship projects.  
As Figure 11 illustrates, the programmes vary in their purpose, recipients, form, 
reimbursement expectation and size.  
Figure 11 - EMPIS Structure 
 
Source: Portugal Social Innovation 2014. 
a) The Capacity Building Programme 
Through its Capacity-Building Programme, EMPIS aims to ensure that social economy 
entities have access to the support services necessary to become investment ready and 
to grow and expand their valuable work in the most effective way. As a catalyst entity, 
EMPIS is using this programme to level the playing field between social and commercial 
enterprises by removing the barriers that the former have in accessing specialist services 
and in capacitating its organisational structure. 
Based on an initial diagnosis of capacity-building needs, a grant of up to €50,000 is made 
available to each social economy entity to enable it to implement its approved capacity-
building plan, specifically tailored to its social innovation project, accessing and paying 
for support from specialist providers in areas such as financial management, business 
modelling, impact measurement, leadership or governance. The total available ESF 
funding for this program amounts to €15 million. 
 57 
 
One of the main challenges relates to the timid representation of social organisation 
specialists service providers in the Portuguese market, as a result of social economy 
entities' traditional inability to pay for these services. At an initial stage, EMPIS expects 
that these service providers will tend to be few, reflecting the current lack of critical mass 
in this area. However the present funding programme incentives are already starting to 
attract new service providers to the market (e.g. universities, SMEs, consultants, etc.), 
who may perceive capacity building support to social enterprises as a new business 
stream to explore. It is expected that in the medium term these entities specialise 
themselves in given areas, competing on the basis of outputs' quality and prices.  
An additional challenge lies on ensuring a lasting impact of capacity-building 
programmes. EMPIS has struggled to meet the mandatory ESF simplified cost lump sums 
rules applicable in this case (it was the first Member-State to do so for social innovation 
projects) while providing the right incentives that ensure knowledge and skill transfer 
between specialist providers and social organisations. As it is structured today, the 
beneficiary entity and the service provider have to co-create a tangible output relevant to 
the project as the final result of each capacity-building intervention. The financial support 
(a fixed lump sum approved for each intervention) is provided based on EMPIS 
assessment of the tangible outputs created.  
Although this demand-driven output-based contract mechanism represented a major shift 
from the previous broad-spectrum supply-centric financing model, it is still in its early 
stages. As a result, the tangible outputs being proposed and contractualised, even if 
tailored to the specific on-going social innovation project and its needs, are often very 
limited in its ambition (e.g. a communication strategy word document, a financial model 
excel document or a business model definition power point presentation).  
This will not be enough to guarantee that capacity and skills are built and embedded in 
the projects and in the social economy entities implementing those. But in the next 
rounds, as the market matures and social economy entities and service providers become 
more sophisticated, it might be possible to achieve this goal, also through a combination 
of service providers’ evaluation and increasingly demanding requirements set for tangible 
output contracting and validation. 
Calls for proposals run from March 2017 to June 2017. EMPIS received 168 applications, 
summing up to €7.85 million, surpassing the initial €3 million made available for this 
round. According to available information, approved applications were 99, for an overall 
amount of €3.5 million (Fi-Compass 2018). 
b) The Partnerships for Impact  
Through this line of the programme, EMPIS matches the funds made available by 
philanthropic donors to promote venture philanthropy in Portugal. The objective of this 
programme is to create the incentives for philanthropic capital to be invested with 
medium-long term visions, alongside with a focus on building the capacity within the 
organisations to deliver to that. 
Under this programme, EMPIS provides a match funding of 70% of the amount 
committed by philanthropic organisations (private or public entities) to a specific social 
innovation or social entrepreneurship project. EMPIS’ financial support is limited to a 
minimum of €50,000 to avoid the need to use ESF mandatory simplified costs rules in 
this programme.  
Eligibility for this programme consists of adopting a venture philanthropy approach: 
philanthropists must commit to the provision of both financial and non-financial support 
for the development of a proven social innovation or entrepreneurship project during a 
period of at least three years, thereby ensuring that grantees become more sustainable 
and effective. The available funding for this program is €20 million. Since there is no 
maximum threshold for this funding, no expectations on the number of projects 
supported have been made. 
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While this programme is expected to widen funding availability and to attract private 
investors, one of the main challenges has to do with the initial cultural shift required for 
changing the traditional relationship between philanthropic organisations and social 
economy entities.  
In addition, philanthropic sources in Portugal traditionally have annual budgets whereas 
this programme demands a multi-year support. This will likely determine that a lower 
number of projects will be supported by philanthropic organisations in a single year in 
exchange for a stronger involvement and longer-term commitment in selected projects. 
Moreover, while the program may attract new capital and will contribute to a shift 
towards a more long term and sustainable engagement by philanthropists it may also be 
used to replace previously committed capital by those philanthropists to support social 
economy entities.  
It will be important to have an adequate monitoring to assess the extent to which the 
program is indeed increasing available funding and shifting the culture of the relationship 
between philanthropists and social economy entities. 
The first programme call took place in the summer of 2016. In this first round, 42 
applications have been approved, involving €7 million from EMPIS. A new selection round 
has closed in January 2018, with 26 applications (€3 million from private investors 
matching approximately €7 million from ESF), and a third one in May 2018, with 91 
applications (where €8 million matched €18.8 million form ESF).  
c) The Social Impact Bonds Outcome Fund 
The aim of this programme is to develop innovative solutions that tackle societal issues in 
areas of public policy, oriented and assessed by outcomes instead of outputs. This will 
promote the importance of outcome-oriented policies amongst public entities while also 
attracting private funding to the provision of social goods. By acting as the direct 
outcome payer, rather than as an investor, EMPIS thus removes an existing bottleneck in 
the SIB development process: convincing public-sector commissioners who are 
traditionally output-focused to shift their commissioning towards outcomes. 
Under this programme, in fact, EMPIS takes the role usually played by local and central 
government in SIBs, paying for the outcomes delivered. This does not imply that public  
entities don’t participate – actually, they must be part of the initial SIBs partnership, 
approving the intervention, identifying the relevant outcomes and stressing its relevance 
and innovation features against the services currently in place. 
Upfront investment can be shared amongst more than one private investor – a 
foundation, a bank or a corporation. The social service provider, investors, and the public  
entity create a partnership, which is responsible to structure the deal and to present it to 
EMPIS applying to the programme. Partners decide on the project size and budget to be 
proposed, as well as target outcomes metrics.  
The available ESF funding for this program is 20 million euros, which is expected to result 
in around 20-25 SIBs until 2020.  
The main challenge lies on the role of local and central governments under the current  
arrangement. By serving as the outcome payer, EMPIS removes the main barrier for the 
development of SIB. However, not having local or central governments paying for 
outcomes might result in less buy-in and accountability (in other words, they have a 
lower incentive to set the right outcomes metrics). To mitigate this, EMPIS makes it 
mandatory for local and central governments to be part of the SIB partnership and 
engage in contract and project management. 
Outcomes payments are paid based on incurred project expenses; this is to say, EMPIS 
does not pay for any financial return on top of the reimbursement on the investment 
made, which might make it less attractive to investors and also lowers the incentives for 
better performance. This is, however, a constraint resulting from the current regulations 
on ESF funds.  
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Interestingly, there are plans being considered to blend outcome payments made by the 
SIB Outcome Fund with top-up from local and central governments thereby correcting 
this problem. 
Moreover, also as a consequence of the expense based payments requirement, the same 
outcomes are worth different prices depending on the time spent since the previous 
outcome took place and the time to the second one. It would be more interesting to 
attach the payment to the actual cost of the outcome and not link it to the project 
expenses during the time to the outcome. This would be a good platform for evidence-
based creation on the cost of solving social issues. This could be done through the use of 
a ESF simplified cost lump sum approach, that under the current EU rules is, however, 
only available to projects below €50,000, a threshold not adjusted to SIBs investment 
that tend to be much higher. 
Thematic calls for proposals were open from August to November 2016. Thematic areas 
included: employment, social protection, health and justice. EMPIS has approved 3 
projects (Code Academy and Go Forward, on youth unemployment, and Project Family, 
on children and youth at risk), and will commit €1.5 million ESF funds to repay initial 
investment from private investors, should the agreed outcomes be achieved. A new 
round, exclusively dedicated to educational projects, and with a total indicative budget of 
5 millions opened in November 2017 and closed in March 2018. It received 15 
applications. A third call dedicated to Social inclusion was scheduled for later in 2018 (Fi-
Compass, 2018). 
d) The Social Innovation Fund 
EMPIS’s fourth financing programme is a wholesale fund that shall co-invest, through 
financial intermediaries, in Portuguese social innovation and social entrepreneurship 
projects, with a track record and potential to generate social and financial returns. The 
aim of this fund of funds is to overcome existing market failures in the access of this type 
of projects to finance, while offering the market new financial facilities, mobilising new 
sources of capital and encouraging investment into the social sector.  
Acting as a cornerstone wholesale investor, EMPIS provides favourable terms and 
conditions to capital holders who wish to create retail structures to fund social innovation 
and entrepreneurship projects. The fund of funds adopts two complementary 
mechanisms: unsecured debt, on the one hand, and quasi-equity and equity finance, on 
the other. The debt mechanism shall be used to fund innovation in more mature social 
enterprises through the provision of asymmetric risk sharing and/or guarantees to co-
investors, therefore improving the risk profile of these products and allowing banks to 
lend to these entities and projects in more favourable terms than before. This type of 
facility is not yet available in Portugal for not-for-profit organisations.  
The equity/quasi-equity mechanism is to be used to fund growth and consolidation of 
social start-ups through the provision of asymmetric return sharing, to co-investors, 
improving the terms in which social venture capital investors and business angels take 
equity stakes and/or sign revenue participation agreements to fund growth and 
consolidation of social start-ups. This will open the way for not-for-profit organisations to 
receive quasi-equity capital, which is also not possible nowadays.  
This is the biggest programme and the only one that is expected to last beyond the 
current funding period, since it is expected to be reimbursed and recycled over and over. 
Available ESF funding for this program is around €95 million to be leveraged by public 
and private investors. Capital should flow to social economy entities through retail 
structures, managed by financial intermediaries. 
One of the main challenges expected with the implementation of the Social Innovation 
Fund is related to the amount of administrative work and conditions demanded by the 
correct management of EU Structural Funds, which may test the smooth functioning of 




Information gathered indicates that discussions on the details on this financial instrument 
have taken place with the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. The 
latter, in particular, has been extremely interested in this instrument that is seen as 
fitting the new priorities for the EIB and EU funds (on the use of competitive financial 
instruments).  
A Fund Manager has been appointed – PME Investimento and, at the time of writing, it  
appeared, that a political decision has been taken to amend this instrument into a more 
retail oriented fund. As recently reported by Fi-Compass, the Social Innovation Fund has 
been created as an autonomous public investment fund by Decree-Law in the beginning 
of 2018, and then approved by the Council of Ministers on 15th March. The President of 
the Portuguese Republic has promulgated it on April 5th 2018.  
While this could be seen as a potential risk of weakening the comprehensive approach 
that the overall EMPIS programme had in its design phase, it should be also considered 
that the implementation delays were a serious motive of concern, since this instrument  
holds 70% of EMPIS’s endowment that shall be deployed until 2023 (following the N+3 
rule). To this extent, the new retail approach may facilitate the absorption of the funds, 
and set the basis for redefining the approach for promoting a broader operational toolkit 
for strengthening the social impact investment market in the next programming period. 
 
4.3. Insights and lessons learned so far 
After looking at the results so far, with three years and a half ahead, it is possible to draw 
some lessons learned and provide some general comments on the Portuguese policy 
framework initiative. Comments are related to the overall original designed initiative and 
do not represent a comprehensive assessment of the initiative of course.  
In fact, although, at the time of writing, four years have passed since its approval, EMPIS 
is in its early days of implementation. Moreover, EMPIS has been following a conservative 
testing and learning process, along with a general approach that aimed at long-term 
results rather than immediate changes. 
The ambition behind the initiative and its broad scope make of EMPIS more than a 
national public initiative to foster social innovation and social investment in the 
Portuguese context. EMPIS has been perceived as a pioneer and testing experience to 
create a suitable market infrastructure with European Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF), clearing the way for other countries to replicate the model. 
Testing, learning, adapting and being very transparent about its experience is how EMPIS 
would yield relevant insights to other countries that are interested in building a social 
impact investment market. Of course, it would be crucial, in this context, for the model to 
be consistently and fully implemented to draw effective lessons for future steps in 
Portugal and other Member States. 
Although being high level, the analysis presented above highlights areas of focus for the 
near future. The biggest threats faced are related with the unbalanced biased that EMPIS 
creates in the market, offering a promising though unsustainable reality, or if the stability 
and long term commitment to the key principles of the project are put into question 
(leading to its captures by the traditional culture).  
EMPIS represents an opportunity to attract new players and to generate new ones; to 
promote competition based outcomes and social change. If instead of creating a wealthy 
outcomes oriented market, money is used to feed existing actors it will be much more 
difficult to claim the potential of social investment in the future.  
In a way, EMPIS is a test to the hypothesis that the most entrenched social issues can be 




As reported below in Table 12, and regardless the exact quantification of the results 
achieved so far, thus more focusing on the processes underlying the life of the 
Portuguese initiative, it is possible to elaborate further on EMPIS’ strengths and 
weaknesses as well as the opportunities and challenges it presents.  
Table 12 – EMPIS SWOT analysis 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
However, still looking at processes, two aspects seem to have played a crucial role for the 
success of such initiative: 
1) There was pre-existing critical mass in the form of the Portuguese Social 
Investment Taskforce (or National Advisory Board). This board, composed 
of 21 members, representing the most influential social institutions in the 
country, had organised themselves to prepare a national strategy. Their 
action plan was structured into supply, demand and market infrastructure 
needs and included: the creation of a unit cost data base (One.Cost), the 
development of social enterprises investment readiness acceleration 
programs (Impact Generator, Amplifica, Montepio Social Tech), the launch 
of a SIB pilot project and the set-up of social investment funds. 
2) The government, in the context of the planning of the EU funds 
programming cycle PT2020, set up a working group that included members 
of the PT2020 team and of the Portuguese Social Investment Taskforce. 
This allowed for a very productive collaboration and an optimal use of the 
existing critical mass on both social innovation and EU structural and 
investment funds. It was then possible to get the political support for a 
catalyst initiative, needed to promote a well-functioning market – the UK 
for example had created a wholesaler fund (Big Society Capital).  
 
Therefore, the main lessons it is possible to draw from the Portuguese experience to date 
are related to the design of a national action plan, the political support and the 
government engagement, and the need for market champions. 
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In fact, and with regard the first lesson learned, i.e. the design of a national action plan, 
the Portuguese Social Investment Taskforce convened decision makers from the public, 
private and social sector and has laid out the foundations for the social impact 
investment ecosystem through five recommendations that tap into the key elements of 
the market. Through this national action plan, EMPIS was able to design funding 
programmes adequate to the market needs.  
Then, the strong political and governmental support since 2013 has played a critical role 
in ensuring the development of the Portuguese social impact investment ecosystem, 
specifically EMPIS. Continuity of support across government is also crucial. Changes in 
government have, so far, not considerably affected the overall Social Impact Agenda 
agenda but it is important to guarantee that it will continue to be the case and that 
recent changes do not correspond to a weakening of that political support and the 
programmes pillars. 
Finally, even though EMPIS is the catalyst entity in this nascent market, other players are 
needed to champion the market. For the Portuguese ecosystem, Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation has been playing a critical role of acting as a cornerstone market player by 
investing both in market-building activities and in developing human resources and 
critical mass on this issue. In addition, the leading role played in Europe on this topic by 
people like the late Diogo Vasconcelos have also raised awareness on the topic at earlier 





5. Italy: A prospective scenario  
5.1. Genealogy of the Italian Social impact investment ecosystem 
5.1.1. Context matters: potential of a consolidated social economy 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, the Italian social impact investment market scores high 
against the framework adopted in this study. However, as seen in the previous chapter on 
Portugal, this does not mean that the rise of a social impact investment market went 
smooth and that it has already achieved its full maturity.  
The Italian social impact investment market, in particular, represents an interesting case: 
its strong and long lasting tradition in the field of Third Sector organisations and social 
finance is, at the same time, its strength and its weakness. On the one hand in fact there 
is a potential wide – although fragmented – demand side; on the other hand, also the 
supply side seems well developed. However, the Italian social impact investment market 
is still far from having achieved a full development and it keeps struggling with some 
burdens to its deployment. In other words, despite the Italian ecosystem has almost all 
the required ingredients, socio-political as well as institutional peculiarities make it 
difficult to see where this richness is heading, or which face the fully mature social 
impact investment market will have. 
Therefore, the aim of the prospective scenario presented in this chapter is to grasp the 
key features of the Italian social impact investment landscape, with a specific attention 
given to the on-going transformations of social entrepreneurship models and the rise of 
an evidence-based culture in the field of social innovation. In other words, this is not a 
case study as the one presented on Portugal, rather a tacking stock exercise on a set of 
different efforts that are shaping – although not yet in a fully clear direction – the future 
of social impact investment in Italy. 
Such a methodological choice and its related approach rely on the lack of any consistent  
and comprehensive public initiative on social innovation, as instead the Portuguese case 
shows. In fact – anticipating here one of the Italian features that will be more extensively 
reported later – it is worth to notice that, while in Portugal private initiatives have been 
nurtured by an ambitious public initiative that assumed the form of a broad policy 
framework programme, the Italian social impact investment ecosystem, following a 
bottom-up approach, is being established almost exclusively by private initiatives put in 
place through the commitment of those actors coming from the field of the social 
economy (such as cooperatives and not-for-profit organisations, or more recently social 
enterprises and hybrid organisation-like entities). 
In other words, the prospective scenario discussed here has a twofold objective: on the 
one hand, to provide a morphological description, in order to have a clear idea of the 
Italian social impact investment landscape; and, on the other hand, to advance a critical 
analysis with regard to the logics and dynamics that are driving the market building 
process in Italy. In particular, the morphological description, despite its limitation due to 
the lack of data, will allow better appreciating some institutional and contextual factors 
that are affecting the debate and the first implementation attempts of social impact 
investment initiatives in the country. 
At the same time, due to possible weakness of a simple descriptive approach, especially 
with regard to the understanding of complex processes such as those behind the birth of 
a market, the morphological description is accompanied by a critical analysis. This is 
conducted mainly through a comparative approach, in which most of the Italian features 
are defined by identifying the differences between the social impact investment market 
developments in Italy and in the most advanced European market, the UK.  
The comparison and the subsequent analysis of the Italian social impact investment 
environment will be therefore useful to explain why the Italian social impact investment  
market, although it belongs to the most performative group of EU Member States, due to 
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its well-grounded tradition and its liveliness, it is not yet fully emerged, and to identify 
possible paths for a future development that takes into consideration the Italian context’s 
peculiarities. 
In the UK, social impact investment emerged as a strategy to face the long lasting cris is 
of the welfare state. The awareness of the gap between the increasing demand for social 
services/protection and the decreasing availability of public resources triggered the 
research for new ways to attract additional private resources to balance the public 
expenditure retrenchment. To this extent the advent of social impact investment in the 
UK, while it represented an answer to the welfare state crisis, it also envisaged a further 
step into the “financialisation process” initiated two decades before the advent of the 
2008 financial downturn. The economic crisis of 2008 acted as an enabler of such a 
process, reducing the families' out of pocket spending capacity, and also affecting their 
fiscal capacity. 
In Italy, instead, the social impact investment approach built on a pre-existing form of 
social finance, and it developed through a quite different path. The Italian social impact 
investment ecosystem did not follow a clear design, being able to be translated into a 
defined strategy and thus to shape a policy agenda (that is what defines the UK 
experience).  
The rise of the Italian social impact investment movement followed rather a bottom-up 
approach. It is not by chance in fact that in Italy, at least in the first phase of 
development, rather than social impact investment, the public discourse focused on 
another term, i.e. “social finance” (finance for those actors working in the field of 
“social”). Indeed this term defined the conceptual perspective through which the social 
impact investment phenomenon has been understood: a set of financial tools and 
products to support and foster the social economy, as an answer to the crisis of the 
Italian long lasting tradition of social finance. This feature characterises the Italian social 
impact investment market development cannot be underestimated when trying to grasp 
its development paths. 
In light of the important role played by the specific institutional settings, in order to 
better understand how the social impact investment practice emerged in Italy, it is worth 
to start with a general overview of the context. It seems reasonable to say that Italy has 
one of the strongest Third Sectors in Europe, ranging from philanthropic foundations to 
cooperatives to social enterprises, generating almost €70 billion (4.3% of GDP) (ISTAT 
2017). Moreover, not-for-profit organisations cover a wide range of activities, spanning, 
from culture, sport and entertainment, to social assistance and care, education and 
research, health or philanthropy. 
The Italian Third Sector is funded by many actors, all belonging to the long lasting 
tradition of social finance which, compared to other countries, showed a quite important  
volume, being one of the biggest in Europe in term of both employed workers and 
number of entities (EESC 2016). To better understand this pre-existing experience, it 
might be useful to mention the emergence of some initiatives by commercial banks and 
philanthropic foundations originated in the Nineties after the adoption of the Amato Law 
act. 
For instance, in 2007 the largest bank in Italy, Banca Intesa San Paolo, founded Banca 
Prossima (and since 2016 this is a Certified Benefit Corporation). Within the Group, 
Banca Prossima was meant to be the bank with the mission of serving lay and religious 
not-for-profit organisations, with a specific service model, products and consulting 
services dedicated to this type of customer.  
Following such an approach, and the willingness to engage with Third Sector 
organisations, also Banca Sella and Banca Esperia established philanthropic funds, with 
the aim of collecting capital, invest it in products able to give a market -average return, 
and devolve a percentage of their fees to charitable organisations.  
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Another relevant initiative is represented by the launch of social bonds: designed and 
implemented by UBI Banca (the third retail bank in the country), social bonds are debt  
that the bank sells on the market to finance its own operations; the bonds are “social” 
because the bank commits to devolve to charitable activities a small percent age of the 
return to investors.  
At the same time, the appearance of bank foundations in the Italian economic landscape 
has been the result of a deep legislative process of reform involving the Italian banking 
system during the Nineties. Following these legal initiatives, Italy had a strong, new, 
private foundation community created out of a process of privatization. 
The financial weight of such an experience makes Italy the world leader in the field of 
what Salamon has labelled as “Philanthropication thru Privatization” (2014b), meaning 
with this expression the process through which the creation of significant endowed 
charitable foundations out of the proceeds of the privatization of state-owned, or state-
controlled assets, is achieved. A figure that might give an idea of the overall comparative 
picture is the one reporting the number and the assets amount for the main countries 
that – since the Nineties – have been affected by this process of change (Table 13). 
This shows that the seeds for the social impact investment landscape in Italy can be 
found somehow ante litteram since the creation of cooperative banks, further reinforced 
by the creation of numerous institutions operating in the credit sector, which extended 
their services to the Third Sector. These institutions have always operated with relatively 
simple financial instruments, being mainly focused on the provision of credit through 
mortgages and loans. More recently, however, the availability of credit to Third Sector 
has been mainly provided as a contribution to the liquidity of not-for-profit organisations, 
which had a large part of their revenues from the outsourcing of public services and the 
grant-making activities of the strong philanthropic sector. 
Table 13 - A “Philanthropication thru Privatisation” comparison across countries 
Country 
Foundations Assets 
Number % Amount (US$ Millions) % 
Austria 33 6.1% $4,882.9 3.6% 
Belgium 1 0.2% $408.2 0.3% 
Brazil 3 0.6% $2,542.8 1.9% 
Canada 1 0.2% $53.0 0.0% 
Czech Republic 73 13.5% $206.7 0.2% 
Germany 29 5.4% $15,672.1 11.6% 
Hungary 1 0.2% N/A N/A 
Italy 103 19.1% $72,021.9 53.4% 
Netherlands 1 0.2% $497.8 0.4% 
New Zealand 36 6.7% $7,073.7 5.2% 
Norway 4 0.7% $6,227.7 4.6% 
Poland 4 0.7% $511.3 0.4% 
Slovakia 2 0.4% $24.7 0.0% 
Sweden 35 6.5% $1,478.8 1.1% 
United Kingdom 9 1.7% $3,170.7 2.4% 
United States 199 36.9% $19,988.5 14.8% 
Other 5 0.9% N/A N/A 
Total 539 100% $134,760.8 100% 
Source: Adapted from Salamon 2014. 
As it seems clear from the information reported above, the history of Italian social 
finance is rooted in a long lasting tradition of financial credit services, philanthropy and 
public procurement of social services. Although many more cultural factors have a real 
explanatory power, numbers behind the Italian social finance’s story partly explain the 
reason why the Italian Third Sector, or social economy, can be considered as one of the 
most developed in Europe.  
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5.1.2. Third Sector and finance: the starving cycle of not-for-profits 
Against such a rich landscape of experiences, it is however difficult to avoid an 
uncomfortable question: why has the pre-existence of such a developed social finance 
sector not translated into a prompt and full emergence of a strong social impact 
investment market? The answer to such a question is in part related to how the 
relationship between capitals in support of the Third Sector and all the various actors 
related to it has been structured. 
Above all, it is a matter of understanding what effects the already existing social finance 
has had in terms of behaviour and morphology of Third Sector organisations. To this end, 
it is needed to shift the focus from the quantity of available resources to their quality: 
this means looking at the relationships the not-for-profit sector established with the 
world of financial services, the use the Third Sector made of the received resources, and 
the consequences this relationship had with regard to the behaviour and morphology of 
the social economy actors. 
To this extent, and in order to complete the picture of the pre-existing Italian social 
finance, it should be mentioned the role of the public sector: in fact, at least since the 
Nineties, under the influence of New Public Management approaches and the trend 
toward privatisation in service delivery, and therefore the development of what has been 
named “welfare mix”, a pervasive process of contracting out has been put in place, 
meaning an increased role of not-for-profit organisations in the delivery system of social 
and health related services (Ascoli and Ranci 2002). This phenomenon, which 
consequences might be appreciated still today, brought the Third Sector to be heavily 
dependent on public resources, i.e. payments made by the public sector versus 
production and delivery of services (traditionally priced for the outputs). 
However, to the purpose of the reflection here proposed, the financial dependency of the 
Third Sector it is not the only relevant aspect to be taken into account. In fact, according 
to Ranci et al. (2005), the state and the Third Sector were heavily dependent on each 
other in functional terms, but this did not translated into any close co-operation in setting 
goals and planning, thus giving rise to a contradiction which seems to be particular to the 
Italian case: the close functional interdependence seems emerging along with weak 
government regulation of the sector and a failure to base the partnership regime on 
explicit criteria of what is public interest.  
In other terms, while the recognition of the role of not-for-profit organisations as either 
primary or supplementary providers of social services was not clearly defined in law and 
government programs, being such a recognition very often implicit, the relationships 
established between the public sector and the Third Sector may therefore be defined in 
terms of a “mutual accommodation” model (Ranci et al. 2005). This mutual 
accommodation consisted of a relationship in which there was no co-operation between 
State and Third Sector with regard to objectives and planning, rather a strong functional 
interdependence between the two. 
Since the scope of the not-for-profit world and the public sector relationships was 
basically the delivery of services, and considering the increasing influence of New Public  
Management approaches, focused on efficiency and cost-effectiveness of purchased 
services, the idea of a Third Sector able to deliver high quality services with very low 
operational costs quickly spread and became part of the public mind-set. 
This idea has been strengthened by the approach assumed more recently by the Italian 
public administration. According to many scholars (Ranci et al. 2005) in fact, the Italian 
public sector, in contrast with what advocated by the Law 328 of 2000, which was meant  
to open the season of a new subsidiarity, seems to consider itself as the only subject 
authorised to read and interpret raising social needs, identify and design the social 
services that a Third Sector organisation will be contracted to (only) deliver.  
This implies also what has been defined as the “copyist paradox”: once the mechanisms 
of engagement and dialogue with civil society organizations and stakeholders has been 
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undermined, the public administration basically proceeded to replicate, almost 
mechanically, the already in place social programs, without questioning the relevance of 
the provision of services with respect to social needs (Mento 2018). These two aspects, 
along with the focus on efficiency, brought to an isomorphic process of the Third Sector 
organisations, which – according to Carazzone – lost their identity, and the awareness of 
their mission, becoming mere suppliers of services (2018). 
Such a picture, probably a bit too severe, however explains why a strong preconception, 
the one that would like to see Third Sector organisations always reducing their 
management costs to the extreme, has remained strong in the public opinion, as well as 
among the operators in the sector. The myth of the need for Third Sector organisations 
to squeeze their operational and management costs was indeed quite spread in many 
countries. However, while this idea has been declining in several countries over the last 
decade, and an increasing number of experts and stakeholders started to confute it, in 
Italy it remained monolithic and unchallenged in the public opinion, and stereotyped in 
the practices of most public and private donors6. 
The mantra that the Third sector itself should be cheap and that all funding should be 
allocated to projects with the related formula of the percentage of structural costs / 
general costs as the only indicator of efficiency, reduced Third Sector entities to “project-
builders or project-executors”, with inadequate organisations, structures and staff. 
Indeed, both in the case of organisations that work with the public administration, and in 
the case of organisations supported by philanthropic foundations, individual projects have 
become more and more the driving force – when not the inspiring one – for Third Sector 
actions, thus reducing these organisations' long-term vision and their ability to design 
development strategies. 
A “working by projects” approach, used as a main tool of action for Third sector 
organizations, has in fact supported the idea that expected results can be reached 
through a list of predefined activities in a limited time, with a predetermined budget all or 
almost to be allocated to activities that do not cover the organisation's general operating 
costs, but must be additional. This approach does not allow such organisations to create 
a real a transformative social impact of the system, since based on instruments that are 
not able to capture the complexity of the processes of social change, trying to harness 
articulated actions in linear meshes, way too narrow, limited and binding. The 
institutionalisation of the separation between the promotion of processes of social change 
and activities has thus produced an inherent weakness of not-for-profit organisations and 
their almost total dependence from projects (Carazzone 2018)7. 
Therefore, the idea of an almost zero operating cost of Third Sector organisations, 
together with the bidding mechanism, strongly exposed the Italian Third Sector 
organisations to the risk of a “starvation cycle”: this happened with the increasing level 
of vital competition between not-for-profit entities and produced an effect of adaptation, 
of isomorphism of the organisations of the Third Sector as efficient project designers and 
mere service providers. 
Over the time indeed, Italian Third Sector organisations had to start dealing with this 
starvation cycle risks, evocated by cash flow and operational capital issues, due to 
payment schedules policy adopted by the public administrations and related delays in 
transferring resources.  
                                     
6 The percentage of operational costs for Third Sector organisations usually span between 7% and 15%, and 
only in few cases it reaches higher point. However it is always lower than the average for for-profit actors that 
are usually around 35% (see The real cost of doing business , Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classification). 
7 These morphological dynamics have been considered by the literature since at least a decade, when Goggins 
Gregory and Howard published The Nonprofit Starvation Cycle on the Stanford Social Innovation Review 
(2009). In their article there was a clear depiction of this starvation cycle, that according to the authors, 
envisages three main elements, mutually linked in a vicious cycle starting with (i) funders’ unrealistic 
expectations on the operating costs of running a not-for-profit organisation, which brings to (ii) an adjustment / 
misrepresentation of overhead costs by Third Sector entities, that in turn, (iii) spend little and / or report back 
less than what they really spend, reinforcing false and unrealistic funders' expectations, perpetuating the myth 
that Third Sector organizations are expected to do more and more with less and less (Carazzone 2018). 
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Also those actors populating the so-called Third Sector that were and still are used to 
work with the support of philanthropic foundations faced this starvation cycle risk. To this 
extent is important to notice that Italian philanthropic foundations have always mainly 
worked through a grant-making approach, sometimes with some sort of reporting back, 
and in any case on the basis of clear projects (Carazzone 2018). To this purpose, the two 
main adopted mechanisms to select projects to be funded were either a direct proposal 
from a Third Sector entity, which would have become a beneficiary or a competition 
among different proposals, all elaborated to comply with the specific requirements of the 
open call. 
However, the risk of a starvation cycle of Third Sector organisations has been in part 
mitigated, by the fact that an important number of resources has been made available by 
social finance actors offering not-too-complex financial products, mainly debt products 
like loans, in order to allow Third Sector entities to overcome their issues of liquidity and 
to make small and short-term investments8. This allowed not-for-profit organisations, 
either in the case they were working mainly with the public sector, or in the case of not -
for-profit entities used to work on individual projects funded by philanthropic foundations 
(or in the case of a mix of both), to develop a relationship with the financial system 
mainly oriented to cover possible operating costs, while waiting a payment from the 
public administration or the award of funding for a project by a philanthropic foundation. 
5.1.3. When the financial crisis hits: the rise of Social impact investment 
In light of the above-illustrated trends, it is easy to understand that the 2008 financial 
crisis had important effects on the emergence of social impact investment in Italy. One of 
the main consequences of the decrease in the volume of available resources has been the 
higher level of competition among Third sector’s organisations, which in turn exacerbated 
those structural limitations at the basis of the starvation cycle risk. On this point it is 
worth also remember the reduction in household spending capacity for health and care 
services, another important item of the Third Sector organisations’ lines of revenue. 
These trends need moreover to be considered along with the general credit-crunch the 
credit system was suffering as a whole.  
In such a situation, the starvation cycle, initially perceived as a potential risk, became 
real, with some relevant effects, including a polarisation between size and wealth of 
organisations: bigger and better structured organisations continued to grow, while 
smaller ones started facing financial instability. Nevertheless, the Italian Third Sector has 
been able to face the crisis, above all due to its high resilience and to a diversification of 
revenue strategy, such as greater openness to the market and new forms of engagement 
with private donors. 
This allowed developing within the Third Sector a deep reflection, precisely in the 
direction of overcoming some cultural prejudices that for a long time has characterised it. 
This represented also the beginning of a general rethinking of the Third Sector as a 
producer of social innovation. In fact, the discovery of the Italian Third Sector productive 
capacity meant to question that model of mutual accommodation for which the Third 
Sector would be seen – for reasons of overall volumes and economic resources – as 
subordinate to others. 
This reflection, still underway and not without internal resistance, has however reached 
the idea that, in order to face the great social challenges in a courageous, innovative and 
effective way, rather than funding for specific projects, the Italian Third Sector needs 
general operational support (overhead/core support), that is funding for the strategic 
objectives of the organisation – “mission-oriented” as Mariana Mazzucato would say 
(2016). In line with such reflection, a broader and general rethinking spread in Italy in 
the last years. 
                                     
8 As an indicator, still in 2016, according to UBI-AICCON, the demand of finance in the sector mainly concerned 
loans and debt products in order to cover costs related to project's activities (2017).  
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This general rethinking constituted a window of opportunity for social impact investment 
to enter into the Italian debate, especially due to some actors that made such a topic the 
object of their mission. Therefore, while the social impact investment debate in the UK 
begun with a top-down initiative by the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron, thus 
adopting forms and style, but also times and scale, of a public policy strategy, in Italy it  
started from a self-awareness exercise of a limited group of actors, as a grass-roots 
movement advocating for a change from a bottom-up perspective, and – probably the 
most important feature – building on the pre-existing social finance tradition.  
In Italy, social impact investment has been thus proposed as strategy for a 
modernisation of the old social finance sector, the finance for those bodies playing within 
a defined perimeter, which is the Third Sector. To this extent, the social impact 
investment in Italy can be considered a conceptual spin-off of the Third Sector, and at 
least in a first phase, it has been conceived as an add-on, not a real strategy of general 
rethinking of the system. While this may be an element of weakness, since there is not a 
comprehensive vision able to act as a coordinating element at the policy level, on the 
other hand the raise of social impact investment represents a slow but not subject to the 
policy agenda process, therefore with a potential capacity for enabling a solid 
institutionalisation development, thus with a greater possibility of lastingly entering into 
the ethos of the actors already involved and of those that will be touched by this new 
possible paradigm change. 
 
5.2. An increasing interest and the first movers in Italy 
5.2.1. Experimentation and advocacy for the Third Sector reform 
To better understand strengths and weaknesses, as well as prospective developments of 
the social impact investment in Italy is important to look at the dynamics and paths 
through which it entered the Italian institutional and entrepreneurial systems. In ot her 
words, to build a prospective scenario for the Italian social impact investment market, 
and to assess its potential, it is crucial to pay attention to the historical emergence of 
social impact investment in Italy, starting with the consideration on how it affected the 
Third Sector reform. In fact, although not dissipating the silent misunderstanding of 
social impact investment as a new generation of the more traditional social finance, the 
debate that brought to the Third Sector reform in Italy owes the social impact investment 
debate many of its innovations, which in turns represent a first achieved result of the 
efforts put in place by several actors. 
Social impact investment entered into the Italian debate in 2013, through the 
participation in the G8 Taskforce on the topic, created by the then UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron, and led by Sir Ronald Cohen. At the same time, the adoption of the 
Italian Social Innovation Agenda proposed by the Italian Ministry for Research, allowed to 
identify a set of actions to address the most pressing social challenges faced by the 
country, and included reference to innovative financial tools that were considered 
enablers to unleash social innovation in the country9. 
With the endorsement of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the work of the G8 
Social Impact Investment Taskforce brought to the creation of the Italian National 
Advisory Board (NAB) coordinated by Giovanna Melandri, president of Human 
Foundation, and which has engaged representatives of the not -for-profit, private and 
public sector, resulted in the publication of a report aimed to catalyse social impact 
investments in Italy (Italian NAB 2014)10. 
                                     
9 In the same year, Italy has been the first EU country to adopt a regulatory framework on equity 
crowdfunding, which scholars have considered as one particular form of social impact investment (Bugg-Levine 
& Emerson 2011). 
10 Within the international debate led by the Taskforce, Italy has been since the beginning the flagbearer of a 
specific standpoint: «the characteristics, and the existence, of the social impact investment market depend on 
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Such an approach played a crucial role also with regard to the social impact investment  
advocacy strategy, i.e. shaping the efforts put in place by several Italian organisations. 
The starting point was in fact what has been shown by a Thomson Reuters Foundation’s 
survey, which after an analysis of different countries in terms of the presence of a 
supportive environment for social enterprises, stated that social enterprises in Italy find 
highly difficult to get grant funding and even more to get debt and equity funding 
(TIRESIA 2016). 
In the wake of this awareness, and building on first results achieved from a set of policy 
initiatives adopted between 2012 and 2013 with regard to technological and socially-
driven innovative start-ups (start-up innovative a vocazione sociale), one of the 
recommendations proposed by the Italian National Advisory Board was to include a set of 
benefits and incentives into the Legislative Decree that would have regulated the raising 
phenomenon of social enterprises. In fact, the previous overall legal framework for social 
enterprises was seen as too restrictive and not aligned with the emerging needs of these 
entities (Calderini & Chiodo 2014). 
The effort of the Italian NAB of the G8 Taskforce, formally ended in September 2014 with 
the publication of the report La finanza che include: gli investimenti ad impatto sociale 
per una nuova economia, has contributed to trigger the debate about the opportunities to 
leverage additional private capitals, beyond the philanthropic ones, and to use an 
outcome based approach in financing organisations with social goals.  
In January 2016, the Italian NAB has been transformed into the Social Impact Agenda 
(SIA), an association that intends to be the advocacy network of Italian social impact 
investors11. Beyond the monitoring of the implementation of National Advisory Board’s 
recommendations, SIA aims to perform advocacy activities, supporting pilots’ 
development, studying emerging best practices and produce a contribution to the 
international debate chaired by the Global Social Impact Investment Steering Group.  
Comparing the new Italian NAB, i.e. SIA, with other national advisory boards and their 
successors, a main aspect that characterises the Italian experience is the establishment 
of a scientific committee, with which SIA launched a series of working papers, with the 
aim of further developing the understanding of a growing and quick-spreading 
phenomenon, and through which contributed to shape and keep updated the Italian 
narrative on social impact investment. The relevance of this approach, according to what 
was also advocated by experts in the field since 2015, is the building process toward an 
epistemic community that might support an interesting practice to become a possible 
paradigm shift (Pasi 2015)12. 
The advocacy efforts made by SIA, leveraging also on the commitment of the forming 
epistemic community, heavily affected the debate and the policy responses given by the 
Italian Government: in June 2016, the Italian legislator issued a Law delegating to the 
Government the reform of Third Sector and social enterprise and the discipline of 
universal civil service. By the beginning of August 2017, most of the subsequent 
implementing decrees were published in the Italian Official Journal and, including some of 
the Italian NAB recommendations and evidence coming from the experts’ debate, what 
resulted is an attempt at harmonising, simplifying and incentivising the Italian Third 
sector13.  
                                                                                                                   
the features of social purpose organization and it is important to avoid the mistake to develop financial 
instruments that do not respond to the real needs of social enterprises» (TIRESIA 2016). 
11 Its members are several banks, aggregators of so cial enterprises, impact funds, foundation, insurance 
companies and consultancy firms. 
12 Looking at this growing scientific community, it is worth to mention TIRESIA, the first research centre fully 
dedicated to the topic of social impact investment, created in 2014. Led by a former member of the G8 Task 
Force and president of SIA’s scientific committee, Professor Mario Calderini, TIRESIA quickly contributed to 
establish Politecnico di Milano among the top 10 universities performing teaching and research activities on 
social impact investment and its research activity is acknowledged by importa nt academic journals (Daggers 
and Nicholls 2016).  
13 Some changes in the legislator perceptions of the undergoing transformation within the Third Sector, and its 
willingness to support them, could also be appreciated when considering that already before th e formal  
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However, the awareness of the need to change within the Italian Third Sector, and the 
belief that social impact investment could have been an opportunity to unleash such 
required transformation, precedes the adoption of the legal framework for the Third 
Sector. Along with the debate on the reform, banking foundations have shown interest 
for the development of new financial instruments and the creation of an ecosystem ready 
to receive new investments. While this can be considered a signal of available resources 
to feed the social impact investment market, it also shows the bottom-up approach that 
social impact investment in Italy is following, as set out since the beginning by the Italian 
NAB and then SIA. 
In fact, within a quite extensive set of activities and initiatives already in places, at least 
since 2007, foundations started some piloting tests with debt and bond instruments 
within the raising social impact investment market.  
Cariplo Foundation, for instance, is playing a leading role in building the social innovation 
ecosystem and opened a new line of social impact investment along with more traditional 
grant-making. It provides a good example of the dynamics taking place in the Italian 
system. Already in 2015, Sergio Urbani, Secretary General of Fondazione Cariplo 
explained that «Mission Connected Investments (MCIs) are targeted socially responsible 
investments that yield social and environmental returns, while seeking moderate financial 
returns (2% above inflation)».  
This is the investment philosophy that was behind the extensive Social Housing 
programme designed and implemented by Fondazione Cariplo at least since 2004, when 
it created the Fondazione Housing Sociale, with the aim of beginning to experiment an 
innovative model based on sustainability and ethical investment, with the objective of 
expanding the range of planning instruments and seeking to involve in its initiatives other 
public and private institutions interested in supporting the Lombardy region in addressing 
the issue of disadvantaged conditions in housing through real estate projects of a social 
nature. 
More recently Fondazione Cariplo created the Giordano Dell'Amore Fondazione Social 
Venture, with the aim of supporting the emerging social impact investment market, via 
direct investments and capacity building. This initiative should couple with the Cariplo 
Social Innovation program, and together, they constitute the Cariplo Foundation’s 
intersectorial programme, to contribute building the Italian social impact investment 
ecosystem.14  
Another example is Fondazione CRT, which already in 2007 founded a dedicated vehicle, 
named Fondazione Sviluppo e Crescita CRT. This is a not-for-profit organisation that 
focuses on the development and growth of the local Piedmont and Val d’Aosta territory, 
and according to its statute, it «operates in accordance with the traditional and 
institutional activity of the Fondazione CRT including numerous innovative activities in the 
field of impact investing». 
Through its interventions the Fondazione aims to transfer skills, develop new networks, 
increase the sustainability of projects and promote innovation. To achieve these goals, 
the Fondazione’s activities are planned mainly along three relevant paths.  
                                                                                                                   
approval of the Third Sector reform, and while the debate was still in its more open stage, Italy has been the 
first country in the world, after the United States, to recognise the Benefit Corporation (B-Corp) model into its 
legal system, thus acknowledging and accepting the possibility of hybrid organisations playing at the cross -
roads of traditional and social economy. In Italy there are now almost 170 certified benefit corporations.  
14 Cariplo Social Innovation, in particular, is focused on the demand side of a potential market: the idea is to 
support and enhance Third Sector organisations’ capacity willing to enter a new social entrepreneurship 
dimension oriented to produce social innovation via economically sustainable initiatives. Fondazione So cial 
Venture, instead, will act mainly as an investor, either through direct investment or co -investments. However, 
within the scope of the foundation’s mission, there is also the aim of disseminating knowledge on social impact 
investment, thus confirming on the one hand the importance of this dimension in shaping an emerging market, 
and on the other hand, the need for a further effort in building the related epistemic community, keeping the 
debate alive and updated. 
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First, social housing: in this field seems to be worth to mention the Ivrea 24-SHARING 
initiative, which is a temporary social housing initiative in Turin, established in 2011 to 
meet the needs for temporary rental properties at controlled costs and is characterised 
by high energy efficiency with a low environmental impact. Still in the field of social 
housing, in 2008, Fondazione Sviluppo e Crescita CRT created the Fondo Social & Human 
Purpose, an initiative belonging to the Socially Responsible Investing, where ethical and 
financial principles are both taken into account. Managed by Real Estate Asset 
Management (REAM) SGR S.p.A, is exclusively supported by Piedmontese foundations of 
banking origins.  
A second path of activities is the one in which there are shareholding and special 
investing vehicles: here it needs to be anticipated that since 2007 Fondazione Sviluppo e 
Crescita CRT has invested in PerMicro, a company specialised in microcredit and birth in 
Turin thanks to some of the Italian social impact investment pioneers.  
Finally, Fondazione Sviluppo e Crescita CRT is active in the field of entrepreneurship and 
innovation carrying out several initiatives, among which some are related to 
crowdfunding, and others, such as the initiative Call4Ideas, oriented to select enterprises 
or entrepreneurial ideas with high potential social impact with the aim of supporting them 
in the definition phase of their business model, and in their growth15. 
Therefore, to sum up, it can be argued that the raise of attention for the social impact 
investment phenomenon in Italy, and the attempts to build a related marketplace, came 
from some actors originally involved with the G8 Task Force that tried to translate the 
social impact investment global debate into the Italian one, i.e. the reform of the Third 
Sector and its need for overcoming the risk of a starvation cycle.  
Thus the Italian social impact investment development assumed a specific demand side 
and bottom-up perspective, characterised by advocacy activities in which the scientific 
debate played a crucial role in shaping the emergence of a more comprehensive 
community, that in turn is becoming instrumental in supporting some experimentations 
put forward by philanthropic foundations. 
5.2.2. Supply and demand: between innovation and path dependencies 
In a context characterised by a growing interest for social impact investment schemes 
and principles, along with the advocacy activities mentioned above, many initiatives have 
been designed, implemented and promoted, either as pilot projects or new programmes. 
Although these initiatives claim to be linked to the social impact investment 
phenomenon, most of them seem to fit more with the pre-existing Italian social finance 
approach rather than with innovative financial schemes that embed the social returns 
into the financial revenues. 
However, to be consistent with the purpose of this prospective scenario exercise, it is 
useful to mention few initiatives that seem to embody the most characterising Italian 
elements and dynamics of the social impact investment market development. To this 
extent it is not required that the initiatives below presented have already shown proved 
and achieved impacts, or even that the initiative has been fully implemented: what 
seems to be relevant is in fact the design and the adopted principles, since the rationale 
is to grasp logics and possible patterns guiding the emerging social impact investment 
market in Italy. 
                                     
15 On a different scale, but of particular interest, in 2012, Fondazione Sviluppo e Crescita CRT created Cantieri 
OGR-Torino – Società OGR-CRT, a dedicated vehicle that purchased the 20,000 square meters, h -shaped 
building, the offices and the yards, previously known as Officine Grandi Riparazion i (OGR). This was an 
abandoned late XIX century industrial complex led to its planned demolition since the early Ninties. Through 
Cantieri OGR-Torino – Società OGR-CRT and an overall investment of 100 million euros, the property has been 
returned to the city, converted into a «new heart beating on creativity, culture and shows, projected towards 
the world». Behind the radical refurbishment and conversion of the OGR there was a plan characterised by hi -
tech solutions, environmental sustainability, historical preservation, versatility of spaces and accessibility for all. 
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This is the case of an initiative that is worth to be mentioned, despite the project 
remained at a design phase and has not been implemented up to date. In 2014, with the 
involvement of the Group Intesa Sanpaolo (through Banca Prossima), an interesting 
financial scheme has been designed and proposed in the area of waste cycle 
management by the city of Naples, which to dispose of one tonne of waste at facilities 
located in Northern Italy, including the cost of transportation, was spending about €140. 
To cope with such an expense, which, did not end in itself precisely because of damages 
to the city's reputation, the administration presented a project for the construction of a 
composting plant for an overall cost of €14.6 million in Scampia, one of the poorest 
districts in the city. The project envisaged building a modular type plant that, thanks to 
innovative technologies, does not involve combustion rather cold extraction without 
emission of substances and odours produces biogas, in addition to significant amounts of 
high quality compost16.  
The Intesa Sanpaolo Group, through Branca Prossima, expressed its willingness to 
finance the plant by issuing a bond, called TRIS (Titolo di RIduzione della Spesa pubblica, 
i.e. Bond for the Reduction of Public Spending). TRIS was designed as a risk-free bond 
(since Intesa Sanpaolo was guaranteeing the entire project cost) that would have yield to 
investors interests in line with those of public debt bonds, over f ive years. Interestingly, 
the pricing of invested capital, i.e. the interest rates for repayment of funding, was a 
linked to the reduction of public spending in the waste cycle management. In fact, 
important savings were expected: ASIA, the publicly owned company that manage the 
entire waste management process in Naples, on the basis of the new agreement, would 
spend €100 per tonne to give the new plant the collected waste (compared to the 
previous cost of €40 per tonne). This would imply a saving of about €800,000 per year 
with respect to the past. To sum up, the scheme envisaged first, quantified savings for 
the City (€40 per tonne of wet waste treated); second, zero risk for private or 
institutional investors (the whole investment was backed up by the Bank’s guarantee); 
and third, no public entity issuing the bond, rather a private player17. 
Another relevant case is the UBI Social Project Finance. Since November 2015, UBI has 
undertaken what can be considered the first Social Impact Project Finance initiative in 
Italy, in order to renovate a local residential care home in Turin and improve assistance 
for the elderly by creating a network of services for the local community. The goal was to 
increase the number of care homes from 117 to 144 and maintain them over time, 
besides delivering a minimum of 400 hours of home care per year (equalling care 
services to around 100 elderlies) by the Alice Project.The project involved total financing 
of €8 million granted by UBI Banca to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) owned by Torino 
Sociale Cooperativa Sociale Onlus (TSC Onlus), a local not -for-profit, and with additional 
support to the Alice Project, in partnership with the City of Turin and the local health 
authorities (ASLTo1 and ASLTo2) for elderly assistance. The project included a Senior 
Line (16 years) of approximately €6 million to TSC Onlus, and repayment through cash 
flows generated from the delivery of care services. Additionally, the initiative has been 
designed to achieve a possible reduction of the spread applied by UBI Banca to TSC 
Onlus by 0.25%, based on the attainment of predetermined objectives, through a pay-
for-success approach. UBI Banca committed in paying €18,000 as a donation to cover 
the initial costs plus annual donations for a total up to €160,000 to the Alice Project, 
subject to the achievement of objectives which, as a start -up, would have encountered 
considerable difficulties in gaining access to sources of finance. Therefore, the Social 
Impact Project Finance played a pivotal role in guaranteeing on-going financial support.  
                                     
16 The plant was projected to have a maximum capacity of about 20,000 tons a year of separated waste, 
producing more than 7,000 tons per year of high quality compost and 1.3 million cubic meters a year of 
methane (Pasi 2015). 
17 Social impact was not simply linked to the size of ecologically sustainable waste management, because in the 
projected case it was planned that different social enterprises would have been involved in the various phases 
of the cycle of waste exploitation, thus helping to address an additional social problem, namely unemployment 
and integration of disadvantaged people particularly affected by the downturn in the labour market . 
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A different case, which however shares many features with those illustrated above, is the 
Social Impact Bond for social and labour market inclusion of ex-offenders. Although not 
started yet, it is entering in an implementing stage, with the signature of underlying 
contracts. Interestingly, the pilot project stems from the feasibility study The application 
of pay-by-result tools for the innovation of social and labour reintegration programs for 
detained persons, and represents a new model of public -private collaboration. 
Fondazione Sviluppo and Crescita CRT and Human Foundation carried out the study, with 
the contribution of the Polytechnic of Milan, the University of Perugia and KPMG, along 
with the support of the Department of Penitentiary Administration and the effective 
collaboration of the management of the Lorusso and Cutugno Institute of Turin. In this 
sense what seems important here is that the feasibility study has been the instrument 
through which many actors gathered around a common concrete objective: in such an 
attempt, stakeholders with a long tradition and belonging to a social finance world pre-
existing to the advent of the social impact investment have interacted with new actors, 
born with the emergence of innovative financing models for social impact. The dialogue 
between these actors and others, such as two universities and a consulting firm, as well 
as public actors, is an important feature of this new effort. 
A more recent case that needs to be noticed is the case of Ospedal Grando in Treviso. In 
September 2017, Ospedal Grando Impact Investing (OGII) was established as a 
company limited by shares with the mission to carry out social impact investments 
aligned with the project for the new hospital in Treviso. According to Addarii et al. 
(2018), this might be the first social impact investment initiative in Italy devised with an 
explicit purpose to combine profitability and impact to unlock the potential of a large 
infrastructure project accelerating innovation, economic growth and greater value 
generation for the local community. The main goal of the project in fact is to create a 
regional hub for health, with a total value of €250 million. The project was initiated in 
2011 when the public sector was experiencing unprecedented restrictions on access to 
capital. So the Veneto regional authority which is in charge of health policy, opted for 
project finance. Lendlease, an Australian multinational corporation specialised in urban 
regeneration and infrastructure projects, won the contract to finance, design, build and 
operate the non-medical services for 21 years. Together with other financial and 
industrial partners Lendlease established the Special Purpose Vehicle Ospedal Grando 
S.p.A. (OG) to operate the project.  
Although the initial plan was to issue a project bond to finance the project instead of 
borrowing from banks (as often happens in the United States to finance local 
infrastructures), the adopted solution found another form, since the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) offered to finance the project in a club deal with UniCredit Group, 
and Intesa Sanpaolo Bank Group. The lowest rate in the market performed by the EIB 
reduced significantly the cost of lending, and the use of the European Fund for Strategic  
Investment (EFSI) guarantee allowed managing the risks attached to financing the 
construction phase. EIB financed €29 million and OG saved 0.9% on the cost of debt, 
realising €1.8 million in savings that were earmarked for the capitalisation of OGII, the 
social impact investment vehicle, and investments in entrepreneurial initiatives related to 
public health in Treviso and the rest of the Veneto Region as, for instance, new e-health 
services. The choice to use the savings in their entirety for this purpose – instead of 
extra dividends for the shareholders, reducing the costs of the public sector or a grant to 
the community – was an initiative of Lendlease then formalised in the financing contract  
between OG and the banks18. 
This case is especially relevant because transforming the financial model for the 
infrastructure project, has generated new resources to be invested as a corporate 
venture capital operation with impact and has increased the overall value of the 
                                     
18 Benefiting from the length of the contractual relationship and leveraging on evident impact on the well-being 
of the local community, Lendlease wanted to test the potential of social impact investment principles to improve 
the current model for infrastructure projects and tasked PlusValue, a London-based research and consultancy 
company specialised in social innovation solutions to support and advice on such an endeavour.  
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infrastructure project with benefits for all shareholders. If on the one hand the case 
represents a pilot to prove how social impact investment can be embedded in projects 
financed by the EIB, justifying the special lending conditions the EIB offers, on the other 
hand it also shows that social impact investment can operate at scale, being relevant to 
major industrial players and institutional investors19.  
5.2.3. Public-side initiatives: a scattered plan of actions 
While bottom-up social impact investment initiatives have started to be designed and 
implemented, often with the involvement of the public sector, public -driven initiatives 
designed according to social impact investment principles, or aiming at supporting such 
practice, despite having been advocated by many actors, seems not having been fully 
implemented so far. 
In particular, some initiatives have been set up to support the Italian social economy. 
Among these, it is worth to mention for instance the fund for social enterprises from the 
Ministry of Economic Development. On April 2017, the Ministry in concert with the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policies launched a new policy initiative envisaging a set of 
aid and incentives to support the development of the social economy. The initiative 
assumed the form of a revolving fund with the goal of enabling the access to credit 
services for the Italian social enterprises. The measure is among those legislative 
initiatives that accompanied the Third Sector reform. The initiative envisages an active 
role and a direct responsibility of the bank, called to carry out an assessment of the 
socio-economic impact of the proposed investment programs. This assessment will 
consider three specific areas of impact: increasing employment of disadvantaged 
categories, social inclusion of vulnerable people and safeguarding and enhancing the 
environment, territory and cultural heritage20.  
Despite the innovative aspects and the positive impact this initiative, and similar as well, 
might have, however, it should be noticed that most of them seem to be more aligned 
with traditional sectorial incentivising policies rather than a policy oriented in supporting 
the raise of a social impact investment market in Italy21. 
Among the public-driven initiatives closer to the field of social impact investment, one of 
the most advanced so far, at least in terms of conceptualisation and design, is probably 
the new Social Impact Investing Fund built by Regione Sardegna. During 2016, in fact, 
the Regional Council of the Region of Sardinia established an innovative financial 
engineering tool aimed at supporting pilot activities of social entrepreneurship that have 
a positive, measurable social and employment impact. Crucial to the overall design of the 
initiative is in fact the possibility to verify the social impact achieved, thus ensuring 
transparency and accountability in the management of the financial instrument. 
                                     
19 In the wake of this experience, Lendlease is committed to replicate the success with the regeneration project 
for Arexpo Milan. This is a €2bn urban regeneration project to redevelop 100 hectares in the periphery of Milan 
that hosted the EXPO 2015, and build the most important scientific and technological park for life sciences in 
Europe with an estimated population of 60,000 people. This is deemed to be the largest urban development 
project that has a social impact investment strategy designed in the masterplan from the beginning with the 
aim of aligning the prosperity of the community with the financial and economic success of the project. 
20 The resources made available for the revolving Fund for Enterprise Support and Investing in Research 
amount to € 200 million, and it represents a premiere in the Italian context: it is in fact the first time a similar 
financial scheme is oriented to support actors pursuing social purposes. The financial rules underlying the use of 
the fund foresee investments between €200,000 and €10 million. Entitled to these financial aids are social 
enterprises and social cooperatives, and the financing, with an interest rate subsidy of 0.50% with a 15-year 
refund, is available up to the 70% of costs for manufactured goods, machinery, computer programs, as well as 
specialist consultancy, patents and overheads. The remaining 30% is expected to be covered by trad itional 
credit services by the Italian banking system  
21 To this extent, is also important to consider that – as defined when describing the purpose of this study in 
Chapter 1 – social impact investment is not a mere set of financial tools for enhancing social economy: 
therefore, while some initiatives in the field of social economy might be considered as belonging to the domain 
of social impact investment, not all the social economy incentivising schemes are to be considered by definition 
social impact investments. 
 76 
 
The instrument, envisaged inside the measures of the “Priority Work” resolution 
approved by the regional executive in June 2016, will have an initial budget of €8 million 
(six from the “Social Inclusion Plan” of PO FSE-ESF-2014-20 and two by Axis III 
“Competitiveness of the production system” of PO FESR-ERDF-2014-20). The Fund 
invests, in the form of risk capital, in companies or organisations with the aim of 
generating measurable social, employment and environmental impact along with a 
financial return.  
The Social Impact Investment Fund will intervene by providing loans, venture capital or 
bond issuance in favour of projects aimed at creating positive social impacts, and to this 
extent, it seems to go beyond the logic of traditional grants: privates receiving resources 
through the fund are committed to return the amount of received funding as in the 
private equity logic.  
The logic is therefore that of revolving funds, which are self-generated through the 
repayment of funding. This feature combines private investors with the possibility of 
contemplating a remuneration system based on the results achieved, thanks to the 
savings coming from the use of the Fund’s resources, thus innovating with regard the 
traditional alternative funding instruments, believed more expensive and unable to 
regenerate funds through the return of the resources disbursed.  
Another interesting initiative, especially due to its institutional scope, is the National 
Outcome-Based Fund. On December 27th 2017, the Italian Parliament has issued its 
budgetary law (n. 205/2017), containing significant measures aiming to favour and 
strengthen social innovation in Italy in line with European standards. Among many 
provision, one envisaged the creation of a new Fund for Social Innovation. This fund was 
conceived as a support measure for the delivery of feasibility studies and the 
development of local and national public administrations’ capacities to implement 
contracting schemes informed by outcome-based principles and mechanisms.  
The new fund will have an initial budget of €5 million for 2018 and €10 million for 2019 
and 2020 each. Concrete functioning and access criteria of the fund should have been 
further specified in an Implementing Decree by the end of March 2018. This new fund 
represented a substantial change and a key opportunity for the Italian public welfare 
system.  
Despite the overall amount of money, quite limited in absolute terms, what seems to be 
innovative is the adopted approach. After years of debate, the Italian fund might have 
finally contributed to effectively start experimenting “payment by result” mechanisms, 
that are expected to increase the private sector involvement in the production of welfare 
services, their integration (inter-sectoral as well as intra-sectoral), and their 
measurability, at least spreading the culture of social impact assessment and evaluation. 
Moreover, this initiative reflects one of the most debated recommendations of the GSG, 
which advocated for “outcome funds” with the aim of attracting private capitals towards 
public administrations without replacing public resources, but integrating them and 
making them more efficient and effective. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that local authorities are also playing an active role, with 
an increasing interest for social impact investment especially conceived as a new 
approach to enable social innovation within local ecosystems. For instance, Torino Social 
Innovation is the first Italian municipal public programme that finances social start -ups 
through soft loans and grants. The Municipality of Milano, within the broader Smart City 
program, has supported the diffusion of social innovations to solve several urban issues, 
playing between social innovative incubator and urban regeneration projects. Other 
cities, such as Florence, are planning social innovation public programs (TIRESIA 2016).  
Considering the picture here proposed, with regard to the public side of initiatives on 
social impact investment, it can be argued that while some actions are being taken, or at  
least debated by public authorities, the overall landscape is characterised by a scattered 
plan of actions, in which each programme is a stand-alone initiative.  
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Moreover it seems that there is no clear vision on what social impact investment should 
support: social economy and social entrepreneurship, start-ups with some social impact, 
Third Sector organisations, or for-profit firms that however generate positive social 
impact. This confirms the analysis of the genealogy of the emergence of social impact 
investment phenomenon in Italy, which came as a sort of evolution of social finance, 
playing an enhanced role when combined with social innovation. However, the debate 
remains open, and the full development of an Italian social impact investment market will 
depend on three main directions that the prospective exercise so far conducted seems to 
highlight, as the following paragraph explains. 
 
5.3. Insights from the Italian social impact investment ecosystem 
5.3.1. Beyond the need for investment readiness and capacity building 
The current social economy structure demonstrates the potential existence of a new 
platform of investible social business models for an Italian social impact investment 
market. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that more research efforts are 
required to further profile and quantify the actual potential demand for social impact 
investment on a national scale. This effort, which requires extensive surveying of existing 
social entrepreneurship and profit-with-purpose initiatives, is crucial indeed.  
At the same time, given consideration to the peculiarities of the Italian socio-economic 
and institutional context, some trends that have been identified on a global level, might 
be recognised also in the Italian ecosystem: first, public and private collaborations 
represent a robust way to test new emerging application of the Social Impact Investing 
principles and logics; second, financial institutions, i.e. the supply-side of the social 
impact investment market, seem ready and available to mainstream impact -driven 
capital allocation strategies; third, venture capital is eager to follow initiatives in which 
technology’s role in social impact investment is clearer; fourth, grass roots strategies are 
emerging in addressing specific community needs. 
As shown in the previous paragraphs, the concrete positive evidence for a potentially 
performative Italian social impact investment market is a florid and dynamic social 
ecosystem, which animates and is transforming the social economy landscape. This is 
however true mainly on the private side, with a determinant role being played by 
foundations of bank origins, such as Fondazione Cariplo and Fondazione CRT. These 
actors have pioneered innovative processes migrating from a purely grant-making model 
to the creation of social impact investment funding lines. Some financial actors have also 
developed new financing vehicles and instruments for social enterprises that while 
making access to credit easier for social initiatives also shift them towards a more robust  
economic sustainability.  
However, there are at least a couple of challenges that this (potentially) performative 
social impact investment market still has to face. On the one hand, there is the 
investment readiness of potential investees of social impact investment. This means the 
need for further efforts in capacity building on the demand side of the rising market. On 
the other hand, and on a more general level, it seems useful to bring the debate ahead, 
overcoming a too narrow perspective on social impact investment: this is not a mere 
“moderniser” for the pre-existing Italian social finance, rather a set  of principles and 
approaches that develop their effects on a broader scope than the one related to Third 
Sector organisations.  
While the first challenge on investment readiness clearly brings to some specific and 
possible actions, oriented to support a capacity building process among the investment’s 
targets, the second challenge above mentioned is quite more demanding. In order to 
accept that the social impact investment conceptual perimeter is broader than the Third 
Sector’s one, a general rethinking of the relationships between finance, markets, and 
society needs to be developed among the involved stakeholders.  
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Then this might not be sufficient, if it will not reach decision-makers and those who have 
the power to shape the policy agenda. This depends on the fact that, despite the bottom-
up approach followed by the Italian social impact investment phenomenon, at a certain 
point this new emerging market will need to be envisaged within a broader political view, 
entering in such a way into an institutionalisation phase. 
5.3.2. Intangible infrastructures matter: the role of the public sector 
Although there is not a broad national strategy with regard to the role the public sector 
might play within transformative process of the Italian social economy sector, the few 
and very early-stage policy initiatives that come from national, regional, local 
governments or related quasi-public institutions, seem to show the public sector role will 
be crucial not only in terms of possible investments, rather in building and providing the 
extremely needed intangible infrastructure, i.e. the social impact measurement and a 
regulatory framework able to aggregate and organise the demand-side. 
These tasks might be carried out through various approaches and strategies, however, 
promoting benchmark practices in the social impact measurement domain, as well as a 
clearer legal discipline (also fiscal) are instrumental in enabling the Italian social impact  
investment ecosystems to flourish. 
In particular, a further aspect that directly involves the public sector in shaping the future 
of the Italian social impact investment market is mainly cultural: a general rethinking of 
public accounting principles, as well as exploring new forms of institutional arrangements 
and ad hoc created bodies, are both worth to be on the agenda. Regardless specific 
provision that might be adopted in the future, this will however contribute to the 
advancement of an evidence-based culture, benefiting the demand-side and the supply-
side of the future Italian social impact investment market, as well as the public 
administration and management practices, not to say its overall accountability . 
Moreover, it seems worth to notice that, as it comes out from the experimentations put  
in place by philanthropic foundations and all the mentioned cases of more genuine social 
impact investment pilots in the country, the project finance nature of such init iatives is 
clear, and needs to be taken into high consideration when looking at the evolution of 
social impact investment in Italy and its prospective scenario: in such a situation the role 
of the public sector is – once again – crucial.  
Insisting on the project finance nature of most of the promising social impact investment 
initiatives might also be a better way to keep the public sector in the game, while 
allowing it to enlarge the scope and boundaries of action of the Italian social impact 
investment ecosystem: the public sector’s role in fact is not just that of injecting capitals 
or enhancing financial leverages for Third Sector organisations, rather to shape strategic 
objectives and mission to be pursued by social impact investment approaches. To this 
extent the public sector, or better, the policymaker seems to be the only actor able to 
draw the line between social impact investment policies and other broader policies on 
social economy, entrepreneurship, and innovation.  
Finally, as a vehicle to build these intangible infrastructures, it is worth to notice how the 
procurement activities carried out by the public sector act as a demand-side stimulus 
that may push relevant actors to develop specific behaviours. To this extent, it is 
important to pay adequate attention also to the public procurement activities and related 
legal frameworks, as they will help to improve investment readiness and capacity 
building purposes, as well as to shape the required cultural shift mentioned above. 
5.3.3. Synergies between traditional and innovative economies  
The strong tradition of the Italian civil solidarity express itself mainly in the capillarity of 
the social economy initiatives, and it represents a positive peculiarity of the Italian 
ecosystems. However, such feature is also the reason explaining the fragmentation that 
characterises this world.  
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This negatively affects those actors that might work within the ecosystem, intermediating 
demand and supply: limitations deriving from this fragmented demand-side increase 
transaction costs, raising barriers related to the geography, the scale and the scope of 
those initiatives worth to be linked to the supply of finance. 
At the same time, despite the traditional Italian economy shares many features with the 
social economy, and it can be considered fragmented too, it shows a slightly more 
mature attitude towards financial products and services. Moreover, a further aspect to 
take into account is its local dimension and strong link with territorial dynamics and 
communities’ interests. These features might well work as communication channels 
through which investigating possible alliances between more traditional economic 
activities and those of the social economy. To this extent some experiences are emerging 
as benchmark initiatives, embedding social impact investment principles in more 
traditional economic fields, thus interiorising positive social externalities to their robust  
business model (see for instance the mentioned case of the Ospedal Grando in Treviso). 
In this sense, an alliance between initiatives and actors playing in the world of social 
economy, on the one hand, and the production chain of some relevant industries in the 
country, could be a promising field in which new financial instruments that incorporate 
social impact investment principles can be applied. Here lies the reason for this 
prospective effort, with which we attempted to identify – by way of example only – some 
industrial sectors of the Italian economy that could be coordination nexus of a mature 
Italian social impact investment market, therefore entry point for new financial 
instruments for which the social economy has expressed a growing interest and need.  
In the first place, we are thinking at the domain of water infrastructure, waste 
management and other public utilities: these sectors are characterised by quite high 
levels of intrinsic sociality, meaning with such an expression that in these domains, 
provided an adequate supply of patient capital, there is room to keep aligned social 
impact, represented by the public interest, and financial returns. This idea is furthermore 
supported by the fact that in Italy a large share of these markets is owned by publicly 
owned companies, playing de facto as profit -with-purpose entities, often in a quasi-
monopolistic context.  
Another industry that shows some relevant possible synergies with the Italian social 
economy is the one related to public interest infrastructure, urban regeneration and 
construction: as shown by some of the above mentioned cases, the field of real estate is 
an interesting area in which experimentation in linking social outcomes and profits has 
already taken place. 
In conclusion, this prospective scenario on the Italian social impact investment market, 
although it would require further data and more in-depth analysis, allows however to 
identify a possible path for developing a successful strategy for achieving a fully 
performative Social Impact Investing market: in Italy there are some traditional sectors 
that seem to be strongly suitable for the internalisation of social goals; by increasing, via 
capital supply, possible relationships between these sectors and the dynamic social 
economy, a social impact investment market might grow up pursuing its own goals while 
valuing also more traditional economic models. 
Despite the Italian social impact investment have so far developed within an important  
though limited conceptual perimeter, i.e. the one of the social economy and its traditional 
social finance, there are however interesting signs of a potential and significant 
expansion in the coming years. In part icular this is related to the possibility of assuming 
social impact investment principles as an approach in designing new business models and 
interventions in several industries. This also means that, on the one hand, the initial 
semantic scope of the concept is undergoing a quite substantial change, in terms of width 
and potential "application areas" – merging "physical and social infrastructures". On the 
other hand, the Italian social impact investment market will probably embrace a 
development path quite different than the Portuguese one, requiring different volumes 




6.1. Aligning interests and building new institutional frameworks 
As the first chapter indicates the theme of this report raises as much hope as 
uncertainties. Reflection of the dynamism and potential of this area but also of its infant  
stages and uncertainty is a conceptual pluralism that risks confusing more than clarifying. 
As we discussed in Chapter 1, social innovation and social impact investment have 
become two popular terms. They have come to embody a broad set of transformations in 
the public and private sectors approaches to societal challenges. In this respect, the very 
diverse set of policies and actors engaged in developing innovative approaches to 
address such transformations further contributes to the conceptual noise. It is therefore 
important to briefly recall and outline our understanding of those terms. 
Social innovation is a term developed in an almost organic form reflecting a diverse set of 
innovative ways to address new and old societal challenges. It calls the attention to 
innovations on social and environmental services and products or on the processes linked 
to such social services and products. As a consequence it challenges our understanding of 
how social goals can be pursued and attained and social policies funded and assessed.  
Social impact investment, instead, is a term that appears to have been originally coined 
by the Rockefeller Foundation in the United States, arguably to call the attention of 
investors, beyond financial return, to other forms of return on their investment 
associated to common and social goods. It aims to promote investment directed to 
produce social and environmental returns.  
We can say that the two terms "meet", in the sense that both aims at answering to 
increasing societal challenges by democratising how they are addressed at their input 
and output levels. In other words, by involving a broader set of actors and funding 
sources in the design and delivery of innovative solutions to those societal challenges.  
The ultimate goal is that of promoting social justice and welfare in the context of new 
social and financial challenges. These new challenges but also the new opportunities 
generated by innovative public and private ideas are leading the social agenda in new 
directions. The focus is on how to render social actions more sustainable, internalise 
social goods into market activity, promote outcome oriented public policies and private 
funding of social goods. These are the core goals of the social innovation and social 
impact investment agenda and the opportunities it generates. 
This innovation agenda expresses itself in new forms of providing common and social 
goods. It expands and transforms the social economy while changing the traditional 
paradigms of both the market and the public sector:  
 In the market context, it aligns market returns with social and environmental 
goals. In other words, it aims at promoting investment that incorporates social 
values side by side with financial returns. This is done either by making traditional 
social economy projects more financially sustainable or by supporting and 
facilitating investment in for-profit market projects that internalise a strong social 
or common goods impact. 
 In the public sector context, it introduces a results or outcomes oriented approach 
to public policies. In other words, instead of focusing on the provision of services, 
the State shifts its focus to the actual outcomes those services deliver. This has 
two immediate consequences: first, it shifts the metrics of public policies from 
how much of a certain service is provided to the actual results achieved by that  
service in the provision of the common and social goods; second, by paying for 
results the State creates a market for such outcomes, attracting private funding 
for public policies but also promoting a larger pool of ideas on how to provide and 




In Chapter 2 we highlighted a set of instruments that are being tested and implemented 
in the context of this renewed social innovation agenda and the transformations that it  
can generate. These transformations however do not happen in a segregated form. On 
the contrary, they are the product of an interaction between private and public actors. 
For a market in social impact investment to emerge public policies are key to incentivise 
and support the development of market supply for investing in social and impact oriented 
initiatives. On the other side, for these new public policies to be successful the capacity 
to mobilise new ideas and financing from the market is crucial.  
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the landscape of social impact investment is quite 
heterogeneous across Europe. The overall figure suggests social impact investment and 
the social innovation agenda are following different development paths in each Member 
State. This in turn brings to the attention a simple principle: in shaping any attempt to 
unleash the rise of a social impact investment market there is no one-size-fits-all 
strategy, as the market building process heavily relies on the context in which it takes 
place.  
The context is made by several socio-economic as well as institutional features, that 
shape times and forms of the social impact investment ecosystem. This dimension is 
crucial as it may provide different rationales and objectives for developing the social 
innovation and social impact investment agenda. This comes clear when looking at some 
interesting cases, such as Portugal and Italy, as described in details in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, and summarised in Table 14 below. 






Source: Own elaboration. 
Despite the differences that the contexts on which the cases are embedded clearly have, 
a series of common elements emerge from the analysis of the two experiences and the 
review of the social impact investment market in the EU and are at the core of the 
transformations taking place in the design, funding, delivery and evaluation of social 
goods. These are: innovation (new forms of planning, delivering and funding social 
services, products or processes); impact or results orientation (a focus on outcomes – 
the result actually achieved); proximity (these solutions tend to be initially tested and 
implemented at the level of decision making closer to the problem); integrated 
governance (they require the cooperation between different  actors in setting the right  
outcome metric and designing and delivering the solution); high scalability (testing and 
learning usually takes place on a small scale but can be easily replicated).  
It also involves a multiple set of diverse stakeholders: from public actors to private 
actors; from social economy entities to social enterprises; from organisations engaging in 
more incremental and process-centric innovation to organisations (social-start-ups) 
engaging in more disruptive product/service-centric innovation; from not-for-profit to for-
profit but impact oriented actors; from social services providers to investors. All these are 
part of the ecosystem necessary for successful social innovation. 
In this respect, the analysis undertaken in this research is applicable to multiple societal 
challenges and domains of what would fall under the definition of common or social 
goods. The conclusions stemming from the study in fact highlighted a number of key 
suggestions for introducing additional conceptual clarity to the field of social innovation.  
 Social innovation should refer to the transformations in the design, funding, 
delivery and evaluation of social services and products that share the following 
characteristics: innovation; outcomes oriented; integrated governance; proximity 
and usually bottom-up; highly scalable. Social impact investment refers to one 
dimension of social innovation: directing and mobilising public and private 
investment towards policies and services that are measured by their social impac t. 
 Social innovation should not be limited to social policy stricto sensu. It is 
applicable to a large and diverse number of public policies and societal changes, 
involving areas such as social protection but also education, health, justice, 
migration, climate change, etc. In sum, any area with social impact in terms of 
producing common or social goods. 
 Social innovation must be developed in an inclusive manner, engaging both 
traditional and non-traditional social stakeholders and public and private actors. A 
successful strategy needs to be successful in aligning, as much as possible, the 
interests of these different stakeholders. In this context, positive incentives, 
whenever possible, are clearly to be preferred to negative ones. Equally, creating 
an impact investment market and matching demand and supply therein requires 




6.2. Policy recommendations  
The analysis of the current state of maturity of the different ecosystems across Europe, 
as well as the specific focus on the two experiences in Portugal and Italy, allows three 
types of conclusions on the building of a social impact investment market, and some 
proposals for the revision of the regulations on the use of EU funds. 
6.2.1. Building a Social impact investment market 
Demand 
Social innovation depends on an ethos and a qualified demand that do not yet exist or at 
least lack the necessary critical mass. Social innovation, at the same time, creates and 
depends on the existence of a structured new market based on impact investment. This 
explains why, including in the more mature markets, even if many initiatives can be 
found, their relative weight in terms of social impact is largely insignificant when 
compared with traditional instruments.  
Social economy entities are traditionally path dependent on grants. Their operational 
model is not prepared for reimbursable funds and in most cases presents limited financial 
sustainability. As a consequence, often they are not well prepared to put forward social 
innovation projects. They are also naturally suspicious of the emergence of new actors 
into their domain of activity and of changes in how their work is assessed (from the easy 
and more immediate measurement of how much they provide of a certain service to what 
actual outcomes result from that service in the medium and long term). The existing 
deficit on organisational/management skills and competences of most of these 
organisations does not only prevent them from fully entering and benefiting from this 
new space of impact investment and social innovation. It often fuels their opposition.  
When they do overcome path dependence and the risks involved in innovating they often 
find out that, either traditional funding is not easily available for innovative projects, or 
that their nature often restricts their access to new financing instruments. They either 
finance themselves through an organic and patient growth or through the goodwill of 
traditional philanthropists – for instance foundations, corporations and high net-worth 
individuals. External financing of social innovation, through mainstream debt and equity 
finance is unaffordable due to their governance model or legal structure.  
Supply  
Critical mass is also absent with regard to impact oriented private investors. There are 
several reasons for this. Information costs on social innovation projects are high. The 
risks are even higher than with traditional venture investments in light of the character of 
social returns and their corresponding longer financial and more uncertain returns.  
Investors tend themselves to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit activities. 
The idea of expanding their investment in what they traditionally would treat as a not-
for-profit area is foreign to many of them. Thus, it is not strange for most investors to 
actually enter the impact investment as an extension of their t raditional philanthropic 
work. This should also be welcomed while developing a specific offer on social impact .  
In addition, traditional risk assessment instruments do not fit well the social sector where 
more moral oriented behaviour and stronger social capital will often provide better forms 
of risk assessment that are not, however, internalised in the existing financial 
instruments and investors practices. 
Institutional and Public Infrastructure 
With few exceptions, a comprehensive institutional and public framework is only slowly 
being introduced at the level of Member States and the European Union. Where this has 
been more successful it has often depended on strong political leadership, placed at the 
centre of government (crucial for the transversal nature of social innovation) and 
benefited from political continuity in these policies. 
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Even in the most success examples, however, are far from having achieved a full 
internalisation of the requirements of integrated governance and outcomes policies in the 
full scope of the administration. Neither do we have fully reliable and developed 
outcomes metrics systems. The public administration needs, itself, to change from a 
culture of welfare and public policies centred on outputs (on how much is provided or 
given of something) to a culture centred on outcomes (what are the results actually 
achieved). For this it is not enough to talk the talk of outcomes. Neither is it sufficient to 
develop results or outcomes indicators. Such indicators need to be reliable and genuinely 
outcome oriented and the link between the policy incentives and the outcomes must be 
established and guaranteed. 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a good example of both the enthusiasm and prudence 
with which we should address social innovation. On the one hand, they are promoting 
innovative successful new forms of addressing societal challenges and they do it with the 
initial engagement and risk of private capital. On the other hand, their number is still 
very small (so small as to even prevent any reliable sample from which to draw 
significant conclusions) and most do not seem to provide any important return on 
investment. In addition, metrics seem to be hard to design for some of these projects 
rendering difficult or at least contestable the assessment of outcomes. There is also more 
to be done in terms of transparency since we found less data on the metrics and 
outcomes than initially expected. 
SIBs also highlight the political risks involved in this area. In fact, the involvement of 
private actors in the funding or delivery of social services using these instruments, has 
led some to associate social impact investment and social innovation with privatisation. 
That should not be considered the case. First, social innovation private funded projects 
(such as SIBs) do not replace existing public services. They are complementary. One 
should not exclude, however, that, if successful they might come to be replicated and 
expanded by public authorities. One of the purposes (and advantages) of these type of 
social innovation projects is to test new solutions to social problems that, if successful, 
public authorities may later embrace or extend support for. Second, it should be noted 
that, contrary to other forms of public/private partnership, in these instances public 
money is only spent if the projects are successful and the outcomes reached. The risk is 
(must be) on the private investor. Third, there will be many cases where paying for 
results is applied to areas where the State was simply giving grants to private and social 
actors. What is done, in these cases, is to shift the way the State continues to fund these 
private actors’ activities by focusing on outcomes instead of outputs.  
Another potential political risk is associated with the deferring of costs. As mentioned, in 
some cases (particularly SIBs), an initial advantage for the State is that of not having to 
frontload the payment of the provision of a certain service. It will only do so if and when 
the result will be achieved. Naturally, if that is the case (and hopefully so because it 
would mean the contracted social outcome was achieved), this amounts to a deferral of 
costs. There is however a limited risk, if the metrics of the result will not be well 
established, that the State might pay more in the long term than the savings resulting 
from the social result attained. This is an inherent risk on any political decision where the 
benefit may be immediate and the cost deferred. It is crucial therefore for the 
measurement and impact assessment methodology to be solid so as to prevent that kind 
of distortive political incentive from emerging. Transparency as to the metric and 
indicators is crucial. The small scale of the initial projects is an additional control 
mechanism limiting such risks. 
From the analysis, the following recommendations have thus been drawn: 
 Adopt an inclusive strategy engaging both public and private actors and traditional 
and non-traditional social economy entities. This strategy should start by 
convening all those actors and decision makers from the public, private and social 
sector to design a national action plan. This will provide the basis for public action 
in terms of development of a comprehensive public policies framework. 
 85 
 
 Put in place a capacity-building strategy to help the transfer of both private and 
public social actors to the social innovation and social impact investment ethos: 
the new forms of action, impact assessment and sustainability enshrined in the 
social innovation agenda. 
 Clarify and expand the different types of social economy entities, including both 
not-for-profit and for-profit. Make the necessary legal amendments to the 
definitions and regulations of for-profit and not-for-profit actors so as to facilitate 
an expanded access to the social impact investment market. 
 Support the gaining of scale of potential actors or the emergence of new actors by 
venture philanthropy financing models such as the Portuguese EMPIS partnerships 
for impact. 
 Set up new outcome-based policy instruments such as SIBs or Pay-by-Results and 
supporting measurement instruments such as outcome labs and databases.  
 Have a fully transparent policy on the outcomes indicators used, the metrics 
developed and the process through which they are developed. 
 Promote a clearer articulation and complementarity between grants and financial 
instruments in light of the need for both that will continue to exist. This should 
include the testing of SIBs projects with both grants and innovative financial tools. 
 Develop the financial instruments necessary to correct the mismatch between the 
mainstream financial products currently being offered by finance institutions and 
the specific needs of the social innovation and social entrepreneurship projects 
(e.g. in terms of maturity, risk, interest rates, etc.).  
 Include wholesale financial instruments, so as to progressively put in place the 
private investment impact market necessary for a long term support of social 
innovation, not too dependent from the State. 
 Engage political support and transversal government involvement at the highest 
level. Ideally, the public agenda on social innovation should be coordinated from 
the centre of government and be uphold on an integrated governance model. As 
already mentioned, continuity of support across political cycles is also crucial.  
6.2.2. Reviewing ESIF regulations to unleash social innovation 
From the analysis emerged that more mature ecosystems tend to depart from a reality 
where there is either a strong tradition of social economy organisations that can be 
progressively mobilised towards social impact investment and the principles of social 
innovation, or the existence of a set of transformative new agents or investors leaders 
that have often transitioned from the pure for-profit market into a more socially oriented 
market. Market champions indeed play a crucial role in the more successful cases. 
Equally important is the support of a well-developed and comprehensive public policies 
framework. Within this context, European funds should create incentives for the correct 
development of this public framework as well as help leveraging national funds. European 
Structural and Investments Funds (ESIF) in particular, are crucial instrument to finance 
social innovation and steer the necessary changes in the ecosystem and the public 
policies necessary for developing a social impact investment market .  
Social innovation is a transversal priority of ESIF and this fits the results orientation 
currently enshrined in the EU budget and structural funds. The role of ESIF becomes 
more relevant and essential once we take into account the increasing pressure on 
Member States public budgets and soc ial expenditure, hindering the necessary initial 
funding to promote such a change. To this extent, available research in the field has 
shown that EU resources allow introducing new policy frameworks challenging existing 
policy approaches, to experiment with new policy instruments and to promote – 
according to the leverage effect of multi-level governance mechanisms – local players 
preferred policy options (Sabato & Verschraegen 2016). 
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But some adjustments to the current ESIF regulations are considered necessary to 
facilitate this role and really match the rhetoric of results orientation with the set of 
instruments and incentives resulting from the implementation of ESIF rules.  
As both the Portuguese case study and the Italian prospective scenario exercise highlight 
there are some implementation barriers to the use of ESIF in promoting social impact 
investment, as summarised in Table 15 below. 
Table 15 – Issues and policy recommendations on ESIF  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In addition, specific modalities for the review of the compliance with State Aid rules 
should be developed in order to reduce the need for additional State aid notifications at 
later stages of the implementation process. This could also include, perhaps, defining 
new domains of block exemptions for key emerging areas such as Financial Instruments 
targeting social innovation and social entrepreneurship. Current regulatory uncertainty 




6.2.3. Strengthening synergies between ESIF and EFSI 
The European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI)22 is a fund that intends to help 
overcome the current investment gap in the EU, by proving a €16 billion worth guarantee 
from the EU budget, complemented by a €5 billion allocation of the European Investment 
Bank (EIB)’s own capital, to support projects that though economically viable have a 
higher risk profile than usually taken on by EIB. So, following usual EIB procedures, EFSI 
finances projects in domains of key importance for the EU, which also include the main 
areas of intervention of ESIF Financial Instruments, such as support to SMEs and mid-
caps, urban regeneration, and more recently microfinance and social innovation.  
EFSI and ESIF funds can be coordinated at least in three forms: EFSI supports a project  
that benefits from ESIF grant; EFSI supports a project that benefits from a ESIF financial 
instrument; or EFSI and ESIF can jointly establish a financial instrument at the wholesale 
or retail level. The latter can have a substantial leveraging effect with respect to national 
programmes funded by European Structural Funds (both by the use of ESIF funds and by 
attracting private investment). But it can also help in the capacity-building and 
governance dimensions that may lack at national level and in overcoming the geographic 
and thematic limitations to which ESI funds are subject to.  
In managing the EFSI, the EIB has been assuming an increasing role in supporting 
development of Financial Instruments (FIs) at the request and on behalf of several 
Member States (JESSICA and JEREMIE funds managed at Member State level, the 
already EU centrally managed SME Initiative, etc.). Direct management of Member State 
ESIF FIs by EIB has been perceived as a more favourable alternative for Member States 
with no previous FIs experience or installed implementation capability.  
It also represented a faster (though usually more expensive and standardised) set-up 
option for Member States ESIF FIs. In fact, as EIB is subject to previous global 
Commission clearance procedures it does not have to abide by the same lengthy and 
often limiting public procurement procedures or State aid rules of other similar players 
managing FIs at Member States level, even in cases where EIB is managing ESIF and 
Member State public resources on Member State behalf.  
This is not, however, deprived of problems: while the Commission is pushing Member 
States for setting-up FIs in key areas to overcome market failures and closing investment 
gaps, it is also promoting a major EU-wide centrally managed FIs active in those same 
areas, for the exact same purpose. In particular, by relying on an easier route with 
asymmetric (and more favourable) rules, it not only increases the potential for overlap, 
but also exponentially rises the risk of cannibalising and crowding out the national FIs 
that in most cases the EIB, jointly with the Commission, was helping to set -up, 
implement and, in some cases, even directly managing. 
In light of these risks the Commission has made efforts to develop a framework 
strengthening ESIF FIs/EFSI complementarity, although apparently favouring alternatives 
where Member States ESIF FIs leverage and are subordinated to EFSI FIs investments. 
These new rules have materialised in the 2016 COM proposal for an Omnibus regulation 
on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (including 
amendments to ESIF rules, namely to rules applying to ESIF FIs)23.  
It was in fact crucial to develop a clear strategy for the coordination and complementarity 
of Member States and EU FIs. An EFSI instrument managed at EU level offers more 
expertise, lower capture risks, fast results, standardisation, effectiveness, scale and 
                                     
22 http://www.eib.org/efsi/what-is-efsi/index.htm  
23 COM (2016) 605: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and amending Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002, 
Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, EU No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1305/2013, 
(EU) No 1306/2013, (EU) No 1307/2013, (EU) No 1308/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) 
No 223/2014,(EU) No 283/2014, (EU) No 652/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision 




concentration of scarce resources while ESIF Member States FIs offer a proximity 
necessary for better ecosystem knowledge and development, flexibility, resilience, long 
term sustainability and stronger public policy alignment. These two realities are expected 
to coexist and complement each other in most Member States. But they can also develop 
joint financial instruments. ESIF is in fact starting to contribute directly to EU-level FIs. 
This is positive but also risks inverting the traditional “center-periphery” financial flow 
and reshaping Cohesion Policy, at least in what concern FIs.  
A better allocation of tasks is thus necessary in light of the different added values such 
fund has. This might be for example reflected in a governance model where the EIB 
would focus on capacity-building/technical assistance and an evaluation of the incentives 
structures in terms of outcomes and its assessment while management would rest with 
national authorities. 
In this regard, a recommendation emerged from the analysis: 
 Following the adoption of the Omnibus Regulation, use the corresponding revision 
of ESIF FIs guidance notes, as well as the development of new EFSI FIs guidelines 
as an opportunity for establishing a level playing field between ESIF Member 
State-level FIs and EFSI EU-level FIs, establishing a uniform set of procedures, 
transparent checks and balances mechanisms that assure effective ESIF/EFSI 
complementarity as well as, where joint FIs would be developed, a governance 
mechanism differentiating between capacity-building and outcomes “policing” (to 
be placed at EU level) on the one hand and management (to be placed at national 
level) on the other. 
At the same time, there are already examples of EFSI and ESIF joint financial 
instruments. They are projects where EFSI supports, together with ESIF, a national 
financial instrument addressed at that national market. In other words, while this might 
help increase the available funds for setting up a financial instrument at national level it 
does not, in itself, does much to increase the attraction of private investment into that 
financial instrument and the social impact investment market.  
In light of the infant nature of the social impact investment market, the current limited 
number of potential investors and the high information and transactions costs in this 
market at this stage, it would be interesting to study a slightly different alternative in this 
area according to the following recommendation: 
 EFSI could create a European financial instrument for social impact investment 
attracting private investment for social innovation and impact oriented projects. 
This European financial instrument would then work jointly with national financial 
instruments in selecting national investment funds or specific projects (depending 
on the wholesale or retail nature) to be jointly financed. The advantage of this 
model would be to have a European wide approach to the attraction of private 
investment for social impact investment in different Member States. The 
involvement of the EIB expertise would also raise trust in private investors at that  
level of the market. Finally, the creation of such financial instrument (that could 
be called the European Fund for Social Innovation and Impact Investment 24) 
would also provide a much needed visibility at the European level to the social 
innovation and social impact investment agenda. To this extent it would be helpful 
a study of the current Social Impact Accelerator, that has some, but not all or the 
same characteristics of what is suggested here25. 
                                     
24 This proposal clearly reflects another idea circulated among experts and related to the establishment of 1 
billion Outcome Payment Fund to address current EU challenges  (see e.g. Addarii and Lipparini 2017),  
presented and discussed by the authors of this report with Sir Ronald Cohen and Karl Richter among others, 
during the event “Opening Up to an Era of Social Innovation : High-Level Conference”, jointly organised by the 
Directorate General Research and Innovation and the Directorate General Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion in November 2017 Lisbon, Portugal. 
25 The Social Impact Accelerator seems in fact aimed at private investors at national level. 
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6.3. Towards the next EU Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
Insights from the analysis and policy recommendations offered above aim at contributing 
to the on-going debate on the design of the next EU Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
(MMF), especially with regard to the use of EU funds in the next programming period.  
As a matter of fact this exploratory research aimed since its inception at contributing to 
such debate and, along the research journey, some pieces of the analysis fed – and in 
turn have been influenced by the discussion on hown to shape the EU budget proposal.  
Recommendations have been in fact elaborated against the legal framework adopted for 
the programming period 2014-2020. However, they are still valid, also due to the fact 
that are formulated in general terms, addressing general principles that so far have 
affected ESIF functioning. At the same time, since we are currently in a transition phase, 
moving towards the programming period 2021-2027, it is reasonable to briefly conclude 
looking at the upcoming picture for the next MFF in light of this research’s findings. 
To the best of our knowledge, the next MFF will be shaped, to the extent of what here is 
of concern, by two relevant proposals now under discussion. On the one hand, there is 
the new proposal for ESIF; on the other hand, the European Commission has presented a 
proposal for the next MMF with regard to the new EFSI. 
Looking at the proposal for the new European Social Fund, named European Social Fund 
Plus (ESF+), it is worth to notice that  – in line with the policy context depicted in 
Chapter 1 – it has been presented as the EU’s main instrument to implement the 
European Pillar of Social Rights. The new ESF+ will therefore focus its investment in 
three main areas: education, employment and social inclusion. 
Moreover, the ESF+ makes the case with its article 13 for a strengthened effort in 
unleashing the social innovation agenda, as set out in this report. According to the 
proposal, in fact, «each Member State needs to dedicate at least one priority to support 
actions of social innovation and social experimentation or bottom-up approaches based 
on partnerships involving public authorities, private sector and civil society» (European 
Commission 2018a). 
With regard to the need of improving access to the fund, the new ESF+ proposal merges 
different existing funds and programmes (the ESF, the Youth Employment Initiative, the 
Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, the Employment and Social Innovation 
programme, and the Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health. 
The merger of these funds and programmes seems in line with the need of streamlining 
and simplifying existing legal provisions across the different funds – as suggested in 
Chapter 6, increasing possible synergies between the different elements of the ESF+. 
Along with a strengthened link with the European Semester process as well as with the 
principles of the already mentioned European Pillar of Social Rights, this simplification 
seems to aim at a stronger internal consistency of the overall ESF+, enhancing its role as 
a policy tool to foster and steer the Social Dimension of the EMU. 
In line with the recommendations advanced with regard to the reimbursement of eligible 
costs, the ESF+ proposal brings a major novelty that seems able to make it easier for 
national ESF authorities and project implementers to report and indicate costs: «the 
ESF+ Regulation will notably broaden the use of simplified cost options for reimbursing 
Member States on the basis of lump sums or standard costs previously agreed with the 
Member States» (European Commission 2018a). 
Sometimes the pricing of social interventions, especially when particularly innovative, is 
not easy, indeed. In these cases, the ESF+ Regulation proposal advance the idea that the 
Commission «will itself propose an average price for some standard measures […], based 
on data from all Member States while taking into account national contexts», and then it 
«would reimburse each Member State a specified amount once a […] measure has been 
successfully completed» (European Commission 2018a).  
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While this gives space for more innovative approaches to be adopted, it also confirms the 
nature of the ESF+ as a tool to support the upward social convergence of EU Member 
States. Furthermore, this new approach in pricing innovative interventions may also act 
as a way to easier the spread of social innovation across different EU Member States.  
In addition, as also reported by article 46 of the Common Provisions Regulation, and then 
specified with provisions of article 89, the ESF+ Regulation makes use of the new option 
to reimburse Member States on the basis of the achievement of results. This is a major 
change as it contributes to move from the output-logic to the outcomes’ one. 
Such changes seem promising for a more effective support of social innovation and social 
impact investment, especially when considered along with other aspects of the ESF+ 
proposal, in particular the fact that also monitoring and reporting requirements will be 
significantly reduced, and data collection requirements will be simplified. 
The new ESF+ and the new Common Provisions Regulation are not however the only 
promising pillars of the next MFF. In fact, in June 2018 the European Commission 
released a proposal for an InvestEU Fund, to replace the current EFSI. 
According to the Commission, the InvestEU Programme «will bring together under one 
roof the multitude of EU financial instruments currently available and expand the 
successful model of the Investment Plan for Europe, the Juncker Plan» (European 
Commission 2018b). The overall objective of the InvestEU proposal is to «further boost 
investment, innovation and job creation, triggering an estimated €650 billion in additional 
investment» (European Commission 2018b). 
Several innovative aspects have been embedded in the InvestEU proposal, and to this 
extent the new plan, although building on previous experiences and still keeping the form 
of a guarantee scheme, it differs significantly with regard to the previous EFSI. In 
addition to a clear simplification of the Financial Instruments (FIs), with a move from a 
system composed by a multitude of FIs to a single EU investment support scheme, one of 
the most relevant novelties the InvestEU proposal brings is its internal organisation in 
four thematic policy windows (the previous EFSI had two): (1) sustainable 
infrastructures; (2) research and innovation; (3) small-medium enterprises; and (4) skills 
and social investment. 
The thematic policy window on “Skills and Social Investment”, also known as “the social 
window” envisages a €4 billion guarantee that is expected to leverage up to €50 billion to 
finance projects in areas such as (i) skills, education and training; (ii) social housing, 
schools, universities, hospitals; (iii) social innovation; (iv) healthcare, long-term care and 
accessibility; (v) microfinance; (vi) social enterprises; and (vii) integration of migrants, 
refugees and vulnerable people. 
Importantly, and beyond the mere list of topics here reported, this thematic policy 
window of the InvestEU Fund is explicitly linked to the goal of delivering on the European 
Pillar of Social Rights (European Commission 2018b), thus giving the guarantee and its 
social window a clear policy mandate/purpose. This is in fact one of the key features of 
the new proposal, as it results at least from two aspects. 
First, as argued by Rubio and Virel, «the choice for a lower investment target and a more 
conservative provisioning rate […] reflects the Commission´s willingness to shift the 
focus from quantity (mobilising a major volume of private investment in a short period of 
time) to quality (crowding in private investment in specific sectors or projects of high 
policy added value which suffer from persistent market failures)» (2018).  
This less emphasis on volumes26 depends on the improved economic context, where 
investment levels in Europe are practically in line with pre-crisis levels. Thus the role of 
public intervention – also in line with the momentum gained by the mission-oriented 
26 EFSI aimed to mobilise €500 billion of additional investments from 2015 to 2020 (multiplying by 15 the 
amount of the EU guarantee), while the InvestEU Fund’s target is to mobilise €650 billion additional 
investments over seven-year period (a 13.7 multiplier). 
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policy approach advocated among others by Mazzucato (2016) – and with specific regard 
to Social Policy Innovation by Misuraca et al. 2017 – is seen as a tool to enhance 
investments in strategically relevant policy areas, according to a strengthened and 
thoroughgoing concept of additionality.  
Second, as illustrated in the InvestEU´s impact assessment, the decision of allocating the 
InvestEU resources to four thematic policy windows relies on «policy prioritisation, 
absorption capacity, and the size of the investment gaps» (European Commission 
2018b). And this “policy re-prioritisation” principle seems to explain in particular the 
significant increase of funding for projects under the InvestEU social window, also taking 
on board recommendations from the recent report of the High-Level Task Force on 
Investing in Social Infrastructure, where – not by chance – experts made the point for 
boosting investment for inclusive growth also dedicating a relevant part of the study to 
the social impact investment phenomenon, in particular to Social Impact Bonds (Fransen 
et al. 2018). 
These assonances and frequent recalls to social impact investment and the revival of the 
Social Dimension of the EU as a key policy objective are signs of a renewed political 
commitment. As illustrated in the previous paragraph and emerged from the analysis of 
the Portuguese and Italian experiences, this commitment is crucial to build a social 
impact investment market.  
However, in the InvestEU proposal there are more than assonances with the topics of 
social innovation and social impact investment. In fact, and in line with some of the 
policy recommendations advanced above, it is worth noticing that several issues related 
to EFSI governance mechanisms have been addressed. 
According to the new InvestEU proposal, a major change is related to the implementation 
of the guarantee: this will not be exclusively entrusted to the EIB, as it was with EFSI. 
Rather the proposal envisages a plurality of eligible implementing partners. In fact, the 
InvestEU proposal foresees a direct access to the guarantee «to new partners, 
particularly International Financial Institutions (IFIs) active in Europe (such as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Developments, EBRD, the World Bank or the 
Council of Europe Development Bank) and National Promotional Banks and Institutions 
(NPBIs)» (Rubio and Virel 2018). 
This would mean for the Commission to have the possibility to work with other 
implementing partners, as above suggested in mentioning some of the EFSI possible 
improvements. In fact, «giving access to the EU guarantee to other public players with 
different expertise and geographic scope can help extend the reach of the new Fund to 
sectors or regions under-served by EFSI» (Rubio and Virel 2018). 
The proposal of opening the implementation of the EU guarantee to new actors, closer to 
the local level intervention, such in the case of social innovation and social impact 
investment is in line with what discussed above in shaping the policy recommendations 
on possible synergies between EFSI and ESIF, as well as on the opportunity to facilitate 
combination of EU-level instruments and national and regional promotional schemes,  
Finally, and yet on the possible synergies between the InvestEU social window and ESIF, 
it is worth to notice that the InvestEU proposal envisages more incentives to transfer part 
of Member States’ cohesion funds to the EU level. In particular, according to the new 
scheme, Member State-level authorities can appoint their own Promotional Bank to set-
up and implement financial instruments covered by the EU guarantee, thus lowering the 
risk of inverting the traditional “center-periphery” financial flow, and improving the 
allocation of tasks among different governance levels. 
In view of these important changes in the structure, governance and modes of 
implementation, and with the purpose of supporting the further development of a social 
impact investment market, insights and recommendations drawn by this exploratory 
study on financing strategies and outcomes oriented approaches for a new generation of 
innovative social policies in the EU also set the ground for future research directions.  
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On a more theoretical level, what the social impact investment discourse seems to be 
missing, due to its pragmatic origins, is a direct reference to a theory of justice and a 
broader institutional theory, i.e. its link with current transforming institutions such as the 
State and the market. A possible direction to look at this is the one became particularly 
popular in recent times and that goes under the name of mission-oriented policy 
(Mazzucato 2016). This approach, in line with some of the novelties brought by the new 
InvestEU proposal, postulates that «rather than focusing on particular sectors – as in 
traditional industrial policy – mission-oriented policy focuses on problem-specific societal 
challenges, which many different sectors interact to solve». 
This conceptual approach seems to better envision, justify, measure and assess public  
investments, working within an ecosystem of public, private and Third Sector actors 
across the innovation chain. For this reason a mission-oriented policy approach focuses 
on the role of the State as shaping and creating markets, not only fixing them. It a lso 
enables the development of economic policy to be informed by a broader theoretical 
underpinning that needs to be explored. Such a research endeavour might contribute to 
a general rethinking of the current dynamics between the market and the State as 
advocated by many well-known scholars (Mazzucato & Jacobs 2016; Stiglitz, Sen, 
Fitoussi 2009) but also advanced as part of the IESI research under the concept of Social 
Policy Innovation by Misuraca et al. 2017. 
To this extent, a renewed effort in investigating the potential theoretical underpinnings of 
social impact investment also suggests that worth to be explored is of course the issue of 
assessing, evaluating, and – probably of utmost importance – managing social impact. 
On this point, however, it should be kept in mind that one of the main challenges here is 
the pricing of invested capital against the generation of social impact.  
This contribution, which could build on the concept of "Implied impact" (Evenett and 
Richter 2012), brings to a more empirical level, suggesting at least two directions worth 
to be mentioned. First, it is needed to further develop a social impact investment market  
ecosystem maturity index, with clear and well defined variables to formulate testable 
hypotheses on patterns and stages through which the market develops. Second, and with 
the purpose of gathering robust empirical evidence, a direction of research worth to be 
explored is the one that map policy actions undertaken by governments at  different 
levels, in order to allow comparative studies, taking into considerations diverse 
institutional settings and policy design approaches of each analysed case and system. 
To this extent, we see different research efforts that might be useful to carry out, in 
order to broadly define a research agenda for developing a monitoring tool/observatory 
of EU funds for social innovation and social impact investment. This monitoring system 
should feature some key functions, being able to (1) keep track of the performance of 
the InvestEU social window; (2) assess the actual additionality of funding moved by the 
InvestEU guarantee; (3) identifying best practices and most performing funded projects; 
(4) studying and analysing most promising cases to grasp success factor and thus 
provide expert support to the InvestEU Fund Steering Board, the Policy Boards and the 
relevant independent Investment Committee, and give guidance to the use of available 
resources for technical assistance. 
Building on this approach, as well as leveraging on the methodological contribution 
offered by this research (see Chapter 3) it would be also possible to consider developing 
a more sophisticated framework, integrating a detailed taxonomy for the type of policy 
tools under use in each country as well as some more quantitative indicators. This 
assessment framework, acting as the backbone of the broader monitoring 
tool/observatory, incorporating social impact investment measurement and management 
principles and concepts such as the Implied Impact (Richter 2012) should represent the 
basis for setting up a macro-prudential stability index, intended to reduce homogeneity 
of global financial system through adding a variable in standard calculations, thus making 
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